One of the most controversial topics in the study of Greek lyric poetry centers on Simonides’ poem to Scopas and its role in the Protagoras. Uncertainties remain concerning the genre to which the poem belongs, the poem’s original setting and intent, and the interpretations of the poem by Protagoras and Socrates. Scholars have attempted to reconstruct Simonides’ poem from the quotations in the Platonic dialogue and thus have isolated it from the only context in which it has come down to us. [1] My purpose in studying Simonides’ poem and its interpretation in the Protagoras is not to argue for any definitive text of the poem and thereby divorce it from the context of the dialogue.

My interest lies in Socrates’ interpretation of the poem and the poem’s role in the conversation between Socrates and Protagoras. I believe that Socrates’ represented interpretation is fundamentally sound and that this section of the dialogue, which some consider a comic digression on Plato’s part, has a serious intent. Plato has Socrates view the meaning of Simonides’ words from a “Socratic” standpoint. As we shall see, Socrates ascribes his own philosophical tenets to Simonides. If Socrates’ statements regarding Simonides’ poem seem ludicrous to us, perhaps we are lacking the knowledge that Plato’s—not to mention Socrates’—intended audience possessed regarding the poem under discussion. It is important to notice at the very beginning of any study of Simonides’ poem that the poem is not quoted in its entirety. Extrapolation on the part of scholars therefore becomes necessary but, in some cases, may lead to conclusions that appear as unfathomable as Socrates’ own interpretation.

Protagoras is coerced into asking questions of Socrates so that the discussion regarding ἀρετή (‘virtue’) can continue (339a-d). However, the inquiry is now transferred to the realm of poetry (339a5-6: τὸ ἐρώτημα…μετενηνεγμένον δ’ εἰς ποίησιν), and the role of poetry in a man’s παιδεία (‘education’) has become the focus of the discussion (338e7). The significance of the episode in the Protagoras involving the interpretation of verses from Simonides’ ode to Scopas is difficult to grasp because Plato appears to portray Socrates as unable to provide a convincing defense of the meaning of the verses quoted by Protagoras. The sophist claims that Simonides contradicts himself, since he makes two seemingly contrasting statements in the same poem. First, Protagoras quotes the following lines (presumably the beginning of the poem): [2]

Socrates claims that he knows this poem very well and that it is composed correctly (339b8). Protagoras asks Socrates whether a poem is well-constructed if the poet contradicts himself; Socrates says that it doubtless is not. The sophist proceeds to quote more of Simonides’ poem:

Protagoras then asks Socrates if all the lines he quoted belong to one and the same poet and if the latter words are in accordance with the former. According to Socrates, the two quotations agree with one another; however, in an aside, he expresses his apprehension regarding Protagoras’ seemingly purposeful line of questioning (339c8-9: καὶ ἅμα μέντοι ἐφοβούμην μὴ τὶ λέγοι—‘and yet I feared that he may have a point’).

Protagoras’ questions make it clear that he intends to criticize Simonides’ poetic skill. I take it that when Protagoras says that the poet ‘does not speak correctly’ (οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγει), he is referring to a flaw in the logic of a poem’s overall meaning or intent. [4] Since Simonides had first stated that it is difficult for a man to be good truly, he seems to be inconsistent when he criticizes a similar remark by Pittacus (339c4-5: χαλεπὸν φάτ’ ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι—‘he said it is difficult to be noble’). Before looking closely at the lines attributed to Simonides, it is important to ask why Socrates feels compelled to uphold Simonides’ integrity as a poet. Is Socrates really concerned with Simonides’ meaning, or is he intent upon countering Protagoras’ display of knowledge with respect to poetry only to present any type of challenge that he can muster against the sophist? The latter is the more probable, since Socrates himself views his confrontation with Protagoras as a sort of bout. The language Socrates uses to describe the effect of Protagoras’ “blow” belongs to a boxing match: ὡσπερεὶ ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγείς, ἐσκοτώθην τε καὶ ἰλιγγίασα (339e1-2: ‘things went dark and I felt dizzy, as if I had been hit by a good boxer’.) If one considers the exchange between the two as an agôn in which Socrates is intent upon demonstrating that Protagoras is not as keen a literary critic (or one who ranks himself as sophos as the poets) as he himself thinks, then the validity of Socrates’ argumentation becomes secondary. Socrates confesses that he appeals to Prodicus the Cean in the immediate audience in order to have time to think about what Simonides meant in the poem under discussion (339e3-5). Socrates puts his appeal in the language of Homer, quoting Iliad 21.308-9, and views Simonides as though the poet were a citadel in need of protection from the attack of Protagoras. [5]

