I. Between Mantinea and Leuctra: The Political World of the Peloponnese in a Time of Upheaval

Peter Funke
The aim of the reflections that follow is to define the historical and political framework in which to locate the central topic of the conference whose results are presented here. In other words, my contribution has an introductory function and will try to sketch a background of sorts for the volume. [1] It will summarize the political prerequisites and conditions of the crisis of the Peloponnesian League and of the political upheaval in the Peloponnese after the battle of Leuctra, in an attempt to free the evaluation of these events from a one-sided perspective that is still widespread in scholarship. Thereby the complexity of the political configuration from which the new system of polities in the Peloponnese emerged in the late seventies and early sixties of the fourth century will appear with greater clarity.

1. Thebes and the Effects of the Battle of Leuctra (371 BCE)

An inscription from Thebes commemorates three men who clearly had distinguished themselves in the battle of Leuctra. [2] Their names—Xenokrates, Theopompos and Mnasilaos—are followed by this epigram:
When the Spartan spear was dominant, then Xenocrates took by lot the task of offering a trophy to Zeus, not fearing the host from the Eurotas or the Spartan shield. “Thebans are superior in war,” proclaims the trophy won through victory/bringing victory by the spear at Leuctra; nor did we run second to Epaminondas. [3]
The monument appears to have been erected immediately after the battle. [4] Ever since the inscription was published, [5] scholars have tried to connect the text to passages from ancient authors that mention the fact that, before the battle, the oracle of Trophonios in Lebadeia emphatically encouraged the Thebans to fight against the Spartans. Besides shorter references by Callisthenes (FGH 124 F 22a = Cicero On divination 1.74), Diodorus (15.53.4), and Polyaenus (2.3.8), a passage from Pausanias (4.32.4–6) deserves special attention. According to Pausanias, Epaminondas had asked Xenokrates, in accordance with an oracle, to fetch the shield of Aristomenes, a legendary hero presumably from the time of the Second Messenian War, that was kept in the temple of Trophonios in Lebadeia, and use it to decorate a victory monument erected before the battle, for all the Spartans to see.
Hartmut Beister (1973) and Christopher Tuplin offer the most recent extensive discussions of these texts, revising previous interpretations in the attempt to clarify possible connections between the inscription and the literary tradition. They come to very different conclusions, which cannot be discussed in detail here, especially since it seems impossible to reach a final decision. [6] However, they agree that the story of the shield of Aristomenes reported by Pausanias has to be considered an invention of the Messenian historiography of the fourth century BCE. [7] This integration of the hero of Messenian freedom into Theban traditions about the battle of Leuctra certainly goes back to the attempt by the Messenians to consolidate their identity in the years after 370/69; [8] but it also reveals something about the way in which Thebes, the new dominant power in the Greek world, if for a short time, depicted itself in historiography. For the Thebans, it was obviously very important to show their newly acquired hegemony in the best light and to underpin it with ideology. [9] Of course, the Thebans did unquestionably play a decisive role in the liberation of Messenia. The foundation of the city at Mount Ithome and the creation of a new Messenian state that accompanied it were doubtless consequences of the first Theban expedition in the winter of 370/69; Epaminondas’ initiative and commitment clearly deserve credit for this. [10] It is also beyond question that the battle of Leuctra laid the foundations for the dissolution of Spartan hegemony over the Peloponnese. From this point of view, it can be said that the (fictive) participation of Aristomenes in the outcome of the battle of Leuctra was perfectly justified on the level of ideology.
However, the Thebans’ attempt to set themselves up as the champions of all the political upheavals in the Peloponnese and to take exclusive credit for all these profound transformations is much more controversial. Already the statue of Epaminondas, erected by the Thebans after his death, was allegedly accompanied by the following epigram:
By our counsels was Sparta shorn of her glory, and holy Messene received at last her children. With Thebes’ arms Megalopolis was surrounded with walls, and all Greece won independence and freedom. [11]
Pausanias and Plutarch—and before them, presumably, already the Boeotian or Theban local historiography of the Hellenistic age—have contributed to overemphasizing the role of Thebes in such processes of political transformation. [12] It is the Thebans who decide after Leuctra to bring back the Mantineans to their city (Pausanias 8.8.10), and Epaminondas in particular is depicted not only as the founder of Messene, but also as being responsible for the Mantineans’ return and for the unification of Arcadia and the foundation of Megalopolis (Pausanias 9.14.4; Plutarch Pelopidas 24).
