Peter Funke and Nino Luraghi, editors, The Politics of Ethnicity and the Crisis of the Peloponnesian League
I. Peter Funke, Between Mantinea and Leuctra: The Political World of the Peloponnese in a Time of Upheaval
II. Klaus Freitag, Achaea and the Peloponnese in the Late Fifth-Early Fourth Centuries
III. James Roy, Elis
IV. Claudia Ruggeri, Triphylia from Elis to Arcadia
V. Maurizio Giangiulio, The Emergence of Pisatis
VI. Maria Pretzler, Arcadia: Ethnicity and Politics in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BCE
VII. Nino Luraghi, Messenian Ethnicity and the Free Messenians
VIII. Eric Robinson, Ethnicity and Democracy in the Peloponnese, 401–362 BCE
IX. Catherine Morgan, The Archaeology of Ethnê and Ethnicity in the Fourth-Century Peloponnese
X. Robert Parker, Subjection, Synoecism and Religious Life
XI. Christoph Ulf, The Development of Greek Ethnê and their Ethnicity: An Anthropological Perspective
VI. Arcadia: Ethnicity and Politics in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BCE [*]
The emergence of Arcadian identity, and its culmination in the foundation of an Arcadian state in 370 BCE, was a crucial factor in the disintegration of the Peloponnesian League. With very few exceptions Arcadia becomes visible in the ancient literary sources only in the late archaic period, at a time when most of the region, if not all, was already part of Sparta’s growing Peloponnesian League.  A united Arcadia as we see it in the 360s BCE is, in fact, one extreme in a wide range of decisions and actions adopted by Arcadian cities in relation to a common regional identity that we can observe in the archaic and classical periods. The sources often document a very fragmented political landscape in which Arcadian cities did not hesitate to abandon pan-Arcadian concerns in favor of co-operation with an outside ally. Yet in 370 BCE Arcadia seemed ready for political unification at very short notice.
In this paper I trace the emergence of a common Arcadian identity in an environment that, on the surface, does not seem conducive to such a development. I start with an investigation of the nature of Arcadian identity in 370 BCE, especially focusing on the arguments that were deployed to convince all Arcadian cities to abandon particularism for a while and to support a common Arcadian cause. This is followed by a study of pan-Arcadian ideas and actions before 370 BCE, as developed and expressed in the region, and especially in relations between Arcadians and outsiders. Sparta has a special role to play in this story: concerted Arcadian action recorded in our sources usually takes place in opposition to the region’s ambitious southern neighbor, or in the context of the activities of Sparta’s Peloponnesian League.
Arcadian Rhetoric and the Foundation of the Arcadian State
The Spartan defeat at Leuctra in 371 BCE triggered developments in Arcadia that, although in themselves short-lived, had lasting consequences for Sparta and, ultimately, for the whole Peloponnese.  The initiative probably lay with Mantinea, broken up into villages in 385 BCE by a Sparta at the height of her powers after the King’s Peace.  The Mantineans lost no time in undertaking a synoecism and in rebuilding their walls. Many Arcadian cities gave them their support,  a sign of pan-Arcadian feelings which are especially remarkable in the light of Mantinea’s small-scale imperialist tendencies in the fifth century.  Tegea, Mantinea’s neighbor and only rival in Arcadia, underwent a stasis in which the pan-Arcadian democrats gained the upper hand over a sizeable pro-Spartan party.  With both major cities on board the Arcadians proceeded to found a federal state, and although some cities, such as Orchomenos and Heraia, were reluctant to join,  support seems to have been widespread.
This development is remarkable because an apparently fragmented area managed to create a sophisticated territorial state in such a short time. In Arcadia no single hegemonic city could on its own impose a federal agenda, as Thebes did in Boeotia, and there is no evidence for a long standing tradition of tribal cohesion as in Aetolia: tribal states existed within Arcadia, but, as we shall see, before 370 BCE there had probably never been an organization that included the whole region. The new Arcadian state was, it seems, inspired by anti-Spartan sentiments, but this was not a sufficient criterion to allow membership: prospective members of “doubtful Arcadian-ness,” such as the Triphylians, needed to be “Arcadianized” by a manipulation of Arcadian myth-history.  This suggests that the Arcadian federal state was indeed defined by, and founded upon, Arcadian identity.
Xenophon provides an example of explicitly Arcadian sentiment in a speech given in 369 BCE by Lycomedes of Mantinea, one of the “founding fathers” of a unified Arcadia.  The speech documents enormous Arcadian confidence based on two main factors: firstly, Arcadian autochthony and the claim that the Arcadians are the only true Peloponnesians, and secondly, that the Arcadians were the most numerous people and the strongest and bravest warriors, which made them indispensable for both Sparta’s and Thebes’ success.
Xenophon’s Lycomedes, it seems, has a well-defined concept of what it means to be Arcadian, and in this speech he uses this sense of Arcadian identity as a political argument, advocating a policy of independent action. This passage in Xenophon’s Hellenica represents the only fairly contemporary summary of how the ethnic identity card may have been played in the context of political debate in Arcadia. Xenophon must have known Arcadia well, and he had certainly made acquaintance with Arcadians among Cyrus’ Ten Thousand.  His bias against most of Sparta’s enemies, however, makes it necessary to assess this passage very carefully. Would Arcadians have recognized this image of themselves? Would they have approved? Would outsiders have recognized these arguments as typically Arcadian? Let us look at Lycomedes’ claims in turn.
It was common knowledge among the Greeks that the Arcadians were autochthonous inhabitants of the Peloponnese. Fragments of Hesiod’s work suggest that Arcadian genealogy was an issue from the earliest days of Greek literature, and Hecataeus, still in the archaic period and well outside Arcadia, also dealt with the subject. All versions of this genealogy suggest that Arcadians were seen as different from their neighbors: they are descended from Pelasgos, which makes them autochthonous, just as Xenophon’s Lycomedes claims.  Arcadians are the only Peloponnesians still to live in their original homeland, since according to Greek tradition the Achaeans, also autochthonous Peloponnesians, left the Argolid for the formerly Ionian region of Achaea when the Dorians invaded. 
Arcadian identity is first and foremost dependent on this common ancestry. In fact, most Arcadian cities were fairly mechanically linked to the Arcadian genealogy by an eponymous founder who was seen as a son of Lycaon, son of Pelasgos. One list of Lycaon’s sons, possibly based on a fifth-century original,  is preserved in Apollodorus’ work, another was compiled by Pausanias, probably from contemporary oral tradition: he specifically looked for remains of the small communities which were wholly or partly deserted after their inclusion in the synoecism of the Arcadian League’s new capital, Megalopolis, and the genealogy presented in his Periegesis conveniently includes those he was able to locate. 