Earlier in the Protagoras, Prodicus is portrayed as a sophist particularly keen on semantic differences; [6] a touch of humor on the part of Plato is obvious in Prodicus’ monologue at 337a1-c4 where he goes on at tedious length to distinguish between the meanings of verbs. This was a hallmark of his “sophistry,” or, as Socrates politely says in 340a8, his μουσική (poetical sensibility and education), and Plato does not hesitate to exploit the comic possibilities that such a practice can offer. Since Prodicus knows how to distinguish meanings, Socrates begins to discuss whether Simonides’ statement that “it is difficult for a man to become (γενέσθαι) good truly” is the same as Pittacus’ saying that “it is difficult to be (ἔμμεναι) good” (340c4-5). Since ‘to become’ is different from ‘to be’, as Socrates maintains and believes that Prodicus—given his love of semantic distinctions—would doubtless agree, then Socrates concludes that Simonides is not contradicting himself when he disagrees with Pittacus’ remark. In order to strengthen his argument, Socrates paraphrases Works and Days 289 and 291-2, where Hesiod describes ἀρετή as something difficult to achieve but easy to possess once one reaches its summit (340d1-5). Socrates probably has in mind another of Simonides’ poems, PMG 579, which resembles the Hesiodic passage as it contains a reference to virtue dwelling atop steep cliffs; the diction of both Hesiod and Simonides is similar. [7] Prodicus agrees with Socrates’ interpretation of the subtle difference between the words of Simonides and Pittacus; however, Protagoras immediately disagrees with Socrates’ argument that Simonides regards virtue as something easy (φαῦλον) to possess on the grounds that all men deem it the most difficult thing of all (πάντων χαλεπώτατον).

Protagoras’ question to Socrates about the lines from Simonides is intended to show us more about Protagoras, the sophist who ranks himself among the great poets whom he views as sophists in disguise. Unlike the poets, Protagoras is not afraid of displaying his knowledge (σοφιστικὴ τέχνη); in other words, Plato is setting Protagoras up as one who considers himself among the great educators of Hellas. Plato has Protagoras characterize Homer, Hesiod, and, interestingly enough, Simonides as sophists:

These are bold words. Protagoras has the audacity not only to liken himself to such figures but also to claim that he surpasses them because he alone does not deny being a sophist; like these ἄνδρες παλαιοί, he educates men (317b4-5: ὁμολογῶ τε σοφιστὴς εἶναι καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους—‘I admit that I am a sophist and educator’).

Since, in his own eyes, his knowledge is equal if not superior to the poet’s, Protagoras can criticize Simonides’ poem. Consequently, Socrates’ reaction to Protagoras’ attack on Simonides can be understood as an attempt to preserve the stature of a traditional transmitter of παιδεία, in the case of Simonides, the poet-educator for the χορός, and to reject the audacious claims of the sophist. Thus, if Protagoras objects to Simonides’ poem, greater objections should be raised against the sophist who claims to be such a great educator, especially in the sphere of ἀρετή. Moreover, if Protagoras displays his lack of ἀρετή by posing a question that does not do justice to Simonides’ poem as a whole, then it is possible to view Socrates’ “literary criticism” with respect to the Simonidean quotations as not simply a misunderstanding of the poem’s meaning on the part of Socrates but as a poor answer to a question that was unfair from the beginning, since it took the quotations out of their original context.

It is usually assumed that Protagoras quoted the beginning of Simonides’ poem. [8] Perhaps Protagoras omitted lines known to the readers for whom Plato intended the dialogue. The poem in its entirety may have been well-known to the immediate audience. Unfortunately, the entire text of Simonides’ poem is not extant. Some of Socrates’ comments may not have been as out of place as they now seem. Although this is a possible explanation for the seemingly unintelligible line of argumentation offered by Socrates in his defense of Simonides, one must not exclude the scenario that Socrates cannot offer an adequate justification of the poem’s meaning because Protagoras has skewed the question-and-answer session in his favor; that is, the way that Protagoras sets up the charge of self-contradiction against Simonides does not permit any suitable rebuttal.

