“Band societies” are characterized by a high degree of autonomy of families and kinship groups. This is illustrated in the diagram:

Figure 1. !Kun San. (F= family)

A look at these “family groups” is relevant because the cohesion between them, present only to a limited extent, is reflected in the form of kinship that characterizes it. The individual families are bound to each other through a cognatic kinship system. This provides the opportunity to build up social relationships in all directions, but precisely on account of this openness the relationships remain comparatively weak. Indeed, the groups live alone for the most part, and only in extraordinary circumstances and for a short time does more than one group live in the same place.

Societies categorized as “local groups” or “village societies” behave differently, as two examples show.

The Tsembaga Maring, who live in New Guinea, form one part of altogether some 7000 Maring-speaking Papua. The economic conditions are precarious. They live in a mountainous region of New Guinea’s central highlands, cut off from the outside. Their pattern of settlement is characterized by a cycle of aggregation and dispersion. On account of the limited resources, the latent threat of warlike conflicts is present, even if it comes to out-and-out war infrequently. In times of peace, interrelated families live together in hamlets. Whenever war draws near, outbreaks of which are cyclical in nature, the families emigrate to village-like settlements surrounding the traditional ceremonial place of their clan. The families of the clan are closely bound to each other through patrilinear kinship and support each other intensively. The sense of community is visibly expressed by the participation in collective cults. Nonetheless, the bounds of the clan, defined through kinship, are not rigid. Not only individuals, through marriage, but even entire families can be accepted into the clan.

Every clan has at its disposal its own territory, and each family lays claim to a part of it. Moreover, the clan has its own house, where magical objects are kept. When periodic outbreaks of war threaten, at intervals of five to twenty years, the clan-territory is marked off with fences. In war the clan fights as a single combat unit, led by its own ritual chieftain.

Figure 2. Tsembaga Maring (New Guinea). (H = hamlet; V = village)

The Enga, who also live in New Guinea, represent another form of socio-political cohesion. They practice intensive agriculture (especially sweet potatoes and yams) in the river valleys of the mountainous region west of Mount Hagen, which are free from the rainforest, but they also cultivate regions of various heights above sea level. Artificial fertilization with compost allows for the constant production of foodstuffs. Since the game animals have been hunted nearly to extinction, the need for protein and fat is satisfied through the energy-intensive breeding of pigs. In addition, stone axes and salt are bartered, as well as prestige goods. The hypothetical population density of 33 to 97 people per square kilometer corresponds to the population density sometimes postulated for Greece in the Dark Ages.

Families live in hamlets, with one house for the men and several for the women in the immediate area of their fields. Each family belongs to a clan-segment, which is determined either by patrilineage or by the somewhat larger sub-clan. Each patrilinear group is named after its progenitor. The sub-clan defines itself by the fictive relationship with a son of the clan’s founder. The dance area and the cultic grove form its center. Important external exchange practices are transacted by the sub-clan, as well as matters of public interest (for example, bride-giving), and the compensation payments for those fallen in war are settled. Each sub-clan is led by one man, whose ambition it is to become the leader of the clan and thereby a “big man.” Since in this case the status of the sub-clan is enhanced, it is in everyone’s interest to increase agricultural productivity. This can be done through raising the work-load of every individual. To this end, the sub-clan leader who aspires to become a “big man” strives to conclude several marriages, because in this way he gains access to a larger productive base. Raising productivity is then the prerequisite for being able to make exchange relationships which are socially successful, that is, based on generosity. These in turn are the prerequisite for rising to the role of “big man.” For this reason, constant competition reigns between the sub-clans.

The clan makes use of a territory which is clearly marked off by a fence. Outside of this territory there is the danger of being attacked. The clan is connected to a fictive founder-ancestor. It is visibly defined, as are the sub-clans, by its own dance area, as well as by the ancestral cult house. Here is the center, where the essential rituals are conducted, those which establish a common identity, and where the ceremonial exchanges with other clans also take place. The clan is the largest group which appears as a unit at these types of ceremonies and in war. The “big men” are in this connection the driving force in the creation of an “intergroup collectivity.” They have to have at their disposal three capabilities: they must possess an exceptional individual working capacity, they must be extraordinary speakers (with an excellent memory for the various kin relationships and for all earlier collective actions), and they must be superior military commanders.

The same mechanism ensures success here as within the sub-clan. Pressure can be and is exerted on individuals who try to eschew the increased work-load. The outcome of this situation is competition between the clans in the production of goods, which can be presented, mainly at celebrations, as proof of their own excellence and strength. Successful clans tend to become larger, through influx from other clans and—following that—through increased rates of reproduction. The increase of the population promises greater chances of success in war, which threatens in short intervals, every two to three years, on account of the limited area of land available, but it also necessitates intensification of production. Occasion for the conflicts frequently consists of theft of small animals (pigs) and objects of value.

Thus there exist numerous levels of socio-political solidarity within Enga society. Clan segments and clans represent firm units, formed according to rules that can be recalled, which are supposed to guarantee the successful production of goods above all else. The political level above the clans exists only in the form of agreements based on the principles of gift economy. It requires institutionalized procedures in order to be accomplished, but can also be rescinded by means of those same procedures. The reason to form them consists of the constant threat of war at short notice.