The development of local mythical history suggests that, as Arcadian identity developed, the (mythical) history of the region was adapted as well, a process that should be expected in the context of an emerging and perhaps expanding ethnic identity.  Such changes are also reflected in the changing accounts of the origins of Triphylia which apparently “became” Arcadian in the space of a few decades in the early fourth century,  just in time to be included in the new federal state. When the Arcadians set up their monument in Delphi, probably in 369 BCE, their eponymous hero, Arkas, had “acquired” an additional son, Triphylos, and as if to stress the point, a son of Triphylos, Erasos, was included, too.  This monument is a crucial piece of evidence because it represents an authentic record of the self-representation of the Arcadian League in the 360s BCE, and the significant remains of the original base together with Pausanias’ detailed description provide an excellent record. The league set up a series of statues representing the most important figures in the Arcadian genealogy,  including Arkas with his sons and his mother Kallisto, and the inscription specifically stresses Arcadian autochthony. The context of the monument is also poignant, because it was placed at the entrance of the sanctuary, a location dominated by Argive and Spartan dedications. This emphasized the powerful message of a new, strong and self-confident Arcadia as an aspiring Peloponnesian power, presented in one of the most public spaces in the Greek world, and it seems perfectly compatible with the image presented by Xenophon’s Lycomedes.
Arcadian identity did not just come with a long genealogy; there were also some traits which were seen as typical for the region and its people. Most of these are, in fact, alluded to in the Iliad’s Catalogue of Ships, a text that, although notoriously difficult to date, almost certainly predates all other preserved literary information about Arcadians except probably Hesiod.  The passage, with its references to the mountainous landscape, to flocks pastured in Arcadia (specifically in Orchomenos), and to inhabitants who are excellent fighters but not acquainted with the sea, remained a crucial reference point for the Arcadian image well into the Roman imperial period. To these typical Arcadian traits one might add piety, poverty and, perhaps connected to the idea of the extreme age of the Arcadian people, a certain reputation for a primitive lifestyle.  The Arcadian dialect was also distinct from other dialects used in the Peloponnese, and just as inscriptions record specific features of local variety we have to assume that it must have been possible to tell the difference between the spoken language of an Arcadian and that of his Dorian, Elean or Achaean neighbors.  It is, however, not clear whether the ancient Greeks ever acknowledged the existence of a specific Arcadian regional dialect in the same way as they thought of Attic or Boeotian.  The Triphylians are an interesting test case: the dialect recorded in their inscriptions is Elean (in some places with slight variations).  Nevertheless the Arcadians were willing to accept them into their tribe: what made the Triphylians Arcadian was not their dialect but their putative ancestry.
Lycomedes’ speech singles out Arcadian prowess in warfare, the Arcadian quality most relevant for a claim to political power. The idea that Arcadians had always allowed others to use their services instead of going to war on their own behalf seems to have been proverbial by the second half of the fifth century: about 425 BCE Hermippos included mercenaries from Arcadia in a list of stereotypical products of different regions.  The comic poet Plato uses the expression Ἀρκάδας μιμεῖσθαι, which describes someone fighting for others while suffering only defeat at home.  This reference is ambiguous: it might point to the Arcadians as long-standing allies of Sparta, or it could refer to mercenary service. The latter is likely to be the interpretation that would have come to most Greeks’ minds, because Arcadians had a reputation for serving as mercenaries in the Greek world and beyond. From Herodotus’ Arcadians who, after Thermopylae, are trying to sell their military services to the Persians,  to the several thousand among Cyrus’ Ten Thousand,  the region was famous for exporting good soldiers, but also troops that might support any cause as long as payment was adequate. This reputation was certainly based on fact: for example, Roy calculates that the Arcadians with Cyrus represented at least eight percent of the adult male population of Arcadia at a time when yet others were employed elsewhere, for example in Sicily. 
Lycomedes’ (or rather Xenophon’s) reference to Arcadians whose efforts in war bring about others’ success sounds suspiciously similar, and it certainly plays on the same stereotypes. The audience’s knowledge of Arcadian warriors’ prowess in mercenary service would help to emphasize the point the speaker is trying to make, although in this context the reference is primarily to Arcadians fighting as (unpaid!) allies of the large powers in Greece, namely Sparta and recently also Thebes. The old Arcadian stereotype is skillfully adapted to fit a bid for an Arcadian state that acts independently of any of the large powers, and Lycomedes goes so far as to hint at the possibility that Arcadia could become a major player in its own right. We know from Athenian sources how markers of local identity were used in public speeches, particularly to underline patriotic statements.  Xenophon probably drew on such traditions when he composed Lycomedes’ speech, and he produced a credible translation of recognized Arcadian stereotypes into rhetorical arguments. Xenophon’s version of Arcadian patriotic sentiment in a political context is likely to have appeared plausible to Greeks in general, and it was probably familiar enough to Arcadians, too.
The Development of Arcadian Identity
The Arcadian view is, in fact, difficult to determine because most references to Arcadia reflect what outsiders thought about Arcadians: the region’s image was relatively clearly defined some time before we see Arcadians themselves declare their Arcadian identity. In the context of this paper it is particularly important to understand how they reconciled their loyalty to a city or local tribal community with their regional identity. In order to understand the pan-Arcadian sentiments that helped to drive political unification after the battle of Leuctra it is necessary to investigate evidence for a regional identity before the league was founded. As far as possible this enquiry must be based on original classical sources, because in spite of its quick demise the Arcadian league is likely to have had a lasting impact on pan-Arcadian symbols and rhetoric, not least by creating Megalopolis, a city that still retained many monuments of pan-Arcadian significance in the Roman period, and that was itself a lasting memorial of regional unification. 