Socrates again consults Prodicus as an authority on the meanings of words. Before a discussion of what Simonides meant by χαλεπόν (‘difficult’: 341a5-d7), Plato has Socrates infuse his words to Prodicus, another sophist in the group, with a mocking tone. He is surely ironic in saying that Prodicus’ presence during the exchange with Protagoras is fortuitous (340e8-9). This somewhat sarcastic tone continues when he states that Prodicus has some sort of divine knowledge that dates back to the days of Simonides or even earlier. Surely Protagoras would agree, since he himself had compared his own knowledge to that of ‘the men of old’ earlier in the dialogue (316d and following). Socrates then is attacking indirectly the sophist Protagoras when he describes the sophist Prodicus in these terms. Socrates’ saying that he is a student of Prodicus takes this ironical tone to an extreme and, as if he were pitting one sophist against another sophist, he claims that he is more expert than Protagoras in the field of semantic differentiation because he can apply Prodicus’ expertise to the matter at hand (341a2-4).

The interpretation of Socrates’ appeal to Prodicus as a means of mocking “sophists” in general is supported by the subsequent passage on the meaning of Simonides’ use of χαλεπόν. Once Prodicus claims that Simonides meant χαλεπόν in the sense of κακόν (‘bad’ or ‘evil’: 341c2), a definition swiftly rejected by Protagoras, and once Socrates agrees with the latter and withdraws Prodicus’ suggestion by saying that Prodicus knew what Simonides meant by the word but was jesting and merely trying to test Protagoras’ ability to defend his interpretation of χαλεπόν as meaning ‘not easy’ in accordance with its common usage (341d7-9), it becomes clear that Socrates is making manifest Prodicus’ ignorance in the very skill that the sophist claims as his own. Prodicus not only fails to understand Simonides’ meaning but he also assumes Simonides was objecting to Pittacus’ faulty diction caused by the latter’s being from Lesbos (341c6-9). A funny twist has taken place: Prodicus, and not Simonides or Pittacus, is the one unable to distinguish between various shades of meaning: τὰ ὀνόματα οὐκ ἠπίστατο ὀρθῶς διαιρεῖν—‘he does not know to distinguish meanings correctly’ (341c7-8).

Socrates, agreeing with Protagoras, provides another line from the Simonidean poem as proof that Simonides could not have meant χαλεπόν in the sense of κακόν. He says to Protagoras:

According to Socrates, the line quoted immediately follows the lines of Simonides’ poem mentioned by Protagoras. The γέρας in the poem of Simonides refers to the condition of being ἐσθλός (here used in place of ἀγαθός). Socrates’ citing of Simonides’ words about a god alone having the privilege of ‘being noble’ shows that he, like Protagoras, knows the poem well. His knowledge of the poem’s contents becomes clearer as the dialogue progresses and it should be noted that it is Socrates (not Protagoras) who quotes other lines from Simonides’ ᾆσμα (‘song’ or ‘poem’). If Socrates later quotes lines in order to uphold his interpretation of the poet’s overall intent (341e7-8: ἅ μoι δοκεῖ διανοεῖσθαι Σιμωνίδης ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ἄσματι— ‘what I think is Simonides’ intention in this song’), then it is reasonable to assume that he will select only those lines in accordance with his view of the poem. More importantly, his purpose in discussing this poem in particular is to show Protagoras that he is περὶ ἐπῶν δεινός (338e7-339a1) and that he can confront Protagoras on his own terms, since, like the sophist, he is “educated” in matters relating to poetry. Protagoras claims that knowledge of poetry is the greatest part of a man’s education (338e7). As a result, Socrates now is forced to display his own δεινότης (‘cleverness’) concerning the Simonidean poem about ἀρετή. It is striking that Socrates must give an account of virtue by being δεινός, a quality ascribed usually to sophists. If Socrates must adopt the sophistry of a Protagoras in order to take up the latter’s challenge, then the seemingly awkward argumentation of Socrates is intended to be understood as a feeble attempt on the philosopher’s part to resemble a sophist. I venture to suggest that Plato intended Socrates’ arguments not to be persuasive; Socrates must not play by the rules of Protagoras’ game.

If Protagoras forces Socrates to pose as a literary critic in the mode of a sophist like Protagoras, [9] then it is not surprising that the philosopher would resort to an interpretation of Simonides’ poem that allows for amplification of the views of Socrates the philosopher and not Socrates the Protagorean-style critic of poetry. In fact, Socrates focuses on philosophical questions concerning ontology (more precisely, the difference between ‘becoming’ and ‘being’ in the lines of Simonides and Pittacus, respectively) and his own famous contention that “no one errs willingly,” a view he ascribes to Simonides and the other wise men (345d9-e2: οὐδεὶς τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡγεῖται οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων ἑκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν—‘no wise man thinks anyone errs willingly’).