Figure 3. Enga (New Guinea). (H = hamlet)

The “regional polity,” represented by the Trobriand Islanders, contrasts with these forms of “local groups,” not least on account of its distinct type of cohesion. The Trobriands live in small villages, each led by its own leader (head man). He distributes the land afresh every year to the inhabitants of the village. He is the owner of the sacred objects, which are regarded as essential to the success of agriculture. He initiates the ceremonies at the dance area of the village.

The villages are consolidated into local groups. The links between the villages are maintained through many processes of exchange on the occasion of various celebrations. Thus reciprocal support is assured and the standing ban on warfare between them established. The villages bound together into such a local group stand in a hierarchical relation to each other. The leader of the village with the greatest prestige also holds the leadership of the entire local group. Since the hierarchy of the villages is unalterable, and the leaders inside the villages can come only from certain families, the system includes features of inheritability. In order to fulfill his obligations, the leader marries several women from various villages and then exerts pressure on his in-laws to support him constantly with goods. On ceremonial occasions, he can employ these goods for display and for exchange. In this way a tributary relationship is produced between the leader and the other inhabitants of the villages. Thereby this paramount leader achieves the social status of a “chief.” This change in status is mirrored, in turn, by the largely fictitious genealogy which incorporates all the villages within a local group and their leaders’ families. For chiefs are set on the top of such genealogies, which are flexible and always illustrate contemporary political relationships.

In one region, several such local groups exist alongside each other. An additional level of cohesion is created above them in the form of a regional unity. The leaders of regional units are selected in the competition which reigns constantly between the leaders of local units. It consists especially of the demonstration of extraordinary economic power and the resulting possibility of the leader’s generosity. In order to ensure his success, a chief does not build only on the support of his villages or relations. As chief, he also organizes a far-ranging long-distance trade (the kula trade). In order to do so, he must become involved in a complex pre-existing system of exchange, for which a sufficient number of prestige goods is the prerequisite. The chief’s involvement in the kula trade secures privileges for him: clothing and jewelry reserved for him as chief, a special warehouse for his supplies, “magicians” working for him to guarantee the fertility of agriculture, especially the cultivation of yams. These privileges function simultaneously as an ideologically effective safeguard of his position. If by all these means a chief is able to secure a position which appears institutionalized vis-à-vis the other big men in his regional unit, he can nevertheless also be deposed in the case of manifest failure. On the ideological level this is reflected immediately, insofar as new realities are accommodated without difficulty in the flexible and, as far as the hierarchy is concerned, fictitious genealogical system.

 Figure 4. The Trobriand Islanders. (V = village)

In order to be able to draw plausible conclusions for the Greek situation from the case studies briefly described above, it is necessary to sum up their constituent features.

The loose social bonds characteristic of “band societies” correspond to the cognatic system, the widest-ranging way of constructing kinship. The ties which arise out of the cognatic system of relationships and are based on reciprocity are sufficient for overcoming economic and “political” problems. Unlike “band societies,” “local group societies” and the societies characterized as “regional polities” live inside the same region in close proximity to each other. The population density is problematically high in comparison to the available resources. The supply of resources cannot simply be increased, since the trade of subsistence goods is only possible to a limited extent.

The quality of the leader that is displayed in competition—and thereby also that of his group—is an important means by which successfully to control the pressure which weighs heavily on the groups. For this reason there are attempts to strengthen the group through co-operation. To enter relationships that take precedence over the socio-political unit(s) to which one already belongs means the surrender of a part of one’s own decision-making freedom. Therefore the step to production of an “intergroup collectivity” in the form of a clan, a “clan cluster,” or an alliance necessitates not only pressure, but also the possibility of perceiving this pressure as an incentive. Limited economic resources and the resulting danger of warlike conflicts produce pressure. So the incentive consists of the chance either to avoid both through the enlargement of the group, or at least to be able to withstand a difficult situation successfully.

However, in the same way as there is an inherent tendency in larger settlements to dissolve, so there also exists a tendency to enter into alliances between groups only when there is an unambiguous—economic or military—necessity. As a result, while alliances that span socio-political units can certainly be called up in case of need, they nonetheless always remain—if a fixed institutional-legal framework is absent—more or less fragile. This applies to the construction of clusters of clans recognizable in the examples as much as to the temporary and non-institutional alliances between clans.

If one observes these societies from the outside, then it appears that the measure of success is doubtless connected to the degree of organizational tightness. In an evolutionarily-oriented view of human societies, a higher tightness of organization is always linked to a hierarchization, in the sense of stratification or classification by rank. However, the functional interpretation of the various human societies suggested above allows for the possibility that there may be arrangements other than hierarchy capable of producing and guaranteeing the systematic coherence necessary for successful cooperation.