Nielsen collects all instances of the regional ethnic in inscriptions and texts, and he does detect a distinct pattern: Arcadians often, but by no means always, chose to call themselves Ἀρκάς, and it was also possible to combine the regional label with a city ethnic: “an Arcadian from Tegea.”  It does not seem surprising that the regional ethnic (as used by Arcadians themselves) is usually found outside the region itself, but even then the label “Arkas” was by no means universally adopted. Epigraphic references to Arcadians outside Arcadia show a good deal of variation. The fourth century lists of naopoioi at Delphi include Arcadians who chose to be known by their city ethnics, alongside others who preferred the regional label Ἀρκάς, without any apparent correlation with the state of the Arcadian League at the time or with the size or prominence of the city in question.  Roy’s observations of Xenophon’s usage in the Anabasis offer a more detailed insight into such personal preferences. Xenophon usually labels personal acquaintances from Arcadia with their city ethnic, while he uses the more general ethnic “Arcadian” when he does not know an individual well. This would suggest that in close interactions with other Greeks these Arcadians preferred to stress their local identity, but as first identification in conversation with an outsider they might choose the regional ethnic before indicating their polis or tribal community. 
Given that a large part of classical Arcadia consisted of well-established poleis, it is perhaps quite surprising how easily some Arcadians did adopt the regional ethnic in place of a city ethnic. Like most Greeks, Arcadians had more than one identity to choose from, and they would have made use of whichever label seemed to be most advantageous or prestigious in a particular context. The relatively common use of the Arcadian ethnic suggests that it was particularly well recognized abroad and therefore a useful category to be associated with. In an “international” context Arcadian identity was apparently attractive, or at least preferable to the exclusive use of less-recognizable city ethnics. The generally positive image that Arcadians enjoyed in the Greek tradition, from their most impressively ancient pedigree to the fearsome warrior image, may well have added to the wide appeal of Arcadian-ness. We should also consider that the Arcadian ethnic may have been acceptable alongside city identities exactly because during most of its history Arcadia was not a political unit. This meant that regional and local identities could co-exist without much friction, unlike, for example, in Boeotia where regional identity became a threat to local identities because it served Thebes as a means of coercing its neighbors into the Boeotian League. 
The most striking epigraphical evidence for a common Arcadian identity can be found in the late fourth-century victory lists set up at the sanctuary on Mount Lykaion.  They present various outsiders with their city ethnics, but Arcadians are all listed as Ἀρκάς. Not only is the use of the regional ethnic unique for inscriptions found in Arcadia, the complete omission of city-ethnics for all Arcadians is not paralleled anywhere else, even outside the region. This has to be seen as a deliberate and particularly strong pan-Arcadian gesture, and although the inscriptions date to a period after the demise of the federal state, they show that Mount Lykaion was seen as a location particularly appropriate for extravagant Arcadian gestures. The importance of this pan-Arcadian sanctuary can, in fact, be traced back into an earlier period: Xenophon reports that Cyrus consented to interrupt his march to allow his Arcadian mercenaries to celebrate the Lykaia festival.  Not only are the Arcadians the only mercenaries among the Ten Thousand to be singled out in this manner, it is also remarkable that men hailing from many different cities regarded a common regional festival as so important that they managed to convince their non-Arcadian Greek commanders and their Persian employer to grant them the opportunity to celebrate it.
It seems clear, then, that by the early fourth century BCE Arcadian identity was well established, regarded as an appropriate substitute for local identities in some circumstances and developed sufficiently to be useful as a political tool. Such a politicized sense of identity must have emerged over time as individuals, cities or regional organizations turned individual political agendas into Arcadian causes. We need to ask, therefore, under what circumstances pan-Arcadian rhetoric may have become an attractive political tool.
The most striking example for apparently common Arcadian activity is a large but enigmatic series of coins which started some time before the mid-fifth century and continued for some decades, possibly as the largest coinage in the Peloponnese.  These coins bear the image of Zeus Lykaios and an unidentified goddess; there is also a legend ΑΡΚΑΔΙΚΟΝ, usually in abbreviated form. As Nielsen shows conclusively, it is very unlikely that there ever was an Arcadian state, or any kind of fully fledged pan-Arcadian organization before the foundation of the federal state in the fourth century.  Nielsen stresses the connection of the Arkadikon coinage with the sanctuary on Mount Lykaion; as already mentioned, this was a particularly important place for a common regional identity.  There is no evidence that the Lykaion was under firm control of one polis before its inclusion in the territory of Megalopolis. Communities in the area lived in villages and small towns and were organized in tribes. The initiative could have come from an organization of states around the sanctuary, a putative Arcadian amphiktyony, as Nielsen suggests, although such an organization is not attested in the sources.  It seems more likely that the Arkadikon coinage represents the attempt by one or more individual powers to harness Arcadian symbols and sentiments for their own ends.
Fifth-century history provides us with a number of examples where regional rhetoric may have been seen as useful in initiating or consolidating the co-operation between different states or political groups in the region, even if none of these efforts seems to have achieved a coalition that included all of Arcadia. Such developments would also have made a significant contribution to a clearer definition of Arcadian identity and the symbols that could best represent it. We cannot rule out that some cities or individuals had pan-Arcadian aspirations as early as the archaic period; both Tegea and Mantinea may have been influential, and it seems that Kleitor also managed to assert power over neighboring communities.  There is, however, not enough evidence to evaluate these developments in any detail and to determine whether any bid for regional power before the Persian Wars went hand in hand with pan-Arcadian aspirations. 
The earliest attested example shows us an outsider attempting to find a common Arcadian symbol to rally his followers in the region. Herodotus reports that Cleomenes I was planning to unite the Arcadians to strengthen his position against political opponents in Sparta, and he expected his new allies to swear an oath of allegiance by the Styx River in northern Arcadia.  These plans probably never came to fruition because Cleomenes was recalled to Sparta before he had formed his Arcadian coalition. The Styx is not usually presented as a place of Arcadian identification, and if we are dealing with a glimpse of a genuinely native tradition, it was soon abandoned, perhaps when the Lykaion became the main focus of regional identity. However, the Styx does seem an unlikely choice for such a role, not only because of its extremely remote location, but also because of its ominous connections with the underworld. It is possible that this episode represents an idea imposed by an outsider (Cleomenes? Herodotus or his source?) not in response to some Arcadian tradition, but rather as a nod to the river’s famous role in the Homeric epics where it serves the gods as a guarantor of their most holy oaths.  In any case, this episode shows that using an Arcadian agenda for political ends was feasible in the early fifth century BCE, or at least that a few decades later, around the middle of the century, Herodotus could present this story as a plausible interpretation of the king’s actions. 
