1. The Many and Conflicting Meanings of Σοφιστής
Most modern treatments of the sophists assert that there existed in fifth- and fourth-century Greece a distinct group of individuals called sophists (σοφισταί).  Such studies often mention in passing that the term had an earlier, less pejorative undertone, but that by the end of the fifth century a new class of people had emerged who appropriated the term for their practices.  Once this group had established itself, the old, complimentary connotation fell out of use. This new class of practitioners of wisdom is meticulously distinguished from other groups, such as the Presocratics, Platonists, Aristotelians, medical writers, and poets.  Although modern treatments occasionally disagree over who should be included in and excluded from the different groups, they generally concur on the establishment of taxonomies consisting of distinct types of individuals. But it is far from clear that this classificatory system accurately expresses historical practices, or that the ancients consistently employed strict categories that referred to clearly identifiable classes of people. It is equally unclear that the historical emergence of the sophists once and for all fixed the semantic range of the term σοφιστής, so that it thereafter referred only to one clearly defined group of people. Against this backdrop, is sophist still a meaningful category?
There is compelling evidence that the term σοφιστής was contested in antiquity, especially in the works of Plato and Isocrates. It is thus problematic for moderns to treat this term as if it were a neutral classification—thereby removing it from its original, contentious context. The use of σοφιστής is intertwined with the development of increasingly specialized practices within the field of sophia and the corollary struggles over the appropriation of the terms philosophia and philosophos.  If the term sophist occurred in a struggle over cultural and intellectual authority—where it was employed (mainly by Plato) to denigrate certain sophoi as less legitimate—then the uncritical adoption of Platonic terminology effectively runs the risk of taking sides in an ideologically driven battle over legitimacy. 
Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle ultimately won the struggle over definition, and the pejorative designation of certain sophoi as sophists has become the “historical” truth. But this truth still does not support our embrace of the term as inevitable. Instead, we must seek to recreate the range of possible intellectual positions available at the time as well as the various points of contention among them; that is, our job is not to perpetuate the Platonic victory of classification, but rather to examine the conditions under which the term “sophist” came to be attached to certain individuals with derogatory connotations. 
For the moment, however, I hope to show only that the almost universal modern adoption of the definitions of “sophist” and “sophistry” advocated by the Platonic tradition has been instrumental in balkanizing a number of practitioners of wisdom as fundamentally different—frequently with a derogatory subtext.  By the Platonic tradition, I mean to imply two (not necessarily mutually exclusive) groups of writers: those who for the most part agree with Plato’s characterization of the sophists, such as Xenophon and Aristotle; and those whose accounts of the sophists seem for the most part to be derived directly from the first group, such as Philostratus, Olympiodorus, and Themistius. In contrast to the wide-ranging use of the term “sophist” in antiquity, the modern employment of the label seems to perpetuate a particular point of view at the expense of other applications. As a result, the historical validity of the term as an intellectual category is deeply problematic. To make this point more compelling, however, it is necessary first to examine in greater detail the ancient uses of the label “sophist.” Next, we shall turn to Plato to scrutinize the intellectual genealogy he proposes for the sophists and the role he assigns them in the Greek wisdom tradition. In the final part of the chapter, we shall consider Isocrates’ alternative understanding of the label “sophist.” This exploration will help us appreciate the rival views of sophists in antiquity and simultaneously caution us against assuming a uniform meaning that consistently referred to a specific set of individuals.
The Ancient Use of Σοφιστής
Our starting point for the examination of the ancient use of σοφιστής will be the statement by Diogenes Laertius to the effect that originally the term sophist was used interchangeably with sophos (οἱ δὲ σοφοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ ἐκαλοῦντο, 1.12).  Some scholars have used this statement as evidence that in early Greek society σοφιστής was indistinguishable from σοφός, and that only later, with the emergence of a novel group of practitioners of wisdom (Gorgias, Protagoras, and the rest), it took on a new, specialized meaning.  This “limited” meaning was from then on consistently applied to these figures, although the old, “indeterminate” sense was occasionally still in use.  However, it was the association with the new group of thinkers that gave it its pejorative ring, similar to the modern connotations of “sophistry” and other similar derivatives. According to this explanation, there is a precise shift from a general to a specific meaning, a process that seems to mirror the concomitant process of intellectual specialization in Greek society. But does this account hold up under scrutiny? Can we detect in our sources a shift in the application of the word σοφιστής that is coexistent with the figures traditionally referred to as the sophists?