In the case of the Tsembaga Maring, this flexibility is reflected in the fact that the ritual leader is activated, as it were, for the duration of the war, but he is entitled to no real powers, only symbolic ones. The location where the festivals supporting cohesion take place is also furnished with a significant symbol of togetherness in the form of the house of the ancestors. Further, the festivals are organized with an extensive program of ceremonial events (the kaiko ceremony, the tee ceremony) so that all subgroups can be included, but also so that they can operate flexibly towards the outside. The resulting alliances are not secured through any institutional foundations. Thus, in the final analysis, how the field of relationships turns out above the level of the clan depends on the quality of the accomplishments of the leaders and their groups. Since this quality can always change in this environment of constant competition—for example, because of the improved performance of a competitor—these connections must remain labile.

The model of heterarchy not only directs attention to the fact that the constructs which impart identity to the local groups and the “regional polity” do not demonstrate primordial “ethnicity,” but also indicates that the societies themselves are the engineers of ethnicity with the help of more or less articulated genealogies.

Within this complicated topography of diverse societies, political models and divergent influences, the origin of the large units of the Dorians and Ionians, understood as ethnic, is to be re-defined. They can no longer be posited as the sub-units of a primary ethnic unit of “the Greeks.” Also, they must be reconsidered from the perspective of their function. This places the connection between the Dorians and the Peloponnesian League, and between the Delian-Attic League and the Ionians, at the center of attention.

In order to satisfy all claims, these competing views of the origin of the Ionians are integrated into a construction of the migration of the Ionians already found in Herodotus. According to this the Ionians came from Achaea; they were driven out by the Achaeans and migrated to Athens. Here they met fugitives from Pylos. In this way the emigrants from Athens could be simultaneously a combination of different “tribes” and Ionians from Athens. The associations with the name Ionians or Ion, sketched here only briefly, have a single object: through the creation of an “ethnic” past—based on genealogical constructions—community is to be produced.

In the genealogy presented by Euripides, it is not as usual Xouthos who is the father of Ion, but rather Apollo. The god raped Creusa, the daughter of Erechtheus. Creusa abandoned the newborn child on the Acropolis of Athens, and Hermes brought him to Delphi, where he grew up. Xouthos, descendant of Aeolus, who was settled in Achaea, and savior of Athens in the war against the Euboeans, married Creusa. With this constellation, the self-sufficient, autochthonous “history” of Athens is protected. At the same time, Ion receives a new orientation by having Apollo as his father. For Apollo, linked to Athens through Creusa, positions Ion as the ancestor of the Ionians. The Hellenic genealogy is subordinated to Ion, who stems from a divine father, whereas Doros and Achaios are sons of Xouthos and Creusa, born after him. His independent connection with Athens is extended by his becoming the father of the eponymous heroes of the Ionic tribes. From their sons proceeded the Ionian colonization, through which the Ionian cities were subordinated to Athens. This type of genealogy—regardless of how seriously it was intended by Euripides—represents an attempt, which can be paralleled by that of the Spartans to claim Achaean origins, to subvert the innate heterarchical tendency of the competing older genealogies. In this way the hierarchical relationship between the Ionian Athenians and the Ionian league members is supposed to be “historically” guaranteed.

These patterns of thought and forms of behavior, which were assumed above to have assisted the creation of societies in the Archaic Period, can now be seen to intensify. Under the new political and economic conditions, this leads to greater cohesion in the “regions” which up until now did not figure in the foreground of the history of events reported in the sources. Everywhere the local and regional networks must have stabilized. Of that there are sufficient indications. But, corresponding to the varying conditions and the resultant varying motivations in the different regions of Greece, this process did not advance in the same way everywhere. Alongside the general drive to orient oneself against the overarching claims to power of Sparta, Athens and then also Thebes, further motives emerge, rooted in local considerations. The motor that tended to push the small units in Arcadia and Messenia towards unity was the will to release themselves from the clutches of Sparta; in Phocis it was the desire to maintain regional self-sufficiency against the pressure of the Thessalians; the aim of Thessaly and Elis was to maintain the dependency of the perioikoi and to enlarge their own territory. The consequences of these varying motivations, whose treatment here is in no way comprehensive, may nevertheless be apprehended on the basis of a few central parameters.

The varying range of the cults reflects the varying intentions of those who practiced them and also of those who dedicated their votive offerings in the shrines. This conclusion finds striking confirmation when one turns to the second large area open to ideological manipulation: the myths. Myths and the genealogies transported with them are neither fixed once and for all nor limited to an old traditional stock: old stories can be changed, new ones can be invented. In the current context myths serve as means to support and legitimize new “ethnic” identities to counteract the genealogical/mythological rhetoric used by states like Sparta and Athens aiming at regional hegemony.

So if it is the case that the cohesion in settlement communities could and did become stronger through the enlargement of kinship groupings and through their transformation into political institutions, then this also means that the process of ethnicization developing parallel to that on the regional and super-regional levels was not yet concluded in the fourth century. For according to kinship-oriented modes of thought, only the ethnic unit can guarantee a superior cohesiveness. However, by the same modes of thought, that emerging hierarchy can be questioned in order to retain heterarchically oriented structures. Ethnicization was thus no efficient means for achieving the political unity of “the Greeks.”