Among the Arcadians themselves the two largest cities, Tegea and Mantinea, were particularly keen to exploit regional politics for their own ends. Tegea’s anti-Spartan stance after the Persian wars apparently led to an alliance with Argos, and Tegea probably became the leader of an alliance, referred to by Herodotus as “all Arcadians except Mantinea,” which was active between 479 and 465 BCE and was defeated by the Spartans in the battle of Dipaia.  In 423 BCE, when Tegea opposed its neighbor Mantinea with the help of the Spartans, it still had some allies of its own, presumably also Arcadians.  Fifth-century Tegea engaged in some hefty pan-Arcadian and anti-Spartan rhetoric with the aim of showing itself as the traditional leader of the region. Herodotus, who probably visited the city around the mid-fifth century, records a number of examples.  In the temple of Athena Alea, a sanctuary of more than merely local importance, he saw the chains of Spartans who had allegedly been taken prisoner in a conflict before the foundation of the Peloponnesian League. This represents a monumentalization of the ancient conflict between Tegea and Sparta which is scarcely thinkable in a city as faithful to Sparta as the Tegeans had been at Plataea. It does, however, suit a state at the head of an anti-Spartan coalition. The historical conflict is conveniently shown as Sparta’s first step towards a conquest of all of Arcadia which was at least considerably delayed by Tegean resistance.  The mythical history of Tegea also supplied a crucial part of the royal genealogy of Arcadia. One of the Arcadian-Tegean kings, Echemos, was credited with defeating Hyllos, the son of Heracles, with the result that the Heraclidae (in effect the Dorian ancestors of the Spartans) stayed out of the Peloponnese for another three generations. Herodotus’ Tegeans use this essentially anti-Dorian story as an argument to remind the Spartans of their right to a privileged position in the phalanx at Plataea.  Pausanias’ description of Tegea stresses this anti-Spartan role of Tegea even more, but it is impossible to determine how much of the tradition and monuments mentioned date back to the time before 370 BCE.  Herodotus’ evidence alone is, however, sufficient to demonstrate that at least in the fifth century Tegea made a conscious effort to present itself as a long-standing champion of the Arcadian cause, particularly against Sparta.
By the latter half of the fifth century Mantinea was just as eager to show pan-Arcadian tendencies as its southern neighbor. Its coinage shows acorns and bears alongside the traditional Mantinean emblem, the trident. Both are very Arcadian motifs, the bear because Arkas’ mother Kallisto was turned into a bear, and acorns are connected with the image of the earliest origins of the Arcadians: before the invention of agriculture they were said to have lived on acorns, a fact which made βαλανηφάγοι ('acorn eaters') an appropriate epithet for Arcadians in a Delphic oracle quoted by Herodotus.  Thucydides reports that by 423 BCE Mantinea had gained control over a fairly large part of Arcadia which included Parrhasia (part of the area later incorporated in the territory of Megalopolis) and probably also parts of central Arcadia.  Like Tegea, Mantinea therefore had reason to resort to Arcadian, as opposed to purely Mantinean, themes. The period of Mantinean expansionism also offers the most likely background for an initiative to transfer the bones of Arkas to Mantinea, a bold move which suggests a serious claim to pan-Arcadian leadership.  Mantinean policies in this period also had a strong anti-Spartan flavor, especially after 420 BCE, when the Arcadian city joined an alliance with Athens, Argos and Elis, and in 418 BCE Sparta had to take military action to put a halt to their activities. It is therefore likely that, just as with Tegea earlier in the century, Mantinea’s pan-Arcadian rhetoric was closely connected with a struggle against Sparta. In this context it is also interesting to observe that even in the euphoric days after the battle of Leuctra some Arcadians were apparently skeptical about a pan-Arcadian movement. Orchomenos in particular had to be coerced into the new league: a city that could probably look back on a long struggle against its neighbor Mantinea’s expansionist tendencies had good reasons to remember that causes presented as Arcadian might not be equally beneficial to all Arcadians. 
The two great cities of Arcadia were probably not alone in playing the Arcadian card when it seemed politically opportune. Pan-Arcadian claims may have been used in different contexts, and by different parties. For example, Xenophon reports that “the Arcadians” were claiming Lasion (in east Elis) as Arcadian, probably in 397 BCE.  He does not explain who these Arcadians are. All of them? Part of Arcadia? A neighboring Arcadian city such as Psophis or Thelpusa? Xenophon may be projecting the circumstances of his own time (post-370 BCE) into the past, but he suggests that someone was using a pan-Arcadian agenda well before the political unification of the region. There is also an intriguing example of coins from Methydrion and Orchomenos with a number of designs depicting the myth of Kallisto and the birth of Arkas. Nielsen suggests that this coinage might be connected to Orchomenos’ own efforts to assert influence over cities in its vicinity, namely the creation of a sunteleia which probably included Methydrion.  We have to assume that by the fourth century, the “Arcadian argument” was not just used by the big players, and it is possible that under some circumstances, Arcadians may have used pan-Arcadian rhetoric to support a common cause, independent of the interests of one of the cities that had long used regional identity to serve their own ends.
Such ostensibly (if not geographically comprehensive) pan-Arcadian activities were probably the driving force behind the creation of the Arkadikon coinage. If we follow Kraay in dating the beginning of the series just before the mid-fifth century, the best candidate for initiating this coinage is Tegea’s alliance, which fought Sparta at Dipaia. Cleomenes’ activities in Arcadia predate the earliest coins, while Mantinea’s rise in the second half of the fifth century comes too late.  This would also explain why Tegea, a large and relatively prosperous city, apparently did not mint coins of its own for most of the fifth century.  As long as Tegea was the leader of a substantial Arcadian alliance it would have had the clout to determine the use of Arcadian symbols and to initiate a regional coinage which may then have continued well beyond the period of Tegea’s greatest influence. In the variable political climate of fifth-century Arcadia no single substantial Arcadian organization is likely to have survived as long as the Arkadikon coinage, but pan-Arcadian rhetoric and symbols clearly proved useful in different situations. Under such circumstances the minting of Arkadikon coins may well have been interrupted, or perhaps there were even several cities which struck coins of this type at different times: both scenarios would account for the distinct die sequences identified by Williams.  The focus on Zeus Lykaios would suggest a commitment to a pan-Arcadian rhetoric which could be seen as more inclusive than any symbol closely connected to Tegea itself, particularly the city’s major goddess, Athena Alea. The control over (or access to) the Lykaion sanctuary might have played a role in Tegea’s conflict with Mantinea in the area of Oresthasion and Ladokeion, not far from Mount Lykaion. 