Herodotus, a contemporary of many sophists but whose area of interest lay in past events, seems to express well the older, general meaning of the word. He refers to a number of different people as σοφισταί: Solon and the sages who visited Croesus at Sardis (1.29.1), Pythagoras (4.95.2), and Melampus and his followers, who are said to have introduced Dionysus to the Greeks (2.49.1). Indeed, σοφιστής is a fairly common attribute of the early Greek sages, especially of the Seven Sages. But it was in no way limited to this group. Starting out from Kerferd’s classification of the earlier uses of the word σοφιστής (that is, with reference to figures that predated the sophists), we can see that in addition to the Seven Sages and early wise men it was frequently used to refer to poets, musicians, soothsayers and other religious experts, and Presocratic philosophers.  Kerferd concludes that, as opposed to the more open-ended application of σοφία and σοφός, “the term σοφιστής is confined to those who in one way or another function as the Sages, the exponents of knowledge in early communities.”  Elsewhere he appears to link the notion of function as crucial to the sophists by emphasizing that their most distinguishable feature was professionalism.  Both George Grote and Alexander Grant had anticipated him in stressing function and professionalism: “they had nothing in common except their profession, as paid teachers,” writes Grote, who, on the grounds that there was no doctrinal cohesion among the sophists, rejects the use of the descriptive term “die Sophistik” and instead restricts his discussion to a “community of profession.”  Grant follows suit: “At first the word σοφιστής was used in an intermediate sense to denote any one ‘who by profession practiced or exhibited some kind of wisdom or cleverness;’ thus it was applicable to philosopher, artist, musician, and even poet.”  According to this view, the sophists inherited the functional aspects of their predecessors and developed them towards a purer form of professionalism. This process is the crucial link between them: the sophists did not necessarily share in the content of their predecessors’ teaching, but they extended their functional roles as exponents of wisdom. And it was the hyper-professionalism of the sophists that helped cause the term’s subsequent depreciatory tinge.
Others have turned to the history of the word σοφιστής to find more specific predecessors to the sophists. Werner Jaeger, Wilhelm Nestle, and John Morrison, for example, conclude that the sophists were the inheritors of the early Greek poetic legacy, since Homer, Hesiod, Solon, and Simonides were all referred to by that name, and since the sophists all seemed to continue the educational vocation of the poets.  The reason for the shift of the word σοφιστής from the poets to the sophists—from poetry to prose—was that “the didactic function came to be more and more fulfilled through this medium.” 
But all these conclusions rest on the assumption that there is a clear break in the use of the term σοφιστής in the second half of the fifth century BCE, when the sophists established themselves as a new kind of practitioner of wisdom, and that only the pre-sophistic uses are illustrative of its wider range of connotations. It is my contention that this is an artificial demarcation, and that the time limit imposed on the examples considered is problematic. Instead, I would like to reconsider the use of σοφιστής well into the second half of the fifth century and beyond, without making any a priori assumptions about its application. We must thus be open to the possibility that the sophists did not constitute the end stage of the semantic development of the word σοφιστής, but that it could continue to be used—even after the emergence of the “sophistic movement”—to refer to a broad group of people. More specifically, we shall focus on its continued use in respect to “philosophers,” that is, to those practitioners of wisdom we traditionally refer to as Presocratics, Socratics, Aristotelians, etc.
Many of the so-called Presocratic philosophers were referred to as σοφισταί.  Diogenes of Apollonia (a contemporary of Herodotus), for example, labels the (Ionian) natural philosophers (φυσιόλογοι) sophists.  Xenophon (Memorabilia 1.1.11) calls those who engage in natural investigations and discussions about the cosmos by the same name, and elsewhere (Memorabilia 4.2.1) he mentions that Euthydemus had collected many works of the renowned poets and σοφισταί, presumably referring to the Presocratics.  Isocrates attests that Pericles studied with two sophists, Anaxagoras and Damon. Later he warns students not to get too caught up in the subtleties of the early sophists, and he mentions Empedocles, Ion, Alcmaeon, Parmenides, Melissus, and Gorgias as examples of this group.  Diodorus Siculus (12.39.2) also refers to Anaxagoras as Pericles’ teacher and a σοφιστής, as does Athenaeus (5.220b), though without mentioning Pericles. Finally, Plato (Meno 85b), in an apparent reference to the mathematicians, labels them σοφισταί.