This Theban viewpoint has had a long-lasting influence and its traces can still be seen in modern scholarship. In the nineteenth century, Ernst Curtius wrote in his Griechische Geschichte: “Considering that Epaminondas, in such a short time and with his limited resources, founded or contributed to the foundation of Mantinea, Messene, Megalopolis, ... one will not want to deny him the honor of having been the predecessor of Alexander and his successors in the royal art of city-founding.” [13] The depiction of Thebes as the force that propelled and shaped everything, that single-handedly ignited the political upheaval in the Peloponnese, and that left its imprint on the emerging new political world by transmitting to it its own constitutional model, is still present in the most recent scholarship. The underlying assumption is that the basic federal structure of the Boeotian League, in its reformed state after 379, can be identified as the model for the new political formations of the Peloponnese. Hartmut Beister writes: “As is generally known, the tendency to replicate and disseminate its own political model is characteristic of Theban foreign policy after Leuctra.” [14] And Simon Hornblower observes: “One of the most permanent legacies (of the Theban hegemony) was the export of the federal principle.” [15]
Admittedly, it is indeed noticeable that most of the new or reformed polities that emerged in the Peloponnese did not follow the “classical” model of the Greek polis, but rather showed a basic federal structure, more or less pronounced in each case, or at any rate were characterized by peculiar forms of political participation for the various groups of populations that formed the several polities. [16] But only a very superficial analysis could lead one to interpret this as the result of the export by the Thebans of their federal principle. Such an interpretation misunderstands the character of the Boeotian κοινόν after its re-foundation in 379 BCE, as Hans Beck has recently insisted. [17] With his detailed analysis of the institutional structure of the Boeotian League, Beck has shown that in the form it took after 379 BCE it could not be considered a true federal state any more, but should rather be seen “as a highly centralized or as a unitary state.” [18] It is not necessary to repeat Beck’s arguments in detail. For present purposes, it will suffice to note that he has shown convincingly that Thebes was able to use the correlation between κοινόν and συντέλεια as an instrument to consolidate its grip over the whole of Boeotia. Therefore at that point the Boeotian constitution can hardly have functioned as an immediate model for the new states emerging in the Peloponnese. [19]
The constitutional character of the Boeotian League, which had undergone fundamental transformations with respect to the regime in force until 386, [20] is not the only argument against overestimating the influence of Thebes on the political developments in the Peloponnese. As George Grote clearly showed, [21] a critical analysis of the sources, comparing the aforementioned statements by Plutarch and Pausanias with, in particular, the relevant narratives by Xenophon and Diodorus, leaves no doubt that foundations had already been laid in the Peloponnese before the first Theban expedition. The συνοικισμός of Mantinea and the foundation of the Arcadian League had already taken place, and it seems that even the foundation of Megalopolis had already been decided upon in the summer of 370. [22] Furthermore, the diplomatic maneuvers of Arcadians, Eleians, and Argives in the summer of 370 show that, in spite of the success of Leuctra, Thebes was not necessarily the first choice of ally for the Peloponnesians. On the contrary, the Athenians were the first to be approached, and only after their refusal did the three Peloponnesian states turn to Thebes and conclude an alliance with the Thebans. [23]
It is not my intention to throw out the baby with the bath water and to suggest that Thebes could not have had any influence whatsoever on the political developments in the Peloponnese. What my contribution criticizes is the overestimation of the role of Thebes in the political reorganization of the Peloponnese, because it promotes a distorted assessment of the complexity of the situation. There is no doubt that the outcome of the battle of Leuctra was a fundamental and necessary precursor to the thorough-going transformation of the power balance in the Peloponnese—fundamental and necessary, but not sufficient. By the same token, it is beyond question that Thebes played an active role in the liberation of Messene and in the creation of the Messenian state. Theban ambitions and their clash with Spartan hegemony corresponded to the interests of most Peloponnesian states—but only temporarily, as shown by the admonition of Lykomedes of Mantinea, who as early as 368 warned his fellow Arcadians against the danger of rashly granting the Thebans the dominant position formerly occupied by the Spartans (Xenophon Hellenica 7.1.24).