Particular modes of ethnic argumentation adopted by the Arcadians owed much to forms of political discourse practiced in other parts of Greece. In fact, the defining features of Arcadian identity may be the result of an ongoing dialectic process that took place while other identities, especially those connected to the Dorians, simultaneously emerged in the archaic Peloponnese. Arcadian pride in autochthonous origins seems a perfect answer to Sparta’s Dorian rhetoric which centered on the “return” or migration of the Heraclidae to the Peloponnese.  It is possible that this was already an issue in the sixth century when the Spartans tried to stake a claim to pre-Dorian heritage by transferring the bones of Orestes and his son Teisamenos to Sparta.  This particular mode of exploiting mythical history was then in turn adopted by the Mantineans when they transferred the bones of Arkas from Mainalos to their own city. 
Such forms of “ethnic discourse,” developed in the context of interstate politics, would invite Arcadians to think in regional categories, and it seems that ultimately, this made political unification a conceivable option, even if it remained practically impossible as long as Sparta was in control. When the opportunity finally came, the Arcadians were ready to act together as a group, at least for a few years.
The Influence of Sparta
Sparta was the outside factor which had the most significant influence on the development of Arcadian identity, and it is therefore to Sparta that we now turn. Sparta’s aggression and her alliance with all Arcadian cities and communities within the Peloponnesian League were instrumental in shaping the crucial preconditions for the unification of Arcadia which proved so destructive for the whole alliance in the crisis after Leuctra.
In the ancient sources Arcadian opposition to Spartan aggression and control is the most conspicuous aspect of this relationship. Many texts written after 370 BCE are probably influenced by hindsight and by Arcadian anti-Spartan sentiments that outlasted the Peloponnesian League by centuries, not least because Sparta continued to pose a threat to her immediate neighbors.  In spite of this continuing friction the relationship between Sparta and individual Arcadian allies could be very good,  and it should not be forgotten that most of the time Arcadian cities enjoyed considerable freedom to pursue their own policies; even wars between Sparta’s allies were not an unusual occurrence. 
Opposition to Sparta was nevertheless a crucial factor in the formation of Arcadian identity. In general, group identities depend on the existence of the “other” which is perceived as being outside the group, and different from it. Conflict with such an opponent will usually increase group cohesion.  Sparta seems to have been very aggressive in the archaic period, with a focus on its neighbors beyond Messenia certainly in the seventh century, and possibly as early as the eighth.  At the same time at least the evidence from the sanctuary of Athena Alea at Tegea suggests that from the protogeometric period onward there was also close cultural interaction with Laconia.  The Arcadians had ample opportunity to get to know their southern neighbor and to observe contrasts that could help them define their own ethnic identity.
After the battle of Leuctra pan-Arcadian activities constituted a deliberate move away from Spartan influence. Anti-Spartan rhetoric was rife in much of Greece by this point, because Sparta’s heavy-handed policy after the King’s Peace gave ample reason for discontent. The Mantineans, who played a leading role in the move towards Arcadian unity, had a particularly good cause to bear grudges against the state that had forced them to abandon their urban center, and to settle in separate villages.  By the time Tegea was embroiled in stasis it was clear that the unification of Arcadia depended on a struggle of democrats against pro-Spartan oligarchs.  Since, as we have seen, much of the pan-Arcadian rhetoric that developed in the fifth century was closely connected with opposition to Sparta, it was probably easy to adapt already existing ideas and symbols to the new circumstances. The foundation of Megalopolis in particular was an Arcadian federal project which combined a regional agenda with overt anti-Spartan measures. The new city was created by the synoecism of a large part of southern and southwestern Arcadia, which up to this point was organized by tribes and small towns or villages. This region had been strategically important for the Spartans, because it offered access from Laconia to Messenia, and that route was now blocked by a major new fortified settlement.  Moreover, the conspicuous construction of a new “Great City,” emphasized by its programmatic name, symbolizes the power of the new Arcadian League, but it also responds to a long tradition of tensions created by Sparta’s opposition to urbanization projects, be it the construction of city walls or the foundation of urban centers by synoecism, which found its most extreme expression in the dioikismos of Mantinea in 385 BCE. 
The Spartans were not necessarily the only outsiders who contributed to the definition of Arcadian-ness: the prime choice of the “significant other” for ethnic identification may vary in different areas and periods. Argos may have been seen as a serious threat in the archaic period, and one would expect that anti-Elean rhetoric became an especially useful aspect of Arcadian identification at a time when the Triphylians tried to distance themselves from Elis by “becoming” Arcadian. As it turned out in the 360s BCE, however, sentiments against Elis or Thebes, which became crucial issues for the Arcadian confederation, were not enough to keep the region together. After Epaminondas’ Peloponnesian campaign that established Messenia as an independent state, Sparta was no longer equally perceived as a threat by all Arcadians. Soon it became clear that there was no other factor that could replace Sparta as common unifying enemy and therefore guarantor for strong pan-Arcadian sentiments. The result was that individual cities’ concerns, class-consciousness, and even a common Peloponnesian sentiment (for Sparta, against Thebes) could overrule specifically Arcadian interests.  Even in her defeat as hegemon of the Peloponnese, Sparta proved that she was the crucial factor for Arcadian identification, whose absence ultimately meant failure for the pan-Arcadian project. In fact, anti-Spartan sentiment was such an integral part of Arcadian identity that it can still be seen in Polybius’ attitudes, and, even later, in Pausanias’ record of Arcadian traditions. 
There is yet another way in which Sparta contributed to the consolidation of Arcadian ethnicity, namely by making the Arcadian cities and tribal communities part of the Peloponnesian League. It is generally thought that warfare is a significant factor in the emergence of ethnic communities, but it is more difficult to assess the effect of warfare within the context of a large alliance. If I may offer a bold comparison to illustrate my point, the impact of the Roman system of alliances on the peoples and states of Italy shows this effect particularly clearly. By giving an originally disparate group of communities, tribes and states a means of forging contacts and by fostering interaction within the peninsula the Romans not only created an unprecedented military machine, they also contributed to the formation of a new Italian identity which enabled their allies to unite against their masters in the Social War.  Many factors that contributed to this development in Italy, such as the status of Italians and Romans in provinces overseas and the role of Latin as a means of communication and identification in a multilingual environment, have no parallels on the Peloponnese. The states and ethnic groups within Sparta’s league were culturally and politically less heterogeneous to begin with, but as in Italy, decades of membership in a highly active military alliance were bound to promote communication between member states and increase the allies’ experience with war and politics on a scale that a small polis could hardly have allowed them to gain. The activities of the Peloponnesian league, particularly in the Peloponnesian War, also contributed to the prosperity of Arcadian cities because on one hand the region was never a major theatre of the war, while on the other hand Sparta’s allies were probably entitled to a share of the booty acquired in successful campaigns. 