The frequent application of the word σοφιστής continues in reference to figures who were contemporaries of the sophists, like Socrates and Isocrates, and in reference to figures who succeeded them, like Aeschines the Socratic and Aristotle. In Aristophanes’ Clouds (360–361), the chorus professes that Prodicus and Socrates are the foremost of the astrological sophists (μετεωροσοφισταί). But it is not only Aristophanes who refers to Socrates as a sophist; Androtion  and the orator Aeschines (1.173)—only some fifty years after Socrates’ death—also call him by that name.  A number of Socrates’ disciples (the so-called Socratics) were categorized as sophists: Lysias thus designates Aeschines, Aristotle uses the term in reference to Aristippus, and Xenophon in reference to Antisthenes.  Isocrates is called a sophist by Plutarch (Quaestiones Convivales 1.1); and to judge from Isocrates’ defensive attitude against his detractors in the Antidosis, it seems reasonable to assume that Plutarch had many predecessors in that practice.  Isocrates, in turn, delivers an attack against what seem to be Plato’s Laws and Republic in To Philip (12), where he dismisses them as sophistic works.  Lysias also calls Plato a sophist.  Timon is less discriminating in his use of the term: he labels all philosophers—Plato and Aristotle included—sophists.  Finally, Timaeus in his abuse of Aristotle refers to him as a pedantic sophist (σοφιστὴς ὀψιμαθής). 
As is clear from this survey, the word σοφιστής was in use in reference to a wide category of sophoi both during and after Plato’s lifetime. Its broad continuous application is an indication that Plato’s restricted use of the term was neither in general use nor universally accepted.  It does not seem that the word went through a substantial change or crystallization in its definition after the emergence of the sophists. Indeed, in light of these other examples, a question is raised about Plato’s generally privileged position as a witness for the meaning of σοφιστής.  This privileged position is further questioned when considering two crucial passages where Plato seems to advance a double, false genealogy of the sophists.
Plato’s Sophistic Genealogy
Kerferd is illustrative of why we need to exert critical vigilance against adopting Plato’s classification of the sophists. When talking about their most distinguishable feature, their professionalism, Kerferd refers to the testimony of Plato in the Hippias Major (282c–d),  where Socrates says that the sophists were the first to charge money for their services, and that none of the people of old (οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐκεῖνοι) thought fit to do that.  But Kerferd fails to notice the false genealogy of the sophists that Plato advances immediately preceding this passage in the Hippias Major. There Socrates asks Hippias why sages of old—as opposed to the sophists—refrained from participating in politics:
In the same spirit we should re-examine the historical validity of Plato’s claim that Thales, Pittacus, and Bias shunned politics.  Herodotus tells how Thales advised the Ionians to set up a council (βουλευτήριον) common for all the Ionians to avert the impending Persian threat (1.170), and Diogenes Laertius mentions that he practiced politics before turning to the study of nature (1.23). Diogenes (1.25) goes on to say that Thales had proven himself a prudent advisor in political matters: he convinced the Milesians to reject Croesus’ proposal for an alliance, thus saving the city after Cyrus’ ascent to power. The traditional accounts surrounding Pittacus depict him as a politically active and respected figure: he held command in the war against Athens over Sigeum, and he is said to have collaborated with Alcaeus’ brother to overthrow Melanchrus, the tyrant of Lesbos.  Later, he was elected aisymnetes (arbitrator with supreme command during a period of domestic crisis)  for ten years in his native Mytilene, during which time he is said to have brought about reform and introduced new laws. Alcaeus, a hostile—and contemporary—witness to Pittacus’ power, accuses him of being a tyrant, but other sources assert that he indeed gave up his power after his allotted ten-year period of rule.  As for Bias, Herodotus (1.170) relates that after the Ionian defeat by the Persians he advised the Ionians to leave and go to Sardinia to found a new colony there to escape Persian rule. In other sources, Bias is consistently praised for his legal expertise. As early as Hipponax, Bias had become the touchstone against whom any successful speaker was measured, something the sixth-century BCE elegiac poet Demodocus seems to be alluding to in one fragment.  Plutarch tells us that Bias was sent as an ambassador from Priene to Samos during the war against the Milesians, and that he was held in great honor for his diplomatic accomplishments during that mission.  Finally, Diogenes Laertius, who provides the quotes from both Hipponax and Demodocus, illustrates Bias’ effectiveness in court by relating how Bias, after successfully pleading his case, leaned against his grandson and died. Unaware of his fate, the opposing party delivered its speech, the jury voted, and Bias won a posthumous victory. 
It is against these consistent accounts that Plato asserts that Thales, Pittacus, and Bias avoided politics. Indeed, Alcaeus, Demodocus, Hipponax, and Herodotus are all earlier than Plato, and their picture is repeatedly mirrored in later authors. It is especially relevant that Aristotle deviates from Plato’s revisionist portrayal of the apolitical sage. For examples, he refers to Pittacus as a ruler, lawgiver, and aisymnetes,  and in the Nicomachean Ethics he quotes Bias in the context of the importance of justice for a ruler.  In Aristotle’s mind, then, both Pittacus and Bias could be invoked as examples of politically significant historical figures. 