2. Sparta and the Consequences of the Battle of Mantinea (418 BCE)

No attempt to explain the events in the Peloponnese in those years that sees the battle of Leuctra as the single cause of everything can do justice to the facts. Rather, it is necessary to recognize that the Peloponnesian states had their own dynamics that certainly received new and decisive impetus from the Theban victory, but that had displayed their effectiveness already before that event. In what follows, I intend to investigate whether it is possible to see in Peloponnesian politics before 371 significant points that can contribute to a better understanding of the events after 371, and, if so, where these may be found. To this end it is necessary to look closely at the conditions of the first decades of the fourth century and to the already precarious situation of the Peloponnesian League. However, since my observations are intended only to provide a framework for further reflection, I will confine myself to a rather general outline, considering only one case study more closely. [24]
In the immediate aftermath of the Peloponnesian War, burgeoning resistance amongst their former allies, which had sprung up suddenly, was already creating difficulties for the Spartans. [25] Disappointed by the limited readiness of the Spartans to allow for their allies’ interests in the rearrangement of the political balance, some states, especially Boeotia and Corinth, famously turned their backs to the Spartan alliance and eventually, together with Athens and Argos, openly declared their hostility to Sparta in 395/4. The Corinthian War that followed, which soon sucked in the whole Greek world, destabilized Sparta’s hegemonic position, increasingly endangering even the cohesion of the core area of the Peloponnesian League. Only in 386 were the Spartans able to emerge as προστάται of the King’s Peace and to exploit this position in order to consolidate their wavering hegemony. The fact that in these circumstances Sparta treated its own allies in the Peloponnese particularly harshly shows how tense the situation within the Spartan alliance had become. With targeted punitive measures the Spartans tried to re-establish their authority over the Peloponnese and to prevent any further disloyal behavior on the part of their allies (Xenophon, Hellenica 5.2.1). At first, in 385/4, they made of Mantinea an example that cannot have failed to impress the other allies. Since the Mantineans had rejected the request of the Spartan envoys to pull down their city-walls as a token of loyalty to the Peloponnesian League, the Spartans started a siege that ended up with the conquest of Mantinea and the διοικισμός of the city. [26]
What makes the treatment the Spartans meted out to Mantinea particularly telling about the political situation in the Peloponnese is its extraordinary brutality, perceived as such also by contemporaries. After the city surrendered, the Spartans were not content with destroying the fortifications and putting in place a regime favorable to themselves, but insisted on the dissolution of the urban center. [27] The Mantineans were compelled to give up their houses in the city and to move back to the four or five villages from whose union the city of Mantinea had originated, in the first half of the fifth or already around the middle of the sixth century BCE. [28]
What motivated the Spartans in 385/4 to such a harsh course of action against Mantinea, and to such a blatant violation of the conditions of the King’s Peace? [29] I intend to pursue this question in what follows, because this case makes it possible to show that the Spartan system of alliances in the Peloponnese was already fragile in the decades before the battle of Leuctra. At the same time, it is possible to point to the broad increase in autonomy that the individual poleis were striving for already in those years—always within the limits of what was politically feasible.