Socrates begins his interpretation of Simonides’ poem at 342a6. Before quoting various lines, he prefaces his monologue with a small excursus on Crete and Sparta as the oldest leading centers of philosophy in Hellas. Sophists, he goes on to say, abound in these areas but they, like the sophists whom Protagoras had mentioned earlier (316d2-317c1), deny being sophists and hide their wisdom (342b1-6). These Cretan and Spartan “sophists” are so protective of their sophia that they pretend that their regions excel rather in warfare and courage so as not to share their wisdom with others (342b4-6). Socrates is obviously parodying Protagoras’ earlier comments about the reluctance of the sophists of old to divulge their being sophists; Protagoras, on the other hand, is not afraid to show his knowledge. Socrates’ purpose in this part of the Protagoras is obvious: to mock Protagoras’ style of exposition as displayed in his earlier discussion about his relationship to the ancients and to contrast Protagoras’ μακρολογία (‘speaking at length’) [10] with the Laconic brevity of Pittacus’ maxim as quoted by Simonides. Socrates contends that the Spartans have the best education with respect to philosophy and logoi. According to Socrates, the ability to utter short remarks that become memorable sayings is the hallmark of education, and he counts Pittacus of Mytilene as one of the traditional seven sages [11] who were influenced by Spartan paideia. He attributes maxims like γνῶθι σαυτόν (‘know thyself’) and μηδὲν ἅγαν (‘nothing in excess’) to these disciples of Spartan culture and then proceeds to classify Pittacus’ remark that it is difficult to be noble (as mentioned by Simonides) as an example of these pithy “philosophical” statements.

According to Socrates, Simonides intended to ‘take down’ (343c1: καθέλοι) Pittacus’ gnomic statement because he, covetous of fame, wished to gain a reputation for wisdom. [12] Simonides’ entire poem then is a refutation of Pittacus’ gnome (343c3-5 and 344b3-5). Socrates’ account of Simonides’ motivation indirectly mocks the practice of sophists like Protagoras who hope to debunk traditional wisdom in order to display their own cleverness. Although Socrates’ tone seems not altogether serious, his detailed analysis of the poem suggests that he is intent upon clearing Simonides of self-contradiction. Surely Protagoras’ opinion regarding the poem must have been novel; otherwise, Socrates would not have been compelled to defend Simonides. The arguments that Socrates provides, however, are at times strained and, as we shall see, skewed toward Socratic preoccupations.

To support his assertion that Simonides finds fault with Pittacus’ maxim regarding virtue, Socrates points to the μέν in the first line quoted by Protagoras and regards it as an indication that Simonides disagrees with the subsequent lines containing Pittacus’ maxim (343d 1-6). One cannot know whether this interpretation is correct, since the lines that came between the two quotations presented by Protagoras are missing. A corresponding δέ clause that is not available to us may have provided the key to understanding Simonides’ intent. Although some scholars find Socrates’ treatment of the μέν clause unconvincing, [13] it is a possible interpretation if one accepts Socrates’ insistence upon the difference between Pittacus’ χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι and Simonides’ ἄνδρ’ ἀγαθὸν γενέο χαλεπόν. [14] However, his claim at 343d6-344a6 that Simondes used ἀλαθέως as a hyperbaton, modifying χαλεπόν rather than referring back to ἀγαθόν, seems strained and unconvincing. [15] First, the natural sense of the word order precludes one’s understanding ‘it is truly difficult (344a4: χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως) for a man to be good’ instead of ‘it is difficult for a man to be truly good’. Second, the latter meaning seems more appropriate, since Simonides expands upon the meaning of ἀγαθός in the phrase χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον (‘hands and feet and mind foursquare, wrought without blame’). [16]

Instead of claiming that Socrates misunderstands Simonides, it is better to consider Socrates’ motivation during this segment of his analysis. In the case of the alleged hyperbaton, clearly he is trying, at any cost, to maintain that Simonides does not contradict himself. Socrates’ maneuver at 343e-344a is sophistic— i.e., clever but fallacious. More precisely, his is an obviously clumsy attempt at “Protagorean” argumentation. One can view the allusion to μακρολογία at 344b, a practice already attributed to Protagoras by Socrates (334c9-d1) and Alcibiades (336c5-6), as another ironic reference to Protagoras’ argumentative style; Socrates says that he will not delve into all the intricacies of the well-wrought poem, since it would take up too much time (344b2-3: ἀλλὰ μακρὸν ἂν εἴη αὐτὸ οὕτω διελθεῖν). Even though he promises to provide an ‘outline’ (τύπον) of the poem and a discussion of its overall ‘purpose’ (βούλησιν) as a ‘refutation’ (ἔλεγχος) [17] of Pittacus’ saying, his subsequent analysis is lengthy. Socrates’ presentation can then be understood as a subtle mimicry of the sophists infused with a serious purpose. He feels obliged to defend Simonides from the charge of self- contradiction. The convoluted defense, as will be shown, also becomes an opportunity for Socrates to voice his own philosophical views although they are attributed to Simonides. [18] If one sees Socrates’ attempt at literary criticism in such a light, then his interpretation does not seem so outlandish.

