González, José M. 2013. The Epic Rhapsode and His Craft: Homeric Performance in a Diachronic Perspective. Hellenic Studies Series 47. Washington, DC: Center for Hellenic Studies. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebook:CHS_GonzalezJ.The_Epic_Rhapsode_and_his_Craft.2013.
13. Rhapsodic hypokrisis and Aristotelian lexis
13.1 Why Aristotle on Ὑπόκρισις Matters
13.2 Relationship between Λέξις and Ὑπόκρισις
The ‘natural order’ (κατὰ φύσιν) of the inquiry had led to what was ‘first by nature’ (ὅπερ πέφυκε πρῶτον), τὰ πράγματα, specifically, ‘whence it gains τὸ πιθανόν’—this, clearly, a reference to the study of πίστεις in Books I and Ⅱ. The headings that follow under δεύτερον and τρίτον are not a recapitulation of the basic outline of the Rhetoric (πίστεις, λέξις, and τάξις), as is the opinion of those who equate τὸ ταῦτα τῇ λέξει διαθέσθαι with πῶς χρὴ τάξαι τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου. For the verb διατίθεσθαι does not mean here ‘to arrange’ (it is therefore not a synonym of τάξαι); indeed, if arrangement were in view, with ‘style’ playing the organizing principle, we would expect κατὰ λέξιν (or similar) instead of the instrumental τῇ λέξει.  Rather, the DGE s.v. διατίθημι B.Ⅱ.2 correctly cites Rhetoric 1403b20 under ‘explicar, exponer, narrar’, placing the emphasis not on the structure but on the character of the speech in view.  Thus, taking at face value the statement of intention at 1403b15 περὶ δὲ τῆς λέξεως ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν, we should read the δεύτερον and τρίτον that follow the reference to the foregoing material (the πρῶτον) as a twofold conceptual division of λέξις—that second great head in the overall outline of the treatise as we know it today. 
13.3 Ὑπόκρισις, Not a Detour
The ἐκείνη, as I will argue below, takes λέξις as its immediate antecedent, but does so not to the exclusion of ὑπόκρισις, which is subsumed under ‘style’ as the larger heading:  this conceptual overlap alone accounts for the grammar (which calls for λέξις) and the context (which calls for ὑπόκρισις)—a fact of great significance from which it follows that where ‘style’ is mentioned ‘oral delivery’, its primary subdivision, is preeminently in view. ‘When it comes’,  ὅταν ἔλθῃ, clearly picks up on ὀψὲ παρῆλθεν and ὀψὲ προῆλθεν; and ἐγκεχειρήκασι δὲ ἐπ’ ὀλίγον answers to and qualifies οὔπω δ’ ἐπικεχείρηται (1403b21–22). Should there be any need further to establish the tie between this last and the first two passages, note the statement about ἆθλα at 1404a17, with the pointed πάλιν that precedes it, which sends us forward to the καθάπερ clause that follows it and back to the similar comment at 1403b32–34. Aristotle’s focus is on the lack of an appropriate scholarly treatment of ὑπόκρισις and, more broadly, λέξις. In light of this, is it plausible to think that he, too, would have failed to cover ὑπόκρισις in his Rhetoric? After pointing out the gap (twice, if not thrice), would he also have failed utterly to fill it? Scholars by and large seem to think so, and Kennedy (1991:219n8) may serve as illustration; for, translating 1404a12–13 “when delivery comes to be considered,” he adds the footnote: “As it apparently was by Aristotle’s student Theophrastus.” If he is right, how are we to justify the philosopher’s failure? One might perhaps adduce that ὑπόκρισις is not that important after all: but Aristotle calls it ὃ δύναμιν μὲν ἔχει μεγίστην (1403b21). Or one may claim that its study is undesirable, for it is only likely to corrupt the audience. But, to this view and its underlying presumptions (which I examine below and find wanting), Aristotle’s own considered judgment may suffice: ‘Nevertheless, the subject of lexis has some small necessary place in every demonstrative discipline’.  But, one may yet protest, what the philosopher does study is λέξις, not ὑπόκρισις, and therefore he does, after all, fill the gap. The problem with this view, however, is that it drives too wide a wedge between ὑπόκρισις and λέξις, wider than the philosopher’s thought and words will allow; and that it fails to account for the two statements that are unequivocally about ὑπόκρισις in its narrow concern with φωνή: thus a glaring failure to address what Aristotle himself owns as being of the greatest moment would stand—and that, without either any explicit admission of what must then be considered by all an intentional oversight or a rationale for this a priori unexpected course of action.
13.4 Ὑπόκρισις, Not Just in Rhetoric Ⅲ.1
In this case, of course, the vocal melody will depend on notions of intonation and rhythm that are more familiar to us than the ancient Greek modulation, of which tonal accents were so important a component. One can speak similarly of the famous chapters 39–41 of [Longinos] Peri hypsous, written at a time when accentual stress had replaced pitch; and yet these sections preserve a recollection of the Aristotelian connection between ἁρμονία and ῥυθμοί in the orator’s choice and arrangement of words (σύνθεσις). 