Plato’s own contemporary Isocrates also provides a different version from the account in the Protagoras (317b6–7), according to which Protagoras was the first to call himself a sophist.  Among the Athenians, it was Solon, writes Isocrates, who first bore this title,  and he is thus in agreement with the typical pre-sophistic use of the word in linking it to the Seven Sages—precisely the association that I have argued Plato works so hard to obfuscate.  What makes his attribution of the title sophist to Solon the more intriguing, however, is Isocrates’ assertion that it was due to Solon’s rhetorical expertise (ἐπιμέλεια τῶν λόγων; ἄριστος ῥήτωρ) that he acquired this epithet, and that this skill is no longer held in honor among his contemporaries. But we have no more in our sources to corroborate Solon’s position as a master orator and student of rhetoric than we have to support the Platonic claim of Bias and Pittacus’ apolitical stance. It thus seems likely that Isocrates, far from innocently using σοφιστής in its old “indeterminate” sense, is consciously seeking to project back onto Solon intellectual interests and pursuits similar to his own.
Given this alternative historical appropriation of the term “sophist” by Isocrates, it might be worthwhile to look closer at what role he assigns the sophists in his intellectual system. Such an investigation might help illuminate the competing—and often clashing—attempts at jockeying for position in the emerging field of intellectual production. Many scholars have focused on the wide discrepancies between Plato’s and Isocrates’ understanding of φιλοσοφία,  but few have extended their analyses to include the equally contradictory roles ascribed to the sophists. Some even quote Isocrates when discussing the “Platonic sophists” without pausing to question whether the label refers to the same persons.  Both Isocrates and Plato describe philosophy as much in terms of what it is not, as in terms of what it is. In this respect the sophists are of particular significance in both of their intellectual systems.
In the Antidosis, Isocrates denies the label of philosophy to the study of astronomy and geometry, and he admonishes young men not to spend too much time in the pursuit of these disciplines, lest their minds (φύσιν) wither or run aground (ἐξοκείλασαν) on the theories of the old sophists (τῶν παλαιῶν σοφιστῶν).  From a Platonic perspective, this is an unusual connection, since for Plato geometry is generally treated as fundamental to philosophy,  whereas the sophists are usually located outside this tradition.  The shock comes when we hear who the Isocratean sophists are: Empedocles, Ion, Alcmaeon, Parmenides, Melissus, and Gorgias. But that is not all; Isocrates goes on to express discontent with what some call philosophy, and provides his own definition:
In addition to the specific individuals that Isocrates classifies as sophists, he often uses the term in contrast to the poets, as a shorthand for practitioners of wisdom in general. This is how he employs σοφιστής in To Demonicus (51), where he admonishes his addressee to learn both what is best in the poets (τῶν ποιητῶν τὰ βέλτιστα) and the useful utterances of the other sophists (τῶν ἄλλων σοφιστῶν, εἴ τι χρήσιμον εἰρήκασιν); and he makes a similar bipartite division of the sources of wisdom between the poets (ποιηταί) and the sophists (σοφισταί) in the Panegyricus (82) and in To Nicocles (13).  In these examples, then, far from limiting its application to a defined and recognizable subgroup of practitioners of wisdom, Isocrates seems to use σοφιστής as an unmarked and inclusive term to refer to the wisdom tradition in a broad sense, presumably entailing everyone from the Seven Sages onward. 
In the Antidosis (168–170), Isocrates further clarifies his understanding of the relationship among rhetoric, sophistry, and philosophy. When elaborating on the reasons he is viewed with suspicion by his fellow Athenians, he notices that there is a general intolerance against rhetorical instruction (τὴν τῶν λόγων παιδείαν) in Athens, and that he thus runs the danger of suffering harm due to the common prejudice against the sophists (τῆς δὲ κοινῆς τῆς περὶ τοὺς σοφιστὰς διαβολῆς). But, he continues, he will give many reasons to prove that the prejudice against philosophy is unjust (φιλοσοφίαν … ἀδίκως διαβεβλημένην) and that it should rather be embraced than hated. 
The first part of the argument is clear enough: the sophists, who teach rhetoric, have caused a general ill will against eloquence. Isocrates is not a sophist, but fears that the hostility against the sophists will be directed unfairly and indiscriminatingly against himself.  So far Isocrates’ account seems to be in perfect harmony with Plato’s Apology, where we hear of Socrates’ unfair association with the sophists.  Indeed, in the Apology, Plato is very careful to point out the differences between the sophists and Socrates: as opposed to the sophists, Socrates never teaches for pay (31b–c), he is not a teacher (33a–b), and he possesses no wisdom (21b). To Plato, then, there is a fundamental difference between Socrates and the sophists, and Plato repeatedly has Socrates locate his own practices within the realm of philosophy (23d, 28e, 29c, 29d); the understood extension, of course, being that the sophists do not participate in this privileged field, but that their practices are un- or even anti-philosophical.
