Scholtz, Andrew. 2007. Concordia discors: Eros and Dialogue in Classical Athenian Literature. Hellenic Studies Series 24. Washington, DC: Center for Hellenic Studies. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebook:CHS_ScholtzA.Concordia_Discors.2007.
Chapter 5. Satyr, Lover, Teacher, Pimp: Socrates and His Many Masks
The Socrates Question
Socratic Maenadism in Aeschines Socraticus
Erôs, then, as catalyst of miracles, but how? And what can it mean that Socrates, in becoming the teacher he wants to, must take on the persona of a bacchant (bakkhê), whose very name could in ancient sources serve as a byword for a dangerous loss of self-control? Past scholarship, superimposing Socrates’ ostensibly sober self on his bacchic mask, has denied that Socrates here associates himself with mania, the divine rage regularly associated with bacchants and maenads.  But unless we lay the mask on the outside, how can we pay the image its due? Framing Socrates’ pedagogy within his maenadic persona, I shall argue that Socrates’ mask draws him out of his normal self and locates him closer to his dialogical other. But possession by erôs, Socrates’ “Dionysus” and the inspiration for his intuitive teaching, carries with it evaluative two-sidedness. Thus as Socratic apologetic, Aeschines’ Alcibiades makes the case for Socrates’ good intentions and heroic efforts on behalf of his beloved pupil. Yet Socrates’ maenadism problematizes the risks Socrates takes and the impression his pedagogy will likely make.
For students of the ancient sources, the locus classicus will be Euripides’ Bacchae, where the world in and around Thebes is divided into those who empathize and identify with the maenadism of the city’s women and those who do not.  Socrates, then, in declaring his maenadism, challenges others to declare their stance vis-à-vis it and what it stands for in Aeschines’ dialogue: Socrates’ teaching.
Philosophy versus Demerasty in Plato’s Gorgias
Why bring up eros? Comments Dodds, “Socrates is trying to find common ground to make Callicles understand his passion for truth.”  In proposing that it is better to suffer than to do harm, Socrates challenges conventional wisdom, and in so doing, signals his disconnection from society, present company included. Yet in so doing, Socrates merely echoes his beloved philosophy; with that, surely a lover like Callicles can sympathize. For, as Socrates has just finished explaining, there can be no communication without shared consciousness:
Again, quoting Dodds, “Communication is possible only on the basis of some community of experience…”  Here, Socrates addresses an important aspect of the sociality of language: shared consciousness (Socrates speaks of shared emotion, but that can be generalized to shared experience, values, etc.) as basis for shared speech. We see, then, Socrates at work trying to forge with Callicles that first link in Vološinov’s ideological chain. If love is more than a word to each, then “I love” or “you love” becomes more than information. It becomes, potentially, at least, a moment of identification, of social bonding.
Socratic Pandering in Xenophon’s Symposium
The word kratistos ‘excellent,’ ‘best’, used three times in the preceding passage, has already been used by Socrates to describe the suitor who will “best” guide Autolycus on the path to glory (8.38). But Socrates speaks here in terms not just of being, but of seeming to be, best (kratistos). Thus it was in seeming (edokei) to be the best counselor of the dêmos that Pericles’ political expertise proved of value to him. So, too, Spartans profit from their rigorous training by seeming (dokousin) to be great commanders. Does that mean that Callias, in cultivating the appearance of excellence, can afford to neglect its substance? Not exactly. Elsewhere in Xenophon (Memorabilia 2.6.39; Cyropaedia 1.6.22), the reality of virtue offers the best route to the appearance of it, and nothing in Socrates’ Symposium speech contradicts that.