At 334b6-c5, Socrates reiterates what he has just argued, emphasizing that Simonides says ‘it is truly difficult to become a good man’ as though the poet were defending a thesis (344b6-7: ὡς ἂν εἰ λέγοι λόγον). However, the poet’s contention is now expanded upon by Socrates, who claims that Simonides regards ‘becoming agathos’ as possible only for a short period. The distinction between ‘becoming good’ (Simonides) and ‘being in a state of goodness’ (Pittacus) is mentioned again and thus introduces Socrates’ next comment, which he imagines Simonides himself would say if the poet were addressing Pittacus. Simonides would assert that it is not possible for human beings ‘to be good’ [19] since this is a privilege assigned only to the gods. [20] He quotes additional lines from the poem that presumably followed the phrase referring to the gods’ γέρας:

This is followed by Socrates’ insistence that these lines refer to the man who is at times εὐμήχανος (‘resourceful’), not to the man who is always ἀμήχανος (‘helpless’). He uses a quint- essentially Socratic technique here: the comparison of those with the knowledge of some craft (e.g., sailors, farmers, doctors, etc.) to those who profess to have ἀρετή. The meaning of ἀμήχανος συμφορά here is obvious in the context of these lines. ‘Helpless disaster’ [21] refers to circumstances beyond a man’s control that render him κακός. [22] Socrates, in a clever play on words, contends that the εὐμήχανος man would be the only one susceptible to ἀμήχανος συμφορά (344d1-2). [23] The argumentation provided here seems pointless; however, it can be considered a feeble attempt at defending the upshot of this part of his presentation. His purpose is to defend Simonides’ statement that ‘it is difficult to become ἀγαθός᾽ and to infer that the poet would adduce that ‘it is impossible to be good’. If misfortune especially attacks the resourceful man, as Socrates alleges, then it can be argued (albeit dubiously) that only a good man can become κακός while the κακός man is κακός always. [24]

Socrates quotes from another poet, unknown to us, whose views resemble those of Simonides’: αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς τοτὲ μὲν κακός, ἄλλοτε δ’ ἐσθλός—‘a good man is sometimes bad, sometimes noble’ (344d8). [25] Simonides would say ‘to become good is difficult but possible’. The assertion that ‘to be good’ (ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι) is not possible—at least for human beings— is re-emphasized. [26] Another quotation from Simonides’ poem is added as further evidence for Socrates’ interpretation:

The subsequent discussion of these lines allows Socrates to interject one of his favorite philosophical tenets, the notion that ‘doing badly’ (κακὴ πρᾶξις) consists only of ‘being deprived of knowledge’ (ἐπιστήμης στερηθῆναι). [27] This transition at 345b5 to Socrates’ familiar claim regarding the relationship between virtue and knowledge is abrupt; however, one should not discard it on the grounds of seeming irrelevance. On the contrary, it offers a glimpse of Socrates’ insistence on the truth of his own beliefs regarding the nature of virtue.

He manages to connect Simonides’ notion that being κακός is a product of external forces that a man cannot overcome with his own conception of ‘doing badly’ applied to a man’s “inner” state comprised of knowledge. [28] Socrates achieves the fusion of these views by likening the plight of a ship’s pilot and a farmer, both susceptible to nature’s forces (344d), to the κακὴ πρᾶξις of a doctor who, unlike ‘laymen’ (ἰδιῶται), possesses a certain type of knowledge (345a-b). Since no one has absolute knowledge, no one can be ἀγαθός always. One cannot be sure that Simonides shared Socrates’ philosophical tenet; however, Socrates does agree with the poet’s attitude regarding the fragility of human goodness. Socrates interprets Simonides as implying that in order to become ‘bad’, one must first become ‘good’ (345b7-8). Socrates’ wording here is important because he clearly states that his interpretation is what Simonides had intended (345b8: ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ ᾄσματος πρὸς τοῦτο τείνει…). In other words, Socrates is carrying Simonides’ poem a step further than the poet had. It is not clear from the context whether the phrase at 345c3 (ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστοί εἰσιν οὓς ἂν οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν—‘those are best for the longest time whom the gods love’) is Socrates’ paraphrase of a line from the poem or the actual words of Simonides. [29] Socrates continues to quote from the poem:

Although Socrates quotes these lines as additional support for his argument that Simonides is attacking Pittacus, he does not discuss their meaning immediately; he postpones his interpretation until later (at 346d). Simonides’ words are similar to what one finds in praise/blame poetry. The adjective πανάμωμος (‘utterly blameless’), a hapax legomenon, probably is synonymous with the earlier description of the ‘foursquare’ man as one who is ‘fashioned without blame’ (ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένος). [30] A Semonides fragment contains the adjective ἄμωμος modified by the adverb πάμπαν, and, as M. Dickie has noted, the sense in which Semonides uses it is the same as Simonides’ πανάμωμος. [31] Both poets state that a totally blameless human being does not exist. Simonides’ tone seems cynical in the last line, since it is probable that he will not be able to find such a man. [32]

The claim that Simonides directs his poem against the saying of Pittacus is repeated, and, in what appears as an anacolouthon, [33] he quickly shifts to quoting more lines as supposed evidence for this view of Simonides’ motivation:

Another abrupt transition occurs; this time, however, it is shifted toward another of Socrates’ own philosophical views. As before (cf. 345b5), he ascribes one of his philosophical tenets to Simonides. His belief that “no one errs willingly” finds a place in the subsequent interpretation of these lines. According to Socrates, Simonides was not so uneducated (ἀπαίδευτος) as to believe ‘that there were some who performed evil deeds willingly’ (345d6-9). He cleverly reintroduces the ‘wise men’ at this point and attributes his (Socrates’) belief to them: [οἱ σοφοὶ ἄνδρες] εὖ ἴσασιν ὅτι πάντες οἱ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ποιοῦντες ἄκοντες ποιοῦσιν—‘they know well that all who do shameful and bad things do them unwillingly’ (345e2-4). In light of this belief supposedly shared by Simonides and the other wise men, [34] Socrates asserts that the adjective ἑκών refers to Simonides himself and not to the relative clause ὅστις ἕρδῃ μηδὲν αἰσχρόν. Although the natural word order would preclude Socrates’ interpretation, his claim is repeated later at 346e1-4 where Socrates says that Simonides uses ἐπαίνημι, the ‘Mytilenaean’ form of ἐπαινῶ, because the phrase beginning ‘I love and praise all willingly’ is addressed to Pittacus, who is a native of Mytilene. [35]

The curious aspect of Socrates’ analysis in 346a-b is that he not only inserts his own philosophical view but also concentrates on a topic whose relevance is not immediately understood. He dwells on the subject of the tendency of ‘wicked men’ (οἱ πονηροί) to delight in finding fault with the wrongdoing of relatives or others, whereas ‘good men’ (οἱ ἀγαθοί) force themselves, by means of reconciliation and exhortation, ‘to love and praise’ those who act unjustly (e.g., their own parents or homeland). [36] Note that Socrates is sneaking in his own view of the way one should behave toward one’s family and country. Perhaps he is also paying Simonides a backhanded compliment, since the poet, as Socrates says, [37] found himself in circumstances that compelled him to bestow praise upon such figures as tyrants; Simonides would then be counted as one of the ἀγαθοί who do not easily find fault with anyone. [38] It is important for Socrates to note that Simonides, like the ‘good’ men, felt at times that he was praising under the force of necessity (346b7: ἀναγκαζόμενος), ‘not willingly’ (οὐχ ἑκών).

After the lengthy digression on ‘loving and praising’, Socrates provides more lines from the poem in a convoluted juxtaposition of quotation and paraphrase: [39]

These lines, according to the Socratic interpretation, are directed at Pittacus (cf. 347a1-3). One should not rule out the possibility that they actually refer to Scopas, the addressee of the poem (as mentioned by Protagoras in 339a7). The meaning of the adjective ἀπάλαμνος here is a matter of scholarly debate, since it can mean ‘helpless, good for naught’ or ‘reckless, lawless’. [40] Although some understand the word in the latter sense, [41] the consensus maintains that it does not have a “moral” overtone. [42] The word recalls the sense of the adjective ἀμήχανος used earlier by Simonides to describe συμφορά (344c5). Moreover, it would be appropriate for it to mean ‘ineffectual’, since it is contrasted with the adjective ὑγιής (‘sound’ in body and mind) [43] that characterizes a ‘man who knows justice which benefits the polis’. Simonides’ words are reminiscent of the poetry of Solon and Theognis; both are concerned with the preservation of dike in the city-state. Unfortunately, one cannot be sure of Simonides’ train of thought because Socrates may be quoting lines that, out of context, can fit into his own interpretation as offered in 346d1-347a5.