Xenophon mentions some reasons that are supposed to explain the behavior of the Spartans. However, the list of complaints that the Spartan envoys issued to the Mantineans before the opening of the hostilities, pointing to their disloyal behavior during the Corinthian War (Hellenica 5.2.1), is relatively vague and offers little explanation for the particularly harsh actions of the Spartans. Neither the Mantineans’ secret dealings with the Argives, nor the fact that they contributed their contingent of troops only reluctantly, offer a really satisfactory justification for the brutal demolition of the urban settlement of the city, which was not only coupled with the shift from a democratic to an oligarchic-timocratic constitution, but possibly involved a radical transformation of the unitary constitution of the polis. [30]
In this connection, Xenophon’s reference to the fact that the treaty between Sparta and Mantinea, concluded after the dissolution of the anti-Spartan alliance of 418/7 and agreed to last thirty years, [31] had just expired (Hellenica 5.2.2) may be more important. The conclusion of this treaty for a limited period of time shows in itself that the structure of the Spartan system of alliances we call the Peloponnesian League was decidedly more complex than we often tend to think. Clearly not all the bilateral treaties that formed it replicated the model of the treaty between Sparta and the Aetolian Erxadieis, [32] but rather, they adapted to concrete political needs and possibilities, and the Spartans must have accepted this situation as inevitable. The expiration of the peace treaty between Sparta and Mantinea in 387 must have made the continuing membership of Mantinea in the Peloponnesian League seem precarious, and correspondingly it must have conjured up at Sparta the fear that the relationship to Mantinea, tense as it was, but at least so far stabilized by the peace treaty, could once again, as it had done before 418/7, endanger Spartan control of the Northern Peloponnese. [33] That such fears were justified is shown by an inscription first published in 1987 with the text of a sympolity treaty between Mantinea and Helisson, a small political community on the Western border of the Mainalon massif, quite far away from Mantinea. [34]
The implications of this treaty in terms of political history have so far received surprisingly little attention. However, it sheds new light not only on the relationship between Sparta and Mantinea in the late fifth and early fourth century, but also on the ways and means used by Peloponnesian polities in order to create and protect autonomous zones of action for themselves. Having discussed the date of this treaty in depth elsewhere, I do not intend to repeat my arguments here. Suffice it to say that, after considering the various options, the sympolity treaty has to be dated before 385. [35] What are the implications of such a date for the historical interpretation of this document? In order to find an answer, it is necessary to consider the situation of Mantinea before 418. For the first phase of the Peloponnesian War, some hints in Thucydides point to a close relationship between Mantinea and Helisson. Even though Helisson itself is not mentioned, it is possible to infer from Thucydides (4.134.1; 5.29.1; 5.33.1; 5.47.1; 5.67.2; 5.81.1) that, at the latest during the Archidamian War, the Mantineans had succeeded in building in Southwestern Arcadia a small hegemony of their own, which extended to Maenalia, of which Helisson was part. Thucydides uses for this the terminology of hegemonic symmachy, and based on Thomas Heine Nielsen’s comprehensive investigation, we may suppose that Mantinea’s hegemony was structured like the larger hegemonic symmachies, such as the Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues. [36] It is perfectly understandable that the Spartans were keen to dissolve such regional hegemony within their own sphere of influence. Therefore, when Mantinea too, soon after 418, had to acquiesce in a peace with Sparta, one of the main points of the treaty was that the Mantineans had to “give up their rule over the poleis” (Thucydides 5.81.1: τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀφεῖσαν τῶν πόλεων) and thereby to renounce control over extended parts of Arcadia.
We can therefore conclude that from the mid-twenties of the fifth century at the latest, and until 418/7, Helisson, like the majority of the other polities of northern Mainalia, was almost certainly linked to Mantinea by an alliance. After that, such ties were necessarily severed by the treaty between Sparta and Mantinea. Since, however, we have every reason to date the sympolity between Mantinea and Helisson before 385, we can see it as evidence that, at the beginning of the fourth century, Mantinea was again attempting to build up its power, especially against Sparta but also against other neighboring poleis such as Tegea, by extending the citizen body. In this connection, one thinks especially of the Corinthian War. The Mantineans probably exploited Sparta’s weakness at that point, in order to win back the position of power that had been taken away from them by the thirty-years peace with Sparta. In the sympolity treaty, the reference to “the other poleis" (SEG 37.340 line 9: κατάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλισι) suggests strongly that at that point other polities, too, possibly former allies of the Mantineans, had concluded a sympolity with them. This reference to further poleis and the long distance between Mantinea and Helisson show with full clarity the political significance of such agreements.
The fact that Mantinea was now no longer using treaties of alliance, but rather sympolities, was certainly a clever trick to circumvent the corresponding clauses of the thirty-years peace with Sparta. Of prime importance was the insight that a sympolity ensured a much stronger bond than any sort of alliance. It seems that the Mantineans were operating already at the beginning of the fourth century with an instrument of constitutional law that was going to be applied on a much larger scale and with even more success in the foundation of the Arcadian League in 370. The example of the fusion of Argos and Corinth in 392 shows that other poleis, too, were able to resort to sympolity or to similar systems in order to strengthen their autonomous position in the balance of power in the Peloponnese. [37] This emergence of sympolity, attested impressively by the case of Mantinea, can be observed also in other parts of the Greek world, but it seems to be particularly pronounced in the Peloponnese. Here, the relations and conflicts between polities were characterized in a peculiar way by the interplay between the autonomy of the polis and regional—that is, ethnic—cohesion. The tendency towards sympolity across the boundaries of the individual poleis may in many ways have been determined by foreign policy, especially insofar as it worked in opposition to Sparta. However, it is also the political consequence of a conspicuous phenomenon: the “ethnicization” of the political world of the Peloponnese at the end of the fifth and beginning of the fourth centuries BCE.