But it is precisely here that Isocrates deviates from the Platonic typology. Instead of maintaining the distinction between philosophy and sophistry, he seems to conflate the two by saying 1) that there is a common prejudice against the sophists, and 2) that the prejudice addressed against philosophy is unjustified. He uses a participial form of διαβάλλομαι twice within one paragraph to link semantically the prejudice directed at the sophists and philosophy, and so signifies that the same group of people is meant, only from two different perspectives: in the first instance they are labeled by the derogatory tag of their detractors (σοφιστής), while in the second instance they are given the privileged treatment by Isocrates as fellow sophoi, and their practices are thus referred to as belonging to the field of philosophy (φιλοσοφία).  Isocrates seems to suggest that the word sophist is used as a term of abuse against all those involved in philosophy, not exclusively with reference to a special subgroup of second-rate intellectuals, as is the practice in Plato.  When representing voices sympathetic to practitioners of wisdom, however, Isocrates uses the word φιλοσοφία to characterize their practices.
These examples illustrate how contentious the words “philosopher” and “sophist” were. Both Plato and Isocrates sought to manipulate, appropriate, and even naturalize these terms so as to fit seamlessly into their own intellectual agendas.  In this context the label “sophist”—far from entailing certain unequivocal characteristics—is employed relative to “philosophy,” frequently as an accusatory and derogatory designation. “Philosophy,” on the other hand, is almost always reserved for the speaker’s own intellectual position and penchants.
We have thus seen that there appears to have been no consensus in antiquity, either before or after the fourth century BCE, as to the precise nature and definition of σοφιστής,  or as to which individuals should be so labeled—and the same holds true for “philosophy,” one might add. The sharp discrepancy between Plato’s and Isocrates’ views seems particularly helpful in expounding how contentious and multifaceted its application was, as Sidgwick observes:We should thus be sufficiently warned neither to reify the term σοφιστής nor even to assume that it applies to specific individuals. It is true that Plato and Isocrates are in agreement that both Protagoras and Gorgias should be counted among the sophists, but the disagreement—particularly with regard to Solon, Empedocles, and Parmenides—is significant enough to underscore their widely different positions on sophistry and philosophy. I have focused on the difference between Plato and Isocrates in their understanding and application of “sophist” and “philosopher.” One could of course argue that an exploration of how Xenophon and Aristotle use these terms might give more weight to the Platonic evidence in favor of Isocrates. But both Xenophon and Aristotle are heavily indebted to the Platonic position and add surprisingly little by way of new or dissenting material on the sophists. One might equally complain over the lack of consideration of later evidence from, say, Philostratus and the rest, but here the difficulty is both the strong echoes of Plato, on the one hand, and the distance in time, on the other. What makes Isocrates so relevant is precisely his position as a contemporary of Plato—and one with a dissenting view on philosophy and sophistry.
When two antagonists, with vocations so sharply contrasted as those of Plato and Isocrates were, both claim for themselves the name of Philosopher and endeavour each to fix on the other the odious appellation of Sophist, we may surely conclude that either term is in popular usage so vague as easily to comprehend both, and that the two are varyingly contrasted according to the temper of the speaker. 
In conjunction with his elaborate double attempt at disassociating the sophists from the tradition of the Seven Sages and the “legitimate” philosophical tradition, Plato remarks that the sophists were the first to charge money (Hippias Major 282c6). Given the contentious nature of Plato’s history of philosophy just outlined, we need to reevaluate his statement of the sophists’ habit of teaching for pay with this context in mind. To this we turn next.
[ back ] 1. See, for example, Guthrie 1971:3–26 and Romilly 1992:vii–xv. This balkanization of the sophists has been challenged, mainly through Lloyd’s influential contributions to Greek philosophy (e. g. Lloyd 1979:81, esp. n112; 1987:92–93). See also Ford 1993; Wallace 1998 and 2007; Nightingale 2000; Thomas 2000:10 and 21. For the most part, however, this challenge to the validity of “sophist” as a useful category has been voiced without reexamination of its use in antiquity. Ultimately, the decision to abandon “sophist” as an intellectual and historical category has to rest upon such an investigation. See introduction, esp. 9–10.
[ back ] 2. E.g. Guthrie 1971:27–34. But see Edmunds 2006, who argues that no such narrowing of the use of σοφιστής had taken place in the fifth century, but only later, mainly through Plato’s establishment of philosophy as a distinct and specialized activity.
[ back ] 3. “Presocratic” is a modern coinage, notably adopted by Diels in his Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Surprisingly, this neologism has become almost universally adopted and is frequently used alongside the term sophist, which, in contrast, was in general circulation in antiquity. The modern adoption of clear and consistent taxonomies can sometimes make us oblivious to a term’s original polyvalence and contested status. For a more complete discussion of “Presocratic” as a historical category, see Laks 2006.