13.5 Semantic Development of Ὑπόκρισις and Λέξις
This passage contains a remarkable admission regarding the entire rhetorical enterprise, one that belies the attempt of some to restrict to ὑπόκρισις the unflattering δοκεῖ φορτικὸν εἶναι of 1403b36–1404a1, which has instead τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν as its proper subject.  On the contrary, μέγα δύναται (1404a7), as καθάπερ εἴρηται underscores, merely restates ὃ δύναμιν μὲν ἔχει μεγίστην (1403b21), and the correspondence between these two statements presupposes a clear, if qualified, equivalence between τὰ περὶ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν at 1403b22 and τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν as the implicit subject carried over from 1403b36 into this section. It is impossible, therefore, to divorce the philosopher’s notions of λέξις and ὑπόκρισις. Accordingly, even Cope 1877 ad loc. must make the following admission: “[N]ot only ὑποκριτική, but the whole of Rhetoric, is directed πρὸς δόξαν. So that φορτικόν here must stand, as it often does, for the vulgarity which is shewn in unphilosophical habits of mind … and, as applied to a study or art, may signify popular, showy, unsubstantial.”
13.5.1 Φαντασία, ‘mere fancy’?
Aristotle could not be clearer: that has respect to doxa which one would not choose when likely to escape others’ notice. The focus is clearly on appearances in a social context—what I might call ‘social pretense’ (in the spatial sense of praetendo) if ‘pretense’ did not carry such negative connotations. The concern is arguably for one’s reputation in society, for affecting the views that others have of us, for creating a social standing or managing our neighbors’ attitudes towards us. To use Aristotle’s own word as I believe he conceives of it, this would be a matter of φαντασία, of how we appear, of being aware of and trying to control the impact that one’s behavior has on the way we come across, of giving expression to a particular ēthos in a manner, if not so technically proficient as that of a professional orator, yet not entirely different in kind from it.  Such φαντασία could, of course, involve empty show and ostentation, but it need not do so; and it has a legitimate claim on our interest as social beings. The examples point this out well: doing good versus faring well, or even justice versus health. No sham is involved in the act of conferring benefits on others: the suggestion is not that it looks as if someone is doing good while he is not; the point is simply that the benefaction is done with an eye on the profit that accrues to one’s reputation with his neighbors. As to the latter opposition (i.e. justice versus health), no one would insist on a necessary connection between doing justice and mere outward show or ostentation.  But, clearly, whether a person or action is just is subject to debate and opinion in ways that the physical condition of a man—healthy or diseased—is not. It is in this sense, because it is open to judgment and pretension, that justice is said to be of small value. The overriding concern, therefore, is with reputation, with social appearances (one might say ēthos), and this is precisely what πρὸς δόξαν is intended to convey. 
13.6 Φαντασία in the Rhetoric
Nussbaum (1978:254), the one scholar after Cope principally responsible for popularizing Freudenthal’s idea,  realizes that it renders Aristotle’s comment in De anima utterly trivial: “[H]e seems to be saying, ‘Assuming when we say phantasia we mean the faculty in virtue of which we are appeared to in such-and-such a way, and are not using the transferred sense according to which it means (mere) show, then it can be said that in virtue of phantasia we tell truth or falsehood—whereas to say, “in virtue of ostentatiousness we tell truth or falsehood” would be silly.’ It will be objected that this is a trivial point. But for Aristotle it is never trivial to recognize all the senses of a word …” (her emphasis). This last observation notwithstanding, the point is trivial, and it is hard to believe that Aristotle would have felt the need to preclude such a misunderstanding—not to mention that, as argued below (§13.6), this meaning was simply not commonly available until the much later time of Polybios.  Now, this is not the place to conduct a survey of the intricate and extensive scholarly debate on Aristotle’s concept of φαντασία.  Some have even questioned whether he held a single, consistent view of its meaning throughout his works.  But if one can detect some measure of disjunction between (and at times even within) his various writings, this takes place against a background of overall conceptual coherence. It is, at any rate, clear that the meaning alleged by Cope, and widely accepted by other translators, cannot be paralleled in any other passage of Aristotle. Thus, Wedin (1988:68) notes: “Following Freudenthal, [Nussbaum] remarks that φαντασία can mean ‘(mere) show, pomp, ostentatiousness’ and argues that this is the metaphorical sense meant in [De anima] 428a1–4. The remark on the point of usage is acceptable, but that 428a2 counts as a case in point is, I submit, mistaken. An initial reservation is that only one passage in Aristotle can be marshaled in support of the Freudenthal reading, namely Rhetorica 1404a11” (my emphasis).
This famous passage, with its αἴσθησίς τις ἀσθενής, does not, of course, collapse the conceptual complexity of φαντασία surveyed above into a facile equation between it and perception. The enclitic τις here, as often, signals a simplification; it warns us of an approximation that, while suitable to the context and argument at hand, yet lacks the philosophical sophistication and accuracy that might be necessary and present elsewhere.