In this contribution, I have tried to focus on some political aspects of this phenomenon as case studies, in order to offer a background of sorts for the examination of the assumed “politics of ethnicity.” What I have tried to show on the political level has another side on the level of ideology. The tendency to overstep the narrow borders of the polis corresponds to the attempt at founding or recovering the identity of the group beyond the polis. Whether we think of the Mantineans, who went to the Mainalon massif not only to reinforce their influence there, but also to recover the bones of Arkas and bring them to Mantinea, [38] or of Lykomedes, who conjured up the autochthony of the Arcadians against all political pretensions from outside, [39] ethnicity became a political argument.


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[ back ] 1. I thank K. Freitag and M. Haake for their critical reading of my manuscript, as well as all participants in the conference for suggestions and stimuli, and especially N. Luraghi and R. Short, who have also translated the text of my contribution.
[ back ] 2. IG VII 2462; CEG 632; Rhodes and Osborne 2003:150–151 (= Nr. 30); references to further editions in Beister 1973:65fn3a.
[ back ] 3. Translation from Rhodes and Osborne 2003:151.
[ back ] 4. For the date see the commentary of W. Dittenberger to IG VII 2462; see also Tuplin 1987:94f.
[ back ] 5. The inscription was first published on May 17th, 1877 by S. A. Kumanudis in the Athenian newspaper Palingenesia and immediately generated lively reactions; see Beister 1973:65n1 and 2.
[ back ] 6. See also the commentary by Rhodes and Osborne 2003:151f.
[ back ] 7. Beister 1973:79–81; Tuplin 1987:101–103; Ogden 2004:134–138; see already Kiechle 1959:126f. On the person of Aristomenes, around whom many legends obviously grew after the liberation of Messenia by the Boeotians, see now Ogden 2004.
[ back ] 8. However, the relationship to Boeotia, which was also displayed in, for example, the iconographic program of the statuary in the sanctuary of Asklepios and in the hierothysion at Messene (Pausanias 4.31.10–32.1), is only one component of this effort; on this, see also the fundamental treatments of Figueira 1999; Luraghi 2002; Luraghi, this volume.
[ back ] 9. See also Ogden 2004:138–142.
[ back ] 10. See Roebuck 1941:27–41; Meyer 1978:263–266; Buckler 1980:70–90; Buckler 2003:308–310; Grandjean 2003:49–53, 65–70; Shipley 2004:562f.
[ back ] 11. Pausanias 9.15.6; translation from Beck 2000:341f; cf. also Luraghi, this volume.
[ back ] 12. A brief overview of the development of Boeotian historiography is offered by F. Jacoby in FGH IIIb:151–153; see also Shrimpton 1971; Sordi 1974; Buckler 1980:263–277; Tuplin 1984.
[ back ] 13. Curtius 1889:383: “Bedenkt man, wie Epameinondas mit seinen geringen Mitteln und in so kurzer Frist Mantineia, Messene, Megalopolis gründete oder gründen half, ... so wird man dem Epameinondas nicht die Ehre streitig machen dürfen, dass er in der königlichen Kunst der Stadtgründungen Alexanders und seiner Nachfolger Vorgänger gewesen ist.”
[ back ] 14. Beister 1989:151: “Kennzeichnend ... für die thebanische Außenpolitik nach Leuktra ist bekanntlich die Reproduktion und Verbreitung des eigenen politischen Modells.”
[ back ] 15. Hornblower 2002:200; see also 258f.
[ back ] 16. For an overview of these political developments, with references to sources and bibliography, see Beck 1997; Funke 1998; Lehmann 2001.
[ back ] 17. Beck 2000.
[ back ] 18. Beck 2000:338.
[ back ] 19. Contrary to what I previously thought, see Funke 1998:63 on the Arcadian League.
[ back ] 20. See most recently, with further bibliography, Lehmann 2001:25–33; Behrwald 2005:119f. Notice that the system of the συντέλεια of single member-states already functioned as an instrument of power before 386.