The final part of Socrates’ interpretation briefly refers to the last line quoted (πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσί τ’ αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμεικται (‘all is fair that is unmixed with foul’). [44] Simonides, he says, is expressing here his allowance for the middle state (namely, the poet’s acceptance of actions not completely καλά, but still not ‘shameful’) as free from reproach: τὰ μέσα ἀποδέχεται ὣστε μὴ ψέγειν (346d3). [45] After a rapid repetition of the lines quoted earlier regarding the ‘utterly blameless man’, the upshot of Simonides’ words is provided in a hodgepodge of requotation and exegesis (346d-e). Simonides is understood to mean that he is content if a man is ‘average’ (μέσος) and does nothing κακόν. This is followed by the reassertion that the adjective ἑκών should refer to Simonides’ act of loving and praising whoever does nothing αἰσχρόν. [46] Then, still speaking as though he were the poet, Socrates feebly appends a comment on having to praise against one’s will: ἄκων δ’ ἔστιν οὓς ἐγὼ ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ (346e3-4: ‘there are those whom I praise and love against my will’). The hypothetical scenario continues with Simonides blaming Pittacus for pretending to tell the truth when in fact the latter is ‘grievously lying about matters of the greatest importance’ (347a2-3). [47] Socrates had just claimed that Simonides does not consider himself φιλόψογος (‘fond of blaming’), since, in the poet’s words, ‘the race (γενέθλα) of fools is endless’ and one could have one’s fill of blaming them. Obviously, Socrates has not quoted line by line here; consequently, it is difficult to reconstruct the context in which the quotations occur. All that can be said is that Socrates has concentrated on Simonides himself and has insisted that the poet blames Pittacus, even though Simonides, in his own words, says that he usually does not like to find fault with others. It is hard to believe that anyone would have taken Simonides’ claim seriously, since a major function of poetry is to offer praise (especially in epinician poetry and throughout Greek poetry in general) and blame. Therefore, Socrates may be pretending to accept Simonides’ pose in order to highlight his contention that Simonides, one who was not φιλόμωμος, felt obliged to blame Pittacus for not telling the truth. Turning to Prodicus and Protagoras, Socrates finishes his exegesis: ταῦτά μοι δοκεῖ … Σιμωνίδης διανοούμενος πεποιηκέναι τοῦτο τὸ ᾆσμα (347a3-5: ‘this is what I think Simonides intended in the making of his poem’).

Hippias, another sophist who figures prominently in the Protagoras, commends Socrates for his interpretation. Hippias’ words are important because they do not refer to Socrates’ interpretation alone; Hippias himself says that he too has a fine λόγος (‘interpretation’) regarding the Simonidean poem he is willing to display “on the spot” to the immediate audience. This reference to another possible interpretation of the poem is significant because it implies that Socrates’ immediate audience thought that a poem could be viewed in many different ways. More importantly, if a ‘poem’ (ᾆσμα) is subject to more than one λόγος and each of these λόγοι can be considered equally ‘good’ [48] then Socrates’ interpretation should not be dismissed as an unsound display of literary criticism. On the contrary, Simonides’ poem provides Protagoras and Socrates the opportunity to provide differing but acceptable accounts of a work known to their listeners. One of these listeners, the sophist Hippias, has another view of Simonides’ poem, and this implies that the art of exegesis is not rigid in the eyes of Plato’s intended audience. Various interpretations can be offered for one poem and none of them is absolutely correct, even if one interpretation seems to possess more δεινότης than another. Consequently, in the eyes of his audience, Socrates’ exegesis would be considered one of many possible interpretations of Simonides’ poem.

This is a significant observation, since Socrates’ interpretation has been the subject of debate for generations of scholars who have tried to make sense of the poem itself from the quotations and commentary presented by Protagoras and Socrates. Moreover, Socrates’ statements regarding the poet’s meaning have seemed farfetched if not openly misleading to the reader. It is doubtful that Plato’s audience would have reacted to Socrates’ interpretation in a manner similar to ours, since it was not uncommon for a poem to have more than one applicable λόγος. Hippias’ words may serve as a kind of vindication of Socrates’ views in light of the acceptance of multiple interpretations of a familiar poem by the Greeks of the fifth century B.C.E.