[ back ] 4. For a discussion of early contestations over philosophia and philosophos, see Ford 1993:41; Nightingale 1995, esp. chapter 1. See also Lloyd 2005, who points out that some of the earliest attested uses of philosophia and philosophos appear to carry derogatory connotations (12).
[ back ] 5. Cf. Nehamas (1990:5), who, in respect to the contrasting views of Plato and Isocrates on philosophy, writes: “It is not my purpose here to argue that either Plato or Isocrates was correct in his conception of the nature of philosophy, especially since I believe, on independent grounds, that this is not a question that can ever be answered. Indeed, I might say that this is precisely the point I am trying to make in historical terms in this essay.”
[ back ] 6. My theoretical orientation owes much to the cultural sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. For the implications of his method to my analysis, see introduction, 19–21.
[ back ] 7. There are good reasons to focus on the many areas of intellectual overlap and continuity among the various groups of sophoi rather than exclusively seeking to separate and compartmentalize them. This is the ambition with the discussion in chapters three to six.
[ back ] 8. Cf. Photius Lexicon 528 Naber: τὸ δὲ παλαιὸν σοφιστὴς ὁ σοφὸς ἐκαλεῖτο.
[ back ] 9. For this view, see Nestle 1942:249. Kerferd 1950:8, on the other hand, following Grote 1872, distinguishes between an originally more general use of σοφός and σοφία and the restricted application of σοφιστής.
[ back ] 10. The terms “limited” and “indeterminate” are Grant’s, 1885, 1:110. On page 113 he writes: “We see, then, that the word ‘Sophist,’ having first had a merely general signification, denoting ‘philosopher,’ ‘man of letters,’ ‘artist,’ &c., acquired a special meaning after the middle of the fifth century, as the designation of a particular class of teachers. And then men began to talk of ‘the Sophists,’—referring to this class.”
[ back ] 11. See Kerferd 1950.
[ back ] 12. Kerferd 1950:8.
[ back ] 13. Kerferd 1981:25. Cf. Grant 1885, 1:106.
[ back ] 14. Grote 1872:53. He further elaborates this point by saying that it “is impossible therefore to predicate anything concerning doctrines, methods, or tendencies, common and peculiar to all the sophists. There were none such; nor has the abstract word, ‘Die Sophistik’, any real meaning, except such qualities, whatever they may be, as are inseparable from the profession or occupation of public teaching,” 53.
[ back ] 15. Grant 1885, 1:106.
[ back ] 16. Jaeger 1965:296; Morrison 1949:57–59; Diogenes Laertius 1.12 (Homer and Hesiod); Isocrates Antidosis 313 and Herodotus 1.29 (Solon); Plato Protagoras 316c5–e5 (Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides). Nestle 1942:253–254, shares the same view, but he does not emphasize their shared epithet, rather their shared educational vocation.
[ back ] 17. Guthrie 1971:30.
[ back ] 18. I have found the discussions in the following works very useful for this section: Grote 1872:32–80; Grant 1885, 1:106–116; Nestle 1940:250–259; Kerferd 1950; Guthrie 1971:27–34; Imperio 1998:43–130; Edmunds 2006:414–425; Wallace 2007:215–237.
[ back ] 19. Diogenes of Apollonia apud Simplicius Physica 151.20 = DK 64A4.
[ back ] 20. See Kerferd 1950:8, who also understands this in reference to the Presocratics.
[ back ] 21. Isocrates Antidosis 235 and 268.
[ back ] 22. Jacoby FGrH 324 F 69 = Aristides 46.311.
[ back ] 23. See Nehamas 1990, who discusses the application of the label sophist to Socrates, and Plato’s intense attempts to rid him of this epithet. See also Taylor 2006:157, who interestingly argues that Plato “presents Socrates, not merely by implication but avowedly, as sharing some of the characteristics which define a sophist.” Plato does this to emphasize that Socrates’ own profession merely to detect and eliminate false beliefs does not qualify him as a “systematic philosopher” but as “a magician, an individual with an unaccountable power of divining the truths and leading others to it, and by the same token no longer, by Platonic standards, a philosopher, but a very special, and very noble, sophist” (168). See Edmunds 2006 for a discussion of the various epithets associated with Socrates.
[ back ] 24. Aristides 46.311; cf. Athenaeus 13.611d–612f (Lysias); Aristotle Metaphysics 996a (Aristippus); Xenophon Symposium 4.4 (Antisthenes).
[ back ] 25. Isocrates Antidosis 166, 196, 213, and 231.
