González, José M. 2013. The Epic Rhapsode and His Craft: Homeric Performance in a Diachronic Perspective. Hellenic Studies Series 47. Washington, DC: Center for Hellenic Studies. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebook:CHS_GonzalezJ.The_Epic_Rhapsode_and_his_Craft.2013.
14. The Aristotelian tekhnē of hypokrisis
14.1 Technical hypokrisis
14.2 Hypokrisis and the Use of Writing
Its syntax lends itself all too readily to readings that, not to put too fine a point on it, make nonsense of Aristotle’s argument. Conversely, the most compelling and, I believe, correct interpretation is burdened by a choice of referents for ἄμφω and the