At first glance the Spartans were apparently not interested in the large regional and ethnic groups to which their allies belonged; in fact, it has been claimed that they deliberately followed a policy of “divide and rule.” The league was organized by member states, namely cities and small tribal communities: Sparta made treaties with individual states,  troops were usually recruited by community, not by region, and the phalanx was apparently not composed along ethnic lines.  However, in practice regional or ethnic links between allies would have played an important role, especially on campaign. Contingents supplied by small member states could be so small that on their own they could hardly make up an effective section of the phalanx, especially when Sparta did not need the full strength of its allied army and commanded its members just to send a proportion of their full force. Such small contingents would have been dependent on close co-operation and personal acquaintance with men from other cities just to ensure the cohesion necessary to keep the phalanx together.  In the fifth century league campaigns became almost an annual event, and it is likely that fighting and campaigning with other Peloponnesians fostered cohesion among Sparta’s allies.
How, then, would this contribute to Arcadian identity specifically? The region contained a particularly large number of very small states which would need to be organized in manageable units, and smaller ethne within Arcadia, especially Parrhasians, Mainalians, Eutresians, and Kynourians, may have been treated as units, although they did also contain poleis which may have had individual treaties with Sparta.  Ancient authors sometimes group together all Arcadians—or at least those from the smaller cities—when they speak of the contingents making up Peloponnesian forces, and this might reflect actual practice within the league.  There is also some evidence that at times, when they seemed useful for organizational purposes, major regional units were also acknowledged by the Spartans. For example, according to Thucydides the league levied ships by region in 412 BCE, and Diodorus suggests a regional organization of league troops in the early 370s BCE. 
The league gave the Arcadians experience in warfare beyond the means of individual cities, which may explain the efficiency of federal Arcadian troops (the Eparitai) especially mentioned by Xenophon; the new state’s commanders and individual soldiers could already draw on the experience in large scale warfare.  A similar effect also seems to be apparent in Xenophon’s Anabasis: by 400 BCE the Arcadians among the Ten Thousand showed a group cohesion that seems surprising in a particular section of a mixed army of mercenaries. Although they came from various cities, and were probably originally recruited through different commanders, they fought together in an organized contingent (called τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν), and they made their own decisions by casting votes in an assembly.  This organized group knows how to argue its Arcadian case, using superior numbers and military prowess as an argument, just as Lycomedes of Mantinea does in the speech discussed at the beginning of this paper,  and as Arcadians may quite possibly also have done when they were on campaign with the Peloponnesian League. They were also willing to work together with other Peloponnesians, for example Eleans or Achaeans, while at the same time displaying a certain hostility towards Spartans, and, more explicitly, against non-Peloponnesians.  As we have already seen, these Arcadians also knew how to express and celebrate their common regional identity within a multinational group of other Greeks and non-Greeks.  It seems likely that this particularly Arcadian, and to an extent Peloponnesian (Elean, Achaean), behavior was influenced by a long experience of service within the large, mixed armies of the Peloponnesian League.
Membership in the Peloponnesian League also meant participation in league assemblies where members could discuss and influence the common course of action. Although the league was nominally a set of alliances between Sparta and individual cities, fellow members did work together, and cities could seek support among members for particular causes, as shown by Corinth’s canvassing just before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.  Among the members of the league, the Arcadians with their many communities constituted the biggest ethnic block. This does not mean that they automatically decided and voted along ethnic lines, but the negotiation of supraregional policies in this context may also have contributed to a recognition of common interests, especially among the smaller cities. Could an “Arcadian” claim to Lasion have been made in this context?  The Peloponnesian League was quite possibly the first arena for Arcadian arguments in a wider, “international” political context.
The Spartans were certainly aware and often wary of ethnic groups within their league. They were willing to back an ethnic state in Triphylia where it could serve their own ends, but they were clearly aware of the danger that such an ethnic movement could pose for themselves and their league. In Arcadia traditional rivalries between cities offered good opportunities to control the rise of a comprehensive anti-Spartan pan-Arcadian movement. Some cities were evidently more worried about their nearest neighbors than about Sparta, for example Orchomenos and Tegea who were often willing to back whoever was fighting their common neighbor Mantinea. In the fifth century both Tegea and Mantinea managed to assemble sizeable anti-Spartan coalitions but neither succeeded in uniting the whole region.  In 418 BCE the Tegeans were apparently on the verge of civil war in favor of the pan-Arcadian, anti-Spartan cause. Sparta recognized the imminent danger of a united Arcadia and acted immediately and with full force.  In the following period, before the battle of Leuctra, Mantinea continued to be the main proponent of Arcadian and anti-Spartan sentiments, while Sparta relied on a number of loyal cities, presumably ruled by elites whose security depended on the hegemon, to prevent regional co-operation from getting out of hand. Once the King’s Peace gave Sparta a free hand, she disbanded Mantinea into villages which were obliged to send separate army contingents on league campaigns. This drastic action may have been intended as a clear Spartan message against the pressure for larger regional units in general, and pan-Arcadian aspirations in particular. As the developments after the Spartan defeat at Leuctra showed, however, the time for regional/ethnic politics had definitely come.
The Arcadian bid for independence from Sparta in 370 BCE spelled the end of Sparta’s role as a major power in Greece. Within about a year the Arcadians transformed their region of heterogeneous communities into a sophisticated federal state. There is no doubt that this movement was founded upon an appeal to a well-defined sense of Arcadian identity.
In spite of the very fragmentary sources we can trace the development of Arcadian identity back into the archaic period when communities in a region recognized as a distinct entity by outsiders started to develop a common sense of self. This regional identity existed alongside a set of numerous local community identities. For most of the late archaic and classical periods before 370 BCE these communities were members of the Peloponnesian League which was, in fact, the only political organization that united them all, albeit within a much larger framework that also included many other states. In the fifth century Tegea and Mantinea created regional leagues within this framework, and it is likely that both used Arcadian rhetoric to gain support. Neither managed to unite all of Arcadia, but they quickly came into conflict with Sparta.