[ back ] 21. Grote 1888 v.8:194–196.
[ back ] 22. Συνοικισμός of Mantinea: Moggi 1976:251–256 (= Nr. 40); foundation of the Arcadian League: Dušanić 1970; Nielsen 2002:474–499; foundation of Megalopolis: Moggi 1976:93–325 (= Nr. 45); Hornblower 1990; Nielsen 2002:414–455.
[ back ] 23. On this, with references to sources and bibliography, Hornblower 2002:247–249; Buckler 2003:302–310.
[ back ] 24. A more comprehensive discussion of the διοικισμός of Mantinea, here taken as case study, can be found in Funke 2004.
[ back ] 25. On what follows, see the relevant discussions e.g. in Hamilton 1979; Funke 1980; Hamilton 1991; Tuplin 1993; Buckler 2003.
[ back ] 26. Moggi 1976:151–153 with overview of the sources.
[ back ] 27. The destruction of the city-walls was part of the normal repertoire of Greek power politics; cf. e.g. the measures taken by the Athenians against Poteidaia (Thucydides 1.56.2), Thasos (1.101.3), or Chios (4.51.1), by the Thebans against Thespiai (4.133.1), and by the Spartans themselves in previous years against Argos (5.83.2), Athens (Xenophon Hellenica 2.2.20; 2.2.23) and Elis (Xenophon Hellenica 3.2.30). By comparison, the διοικισμός was extraordinarily harsh.
[ back ] 28. Xenophon Hellenica 5.2.5–7; Ephoros FGH 70 F 79; Diodorus 15.5.4;15.12.2; Strabo 8.3.2.
[ back ] 29. On the question to what extent the treatment of Mantinea equalled a violation of the King’s Peace see Funke 2004:429.
[ back ] 30. On the institutional form of the constitution of Mantinea in the years between 384 and 370 the sources offer hardly any useful evidence. According to a note in Xenophon Hellenica 5.2.7, from 384 onwards it was no longer the polis of Mantinea that had to contribute its contingent of troops, but each of the four or five villages by itself, each under the control of one Spartan xenagos. This regulation suggests that in all likelihood the very unity of the polis was at least to some extent dissolved. It is questionable whether this dissolution implies that each of the components of the former polis of Mantinea now had its own oligarchic constitution, as suggested by Gehrke 1985:104f; cf. e.g. Hodkinson and Hodkinson 1981:287f. In any case, this rearrangement could not be very effective, since clearly the vast majority of the population of Mantinea opposed it. The extraordinarily smooth and resolute implementation of the second synoecism (see Moggi 1976:251–256 [=Nr. 40]; Gehrke 1985:105) shows that even fifteen years later the cohesion of the civic body had not suffered lasting damage.
[ back ] 31. Staatsverträge II2 195.
[ back ] 32. The interpretation advanced by Gschnitzer 1978 (= SEG 28.408; also SEG 49.392) for the treaty originally published by Peek 1974 (= SEG 26.461) still seems to me convincing, both as regards the date (first half of the fifth century BCE) and in the interpretation (treaty between Sparta and a hitherto unknown Peloponnesian polity). Every attempt to date the treaty later and to connect it with the Aetolians of Central Greece (see the overview of the different suggestions in Yates 2005:66n4) is undermined by a consideration of the historical circumstances that this would imply; see now also SEG 51.449.
[ back ] 33. On the history of the relationship between Sparta and Mantinea see the summary accounts in Amit 1973:121–182; Nielsen 2002:389–391.
[ back ] 34. Te Riele 1987 (= SEG 37.340); see also Dubois 1988; IPArk 9.
[ back ] 35. Funke 2004:431–433.
[ back ] 36. Nielsen 1996:79–84; Nielsen 2002:367–372; see already Cartledge 1987:257–259.
[ back ] 37. On this fusion, see Robinson’s contribution to this volume, and cf. Moggi 1976:242–250 (= Nr. 39); Funke 1980:82n29; Tuplin 1982; Whitby 1984; Moggi 1996:159f.
[ back ] 38. Pausanias 8.9.3–4; 8.36.8; on this, see Nielsen 2002:403f.
[ back ] 39. Xenophon Hellenica 7.1.23–24. Herodotus 2.171.3; 8.78,1 and Thucydides 1.2.3 show that Lykomedes could count on older and widespread notions.