[ back ] 26. Cf. Grote 1872:33; Sidgwick 1872:293; Grant 1885:112–113.
[ back ] 27. Fr. 281 Baiter-Sauppe = Aristides 46.311.
[ back ] 28. Timon apud Diogenes Laertius 9.65 and 112. Cf. Grote 1872:33.
[ back ] 29. Timaeus apud Polybius 12.8.4 = FGrH 566 F 156.
[ back ] 30. This is a sentiment already expressed by Grote 1872:35, although he does not discuss its post-Platonic use: “Moreover, Plato not only stole the name out of general circulation, in order to fasten it specially upon his opponents, the paid teachers, but also connected with it express discreditable attributes, which formed no part of its primitive and recognized meaning, and were altogether distinct from, though grafted upon, the vague sentiment of dislike associated with it.”
[ back ] 31. Although the word σοφιστής was still in wide application during and after Plato’s lifetime and did not crystallize in its meaning at any given point in time, it nevertheless appears to have acquired a more pejorative tinge in its later use. But this is far from absolute: Xenophon, for example, in the Cyropaedia (3.1.14 and 38) relates the tragic fate of a sophist (σοφιστής) who was unjustly put to death by the Armenian king on charges of corrupting (διαφθείρειν) his son Tigranes. When he was about to die, the sophist sent after Tigranes and asked him not to feel any anger towards his father, since he was acting out of ignorance (ἄγνοια) and not malice (κακόνοια), and, since he was acting out of ignorance, he was acting against his own will. This story is surely meant to allude to the fate of Socrates, and it would be particularly odd if Xenophon chose to use a strictly pejorative epithet in such a context.
[ back ] 32. For the authenticity of Hippias Major, see chapter two, 40n5.
[ back ] 33. Kerferd 1981:25.
[ back ] 38. For a fuller discussion of the sage tradition, see Martin 1993. See also Nightingale 2000 and 2004.
[ back ] 39. For the ancient sources of the Sigean War, see Herodotus 5.95; Strabo 13.1.38; Diodorus Siculus 9.12; Diogenes Laertius 1.74. See also Page 1955:152–161; cf. Andrewes 1974:92–99.
[ back ] 40. Aristotle explains the office of aisymnetes as elective tyranny (αἱρετὴ τυραννίς), Politics 1285a. For the meaning of αἰσυμνήτης and Mytilene’s political situation, see Page 1955:149–161 and 239–240; Andrewes 1974:96–99; Romer 1982; Gagarin 1986:59–60.
[ back ] 41. Alcaeus fr. 348 Lobel and Page; Aristotle Politics 1274b, 1285a; Diodorus Siculus 9.11–12; Strabo 13.1.38–39, 13.2.3; Diogenes Laertius 1.74–76.
[ back ] 42. Hipponax fr. 123 West; Demodocus fr. 6 West. For Demodocus’ date, see Campbell 1982:343.
[ back ] 43. Aetia Romana et Graeca 296a.
[ back ] 44. Plutarch Quaestiones Graecae 20; Diogenes Laertius 1.84.
[ back ] 45. Politics 1274b, 1285a; Nichomachean Ethics 1167a; Rhetoric 1402b.
[ back ] 46. Nichomachean Ethics 1130a.
[ back ] 47. In the case of Thales, however, Aristotle seems more receptive to Plato’s characterization. Indeed, he retells the story of Thales’ practical genius in the Politics (1259a) only to reinforce his position as a disinterested (and poor) philosopher. See also Nichomachean Ethics 1141b, where Thales is said to be engaged in knowledge that is useless (ἄχρηστα), since he does not pursue human goods (τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθά). Perhaps this portrayal is related to Thales’ generally privileged position in Greek culture. He is often invoked as the archetypical philosopher and is never poked fun at in old comedy (Dover 1968:xxxvi).
[ back ] 48. In Meno 91e–92a, however, Socrates says that Protagoras was not the first sophist. Grant 1885:115 points out that Aristotle seems to juxtapose and distance Protagoras from the sophists in the Nicomachean Ethics 1164a23–26.
[ back ] 49. One could of course object that there is a difference between being called a sophist by others, as in the case of Solon, and calling oneself a sophist, as in the case of Protagoras. Isocrates also limits his application of the term to the Athenians, whereas Plato considers its application throughout Greece. Still, the contrast between Isocrates and Plato is significant in two ways. First, even if Solon was an Athenian, he lived long before Protagoras. Isocrates thus gives the term a much older pedigree than that found in Plato. Second, and related to the first point, whereas the Protagoras passage states that there existed people even before Protagoras who should be considered sophists but who refrained from using the title out of fear of its pejorative connotations, Isocrates explicitly states that the Athenians considered the label honorific. Especially significant for my analysis is the term’s association with the Seven Sages in Isocrates.
