Wareh, Tarik. 2013. The Theory and Practice of Life: Isocrates and the Philosophers. Hellenic Studies Series 54. Washington, DC: Center for Hellenic Studies. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebook:CHS_WarehT.The_Theory_and_Practice_of_Life.2012.
Chapter 1. The Influence of Rhetorical Education on Aristotelian Ethics: Knowledge, Training, and Performance
An Art of Practice
The laboriousness of the qualification “which is one of those…” testifies to the essential similarity of calculation (logismos) in production and action,  and we have perhaps already begun to suggest the problems that lie in determining the relationship between Isocrates’ tekhnē of politikoi logoi and “the good life.” It is possible to remain somewhat within the Aristotelian theory and to make such a difficult case more tractable by analyzing, again, the praxis and poiēsis dimensions of a rhetorical performance. A schematic account might be as follows. A craftsman qua craftsman works as an instrument to achieve an end external to himself qua craftsman. It is for the craftsman’s employer to deliberate about the praxis dimension of what the craftsman does: whether it should be done or left undone, and how it is to be done apart from productive considerations. But if the craftsman and his employer are not defined in the same way (“one in account”), they may well be one in number—and the true orator takes responsibility for both of these roles.
The Crucible of Action
The Individual’s Nature
This is connected to the Isocratean form of practical thinking. In both, a store of preparatory knowledge and training—arguments, points of view, common conceptions, and the like—puts the student well on the road to phronēsis and philosophia, though individual phusis is a further requirement that enables the most talented students to marshal and select the arguments in the moment so as to succeed in the agōn.
Aristotle’s Protrepticus is a text rich in Isocratean connections (to be explored further below) and, as Hutchinson and Johnson will argue in their forthcoming edition, was likely a dialogue with a role for Isocrates.  If we consider the echo in this passage of Isocrates’ provocative rejection of the most inert and useless kind of handbook epistēmē (tetagmenē tekhnē), it appears that Aristotle may be purposefully and boldly throwing Isocrates’ language back at him. Lowly stoikheia  (cf. Isocrates’ grammata) can serve as a model of how the philosopher’s most important and “prior things” are knowable in a rationally ordered way (in contrast to the always somewhat intractable and unknowable principles of worldly action).  In other words, Aristotle may intend a riposte to Isocrates in this subtext: “No, we in the Academy, when we pursue the causes of something, do not simply and mistakenly try to express the principles of a ‘creative affair’ [Isocrates’ poiētikon pragma] in the reductive, incommensurate, and mistakenly technical terms of whatever simplified principles are more easily tractable by reason and theory.” 
From Preparation to Performance
The Place of Knowledge
Isocratean and Aristotelian Protreptics
Here we must note Aristotle’s defensiveness about departing from the empirical methodos: such a departure could seem “sophistical.” This fits with his admission in the Nicomachean Ethics X passage of the additional importance of experience (e.g. prosdein … empeirias, 1181a12). It seems Aristotle wishes to reassure his reader that he understands the empirical nature of the inquiry into human laws and will endeavor to avoid the mistaken principles that have hindered the “sophists” from proceeding properly in this largely empirical subject. Bertelli sees here the possibility of a move in an Isocratean direction but resists it, claiming that “Aristotle’s insistence on the empeiria necessary to the true legislator should not suggest … a concession to his adversary.”