After its conflicts with leagues of Arcadians and other ethnic-regional groupings within its alliance in the fifth century, Sparta was wary of such activities and tried to control anti-Spartan—and therefore presumably also regional—sentiments, which probably only strengthened the sense of a common Arcadian identity. These were ideal circumstances for the development of an explicitly anti-Spartan pan-Arcadian rhetoric which was crucial for unification after the battle of Leuctra. It took the removal of Spartan control, the very factor that had been so instrumental in the development of Arcadian identity, to create a functioning political movement that encompassed the whole region. In the absence of that cohesive factor, namely Sparta as an enemy all Arcadians could agree on, that unity was very short-lived indeed.
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[ back ] * I am grateful to Thomas Heine Nielsen for his advice and suggestions for this paper which, as his support in all matters Arcadian, have been invaluable. Thanks are also due to the organizers and participants of the Münster conference, in particular Nino Luraghi and Jim Roy. Last but not least, I would like to thank the anonymous referee for many helpful comments.
[ back ] 1. Ste Croix 1972:97 assumes that by 540 almost the whole Peloponnese was allied to Sparta. This excludes Argos and probably all of the Achaean cities, most of which joined the league during the Peloponnesian War, or just before.
[ back ] 2. Nielsen 2002:475–477, Roy 1974, Larsen 1968:180–195.
[ back ] 3. Xenophon Hellenica 5.2.1–8; on Mantinea as initiator: Larsen 1968:183, Dušanić 1970:285.
[ back ] 4. Xenophon Hellenica 6.5.5; Elis also contributed to Mantinea’s new wall.
[ back ] 5. Nielsen 2002:367–372.
[ back ] 6. Xenophon Hellenica 6.5.6, Diodorus 15.59.1–4.
[ back ] 7. Xenophon Hellenica 6.5.11.
[ back ] 8. CEG 824 (FdD III 3, Pausanias 10.9.5–8), Polybius 4.77.8, Pausanias 5.5.3–6; Nielsen 2002:248252.
[ back ] 9. Xenophon Hellenica 7.1.23–24. Lykomedes: Xenophon Hellenica 7.1.39, 7.4.2, Diodorus 1.562.2, 15.67.2.
[ back ] 10. Roy 1972b.
[ back ] 11. Hesiod fr. 162 W, fr. 163 W, fr. 23a 32 W. Hecataeus FGH 1 F 6, F 9, F 29a, F 29b; Pherecydes FGH 3 F 5, F 82a, F 135a, F 156–161, Asios in Pausanias 8.1.4; cf. Pausanias 8.1.4–4.4.
[ back ] 12. Herodotus 8.73, cf. 2.171, Thucydides 1.2.3.
[ back ] 13. Apollodorus 3.8–9; fifth-century source: Nielsen 2002:235–236 with n. 36; Callmer 1943:45–46, van der Valk 1958:142, Hejnic 1961:55.
[ back ] 14. Pausanias 8.3.1–5, cf. 8.27.1–8; Roy 1968.
[ back ] 15. Nielsen 2002:92–97, see Iliad 2.605–8.
[ back ] 16. Nielsen 2002:230–265, Herodotus 4.148. See Ruggeri, this volume.
[ back ] 17. CEG 824 (FdD III 3), Pausanias 10.9.5–8. See also Polybius 4.77.8–10.
[ back ] 18. Pausanias 10.9.5–6 refers to the monument as Tegean, but the main inscription (CEG 824 lines 1–2) identifies it as a dedication of the Arcadians.
[ back ] 19. Iliad 2.603–614.
[ back ] 20. Nielsen 2002:74–83, Pretzler 2005:526–527.
[ back ] 21. For a detailed discussion of the Arcadian dialect see Dubois 1986.
[ back ] 22. See Nielsen 2002:50–52, 75–76, with Hall 1995, Hall 1997:170–181.
[ back ] 23. Striano 1991, Ruggeri 2000.
[ back ] 24. Hermippos fr.63 (Köck), in Athenaios 1.27F.
[ back ] 25. Borgeaud 1988:21–22, 197–198n109; Plato Comicus (active at least 428–389 BCE) fr. 99 (Köck); see also Xenophon Hellenica 3.5.12 (set in 395 BCE); Nielsen 2002:81–82.
[ back ] 26. Herodotus 8.26.2.
[ back ] 27. Roy 1967:308–309 calculates that there were 4000 at least. Cf. Parke 1933:14–16, Demand 1990:48–49.
[ back ] 28. Roy 1999:346–348, see also Fields 2001.
[ back ] 29. Loraux 2006, esp.132–171, 263–304.
[ back ] 30. Pausanias 8.30.1–8.32.5, Nilsson 1972:18–22, Jost 1973:264–256, Jost 1985:220–235. Note Pausanias 8.53.9, a “common hearth of the Arcadians” in Tegea, which should probably also be seen in the context of the Arcadian League of the 360s BCE and the sentiments, symbols, and rhetoric it created.
[ back ] 31. Nielsen 2002:54–66.
[ back ] 32. Nielsen 2002:63–64 with n. 96, appendix II.
[ back ] 33. Roy 1972b.
[ back ] 34. Examples for Boeotian rhetoric as a threat: Thucydides 2.2.1–4, 3.61.1, 3.64 (cf. 3.55–56), 7.57.5; Xenophon Hellenica 5.1.32–33, 6.3.19.
[ back ] 35. IG V 2.549, 550. Nielsen 2002:61–63 & appendix I.
[ back ] 36. Xenophon Anabasis 1.2.10, Roy 1972b:134–135, Ma 2004, esp. 338–343, cf. Parker 2004:139–140. See also Bergese 1995:111–112: a dedication to Zeus Lykaios found in Sicily; connected with the many mercenaries who were hired in Sicily?
[ back ] 37. Williams 1965, Kraay 1976:98.
[ back ] 38. Nielsen 2002:120–157, Nielsen 1996. One suggestion was that a league was created by Cleomenes I: see especially Wallace 1954, but evidence for events (most prominently Herodotus 9.33, 9.35) in fifth-century Arcadia contradict the idea of a long-lasting comprehensive league. See Roy 1972a; cf. Andrewes 1952.
[ back ] 39. Nielsen 2002:145–152, Nielsen 1996:56–61, Head 1911:444–445, 447–448 (“festival coinage”).
[ back ] 40. See Nielsen 2002:150–152.
[ back ] 41. Tegea: note the successful defence against Spartan aggression; the attack on Tegea is connected to Spartan designs on all of Arcadia (Herodotus 1.66); Mantinea: Pausanias 5.26.6 with Richter 1939:194–201; Kleitor: inscription mentioning spoils “from many cities,” Pausanias 5.23.7 with Richter 1939:199–201.