Hippias, however, is prevented by Alcibiades from embarking on another excursus regarding the poem. The latter curtly says ‘thank you Hippias, but some other time’ (347b2: ναί … εἰς αὖθις γε) and insists that the question-and-answer session between Protagoras and Socrates continue; the role of questioner can be played by either party. Although Socrates pretends to let Protagoras decide which of the two should ask the questions, [49] he steers the conversation away from poetry and back to his original question regarding the unity of the virtues (justice, holiness, temperance, etc.) under the single heading of ἀρετή (cf. 329c2-d2). Before abandoning the topic of poetry, he provides a long speech on the inappropriateness of discussing poetry in a sympotic setting of well-educated gentlemen. He compares discussions involving poetry to the gatherings or symposia of ‘vulgar men from the marketplace’ (οἱ φαῦλοι καὶ ἀγοραῖοι ἄνθρωποι) and contrasts these symposia to the ‘gatherings’ (συνουσίαι) of ‘well-educated gentlemen’ (καλοὶ κἀγαθοί):

Socrates paints a vivid picture of the sympotic environment of the ‘common’ men. Since they are not educated enough to entertain each other by means of intelligent conversation, they resort to hiring ‘flute-girls’ (347d1: αὐλητρίδας). [50] Instead of using their own words and voices, these uneducated men rely on the sound of flutes, an outside source of entertainment, while they share each other’s company. He continues to contrast the two sympotic settings by emphasizing the point that educated participants have no need of these ‘childish things’ (347d6: παιδιῶν presumably refers to the music and dance performed by hired entertainers). They speak and listen to one another in turn while simultaneously drinking a great deal of wine. [51] Surely this type of setting is ideal for Socratic discourse; any music would be an unwelcome distraction.

The poets, says Socrates, like the extraneous sound of the flute, do not belong at a gathering such as that in the Protagoras. Poets cannot be questioned about their own poems and there is no consensus on how to interpret their meaning:

Although Socrates condemns poets (his contemporaries) in the Apology for not being able to explain the meaning of their own works and claims that others can discuss the poems better than the poets themselves, [52] he does not find fault with the poets in the above passage from the Protagoras. In this instance, he blames ‘the majority’ (οἱ πολλοί) who, in contrast to educated men, refer to poets during their conversation and present different interpretations of a poet’s intent (347e4-7). Clearly Socrates is alluding here to Protagoras’ introduction of the Simonides poem into the current conversation. In other words, Protagoras has not behaved in a manner befitting an ‘educated gentleman’ (a καλὸς κἀγαθός), since he, like the vulgar majority, discusses the poets even though he is incapable of proving one way or another what the poets actually meant.

Socrates’ concluding remarks about the manner in which he and Protagoras should continue their conversation is not surprising in light of his usual “dialogue” style as fashioned by Plato. The give-and-take method of argumentation among interlocutors, which he recommends in 348a2, is the familiar Socratic method of ἔλεγχος, the preferred mode of philosophical discourse. Although the term ἔλεγχος does not appear in the passage under consideration, doubtless it is what Socrates has in mind when he says that Protagoras and he should emulate men who, ‘putting the poets aside, make conversation with one another by means of their own words and test the truth as well as themselves’ (348a4-6). The discussion of poetry now ends and the conversation reverts to Socrates’ questioning of Protagoras on the nature of ἀρετή.

Although Socrates’ interpretation of the Simonides poem in the Protagoras can be seen as a comic interlude within an otherwise serious discussion on the nature of virtue, [53] Plato’s purpose is serious, since the interpretation of the poem is not basically unsound in light of the possibility of various interpretations for a single poem. Since Socrates felt obliged to defend Simonides from Protagoras’ charge of self-contradiction and since Hippias was ready but not permitted to offer another interpretation of the poem, this episode is important insofar as Plato has Socrates take advantage of the situation. Consequently, the interpretation of poetry becomes the medium for promoting philosophical tenets. When it becomes obvious that the discussion of poetry is an inadequate means of investigating not only a given poet’s intent but also ‘truth’ (348a5: ἀλήθεια) as a whole, the Socratic preference for philosophical discourse, exemplified by the ἔλεγχος, is reconfirmed. In addition, Protagoras’ sophistry becomes Socrates’ target: Simonides, regardless of his poem’s meaning, is given more credibility than Protagoras, the self-proclaimed teacher of ἀρετή.