[ back ] 50. Antidosis 313 and 235, where Solon is included among the Seven Sophists (οἱ ἑπτὰ σοφισταί); cf. 231–232. Hegel is a testament to the power and long-lasting effects of Plato’s introduction of the apolitical sage/philosopher. In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy (1:52), he writes: “Thus the Greek philosophers held themselves far removed from the business of the State and were called by the people idlers, because they withdrew themselves within the world of thought.” But cf. what he says on 157, where he describes the Seven Sages as men of affairs.
[ back ] 51. For the most recent and significant treatment of Plato’s and Isocrates’ differing views on φιλοσοφία, see Nightingale 1995 with bibliography. For philosophy as a contested term, see, in addition to Nightingale 1995, Ford 1993:45; Wardy 1996:94–96; and Ober 2004:26–27.
[ back ] 52. For examples of such practice, see Guthrie 1971:36 and Blank 1985:2 and 4n15.
[ back ] 53. Antidosis 266–268.
[ back ] 54. For the link between geometry and philosophy, see, e.g. Republic 510c–511a, 526c–528e, and 533b–c. See also, e.g. Penner 1987:126–127n19; Kraut 1992b:6n24; and Mueller 1992:170–199.
[ back ] 55. Xenophon (Memorabilia 1.1.11) also attributes physical speculation to the sophists—normally a distinguishing characteristic of the Presocratics—and appears less concerned than Plato to maintain the rigorous division between sophists and philosophers (cf. Sidgwick 1872:293). When talking about Socrates, Xenophon writes: “He did not discuss the nature of all things in the same manner as most of the others, nor did he examine the nature of the so-called cosmos of the sophists (ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος) or the laws that govern the heavenly phenomena.”
[ back ] 69. The label seems to have an equally broad application in Panegyricus 3, where Isocrates remarks that he is aware that many who profess to be sophists (πολλοὶ τῶν προσποιησαμένων εἶναι σοφιστῶν) have eagerly taken up the topic that he is about to address.
[ back ] 70. Solon is labeled sophist (Antidosis 313), and he is also mentioned as one of the seven sophists (Antidosis 235). Isocrates thus seems to have envisioned the Seven Sages, in general, and Solon, in particular, as the functional predecessors of the subsequent practitioners of wisdom.
[ back ] 71. Cf. To Philip 29, where Isocrates reiterates how unjustified the opprobrium directed toward the sophists is (δυσχερείας τὰς περὶ τοὺς σοφιστάς).
[ back ] 72. Cf. Panathenaicus 5, where he complains that he is a victim of prejudiced misrepresentations at the hands of the discredited and worthless sophists (ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν σοφιστῶν τῶν ἀδοκίμων καὶ πονηρῶν διαβαλλόμενος).
[ back ] 73. For the Apology as a subtext to Isocrates’ Antidosis, see Nightingale 1995, especially chapter one.
[ back ] 74. There is a similar conflation of sophistry and philosophy in Xenophon’s Memorabilia (1.2.31), where we hear that Critias after coming to power as part of the Thirty passed a law against the teaching of rhetoric (λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν) in an attempt to take revenge on Socrates for an old insult. Critias thereby sought, writes Xenophon, to impute the common censure against the philosophers to Socrates (τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον ἐπιφέρων αὐτῷ), and so misrepresented (διαβάλλων) him before the people. By predicating the common censure against the philosophers on the teaching of rhetoric Xenophon effectively obliterates the sharp distinction between sophists and philosophers, so carefully maintained in Plato (cf. Sidgwick 1872:291). Xenophon’s choice of the verb διαβάλλω implies that the prejudice is undeserved, and this is similar to the Isocratean use.
[ back ] 75. But even Plato acknowledges in the Statesman (299b) that σοφιστής could be used as a derogatory label against anyone undertaking clever speculations (σοφιζόμενος ὁτιοῦν) that go beyond the accepted norms. Cf. Sidgwick 1872:293.
[ back ] 76. Cf. Nehamas 1990:5, who has called attention to this agonistic process: “In the fourth century B.C. terms like ‘philosophy,’ ‘dialectic,’ and ‘sophistry’ do not seem to have had a widely agreed-upon application. On the contrary, different authors seem to have fought with one another with the purpose of appropriating the term ‘philosophy,’ each for his own practice and educational scheme.” See also Nightingale 1995, esp. 13–60, for the conflicting views on philosophy in Plato and Isocrates.
[ back ] 77. The present discussion is limited to the so-called “first sophistic.” The situation is different in respect to the “second sophistic.” For this intellectual current, see Whitmarsh 2005.
[ back ] 78. Sidgwick 1872:293.