[ back ] 42. Nielsen 2002:185–188, Roy 1972a:336, 339–340; cf. Roy 1972c.
[ back ] 43. Herodotus 6.74–75.
[ back ] 44. Iliad 2.755, 14.247, 15.37; Odyssey 2.185.
[ back ] 45. Roy 2001:266, Nielsen 2002:84–85.
[ back ] 46. Herodotus 9.35, Nielsen 2002:142–145, 366–367; see also Andrewes 1952.
[ back ] 47. Thucydides 4.134.
[ back ] 48. Herodotus 1.66–68, 9.26–28.
[ back ] 49. Herodotus 1.66.
[ back ] 50. Herodotus 9.26.
[ back ] 51. Pausanias 8.45.3, 47.2, 47.4, 48.4–5, 53.10, 54.4. Pretzler 1999:109–111, 114–118. See also Pretzler 2007:152–153.
[ back ] 52. Herodotus 1.66, cf. Pausanias 8.1.6.
[ back ] 53. Nielsen 2002:367–372, Thucydides 4.134.1–2, 5.28.3–5.29.2, 5.33.1–3, 5.4.7, 5.67.2, 5.81.1.
[ back ] 54. Pausanias 8.9.3, 8.36.8, for the date see Hejnic 1961:29, Jost 1985:128, Bergese 1995:25, Nielsen 2002:403–404, esp. n. 460.
[ back ] 55. Xenophon Hellenica 6.5.10–11, Diodorus 15.59.4. Cf. Thucydides 5.61–62 (418 BCE); see also Roy 1971:571–572.
[ back ] 56. Xenophon Hellenica 3.2.30.
[ back ] 57. Head 1911:451, Nielsen 2002:355–357. Cf. Head 1911:452, a fourth-century coin of Pheneos showing Hermes with the infant Arkas; in some specimens the child is even identified by a legend.
[ back ] 58. Dates: Kraay 1976:98.
[ back ] 59. Nielsen 1996:56; Head 1911:454: start of Tegean coins in c. 420 BCE. Possible archaic coinage: Nielsen 2002:594.
[ back ] 60. Williams 1965.
[ back ] 61. Thucydides 4.134, 5.29.1, Nielsen 2002:372–373.
[ back ] 62. Hall 1997:34–66, cf. Thucydides 1.2.3, Herodotus 8.73.
[ back ] 63. Transfer of bones by Sparta: Herodotus 1.67–68, cf. Pausanias 8.54.4, 3.11.10 (Orestes), Pausanias 7.1.8 (Teisamenos); Ste Croix 1972:96, Leahy 1955, Dowden 1992:91, Welwei 2004.
[ back ] 64. Pausanias 8.9.3, cf. 8.36.8.
[ back ] 65. Pretzler 1999:114–119.
[ back ] 66. E.g. Tegea in 479, and again from c. 365 to 370; Nielsen 2002:142–145.
[ back ] 67. Wars among league members: e.g. Thucydides 1.103.4, 4.134, 5.29.1, 5.33, Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.36. Ste Croix 1972:120–122. See also Roy 1972b:339–340, Roy 2001:265.
[ back ] 68. Smith 1986:37–38.
[ back ] 69. Osborne 1996:184–185.
[ back ] 70. Voyatzis 1999:143–145.
[ back ] 71. Xenophon Hellenica 5.2.1–8, 6.5.5–6.5.11.
[ back ] 72. Xenophon Hellenica 6.5.6–9. Roy 1971:569–571.
[ back ] 73. Pausanias 8.27.1–8, Diodorus 15.72.4. Note that there is a dispute about the date (371/0 BCE or 368/7 BCE). If the later date is chosen the foundation of Messene (369 BCE) may have been a further incentive or inspiration, although direct Theban involvement is ruled out by most commentators. Nielsen 2002:414–442, Hornblower 1990 esp. 75–77, Demand 1990:111–118, Moggi 1976:293–325, Braunert and Petersen 1972, Larsen 1968:185–186, Niese 1899.
[ back ] 74. Demand 1990:59–72, see also Braunert and Petersen 1972.
[ back ] 75. Xenophon Hellenica 7.4.33–7.5.3.
[ back ] 76. Pretzler 1999.
[ back ] 77. Keaveney 1987:3–39.
[ back ] 78. Callmer 1943:98–99.
[ back ] 79. Tausend 1992:174, Ste Croix 1972:106–116, Kagan 1969:13–30, Kahrstedt 1922:81–82.
[ back ] 80. E.g. Plataea: Herodotus 9.28.3–31.5, cf. 9.26.1–2; cf. Plutarch Moralia 193B; Pritchett 1974:190, 194–199, Hanson 1999:205–208.
[ back ] 81. Hanson 1989:117–123; allied armies could find it difficult to achieve cohesion within the phalanx: Pritchett 1974:190–193, 206.
[ back ] 82. The Mainalians sent troops to fight with the Spartans in 418 BCE, Thucydides 5.67.1. On individual cities within these tribes see Roy 1972d 48–49; e.g. Thucydides 5.33.2 (poleis in Parrhasia), Xenophon Hellenica 6.5.12 (Eutaia in Mainalia); see also Pausanias 8.3.1–4, 8.27.3–14, 8.28.1.
[ back ] 83. E.g. Herodotus 7.202, 8.72; Thucydides 5.60.3 5.57; Nielsen 2002:153.
[ back ] 84. Thucydides 8.3.2, Diodorus 15.31.2.
[ back ] 85. Xenophon Hellenica 7.4.19–27; cf. Diodorus 15.62.1–2, 15.67.2. Note that the number and exact nature of the Arcadian federal troops is disputed. Parke 1933:92–93, Pritchett 1974:223, Thompson 1983:154–158.
[ back ] 86. Xenophon Anabasis 4.8.18–19, 6.4.10–11; Roy 1967:296–309. See also Roy 2004, esp. 272–276, Hornblower 2004.
[ back ] 87. Xenophon Anabasis 6.2.9–11, cf. Xenophon Hellenica 7.1.23.
[ back ] 88. Xenophon Anabasis 6.1.30, 6.2.9–10.
[ back ] 89. Xenophon Anabasis 1.2.10 (Lykaia), cf. 6.1.11 (Arcadian dances).
[ back ] 90. Thucydides 1.119–120.
[ back ] 91. Xenophon Hellenica 3.2.30.
[ back ] 92. Herodotus 9.35, Thucydides 4.1.134; Nielsen 2002:367–374.
[ back ] 93. Thucydides 5.64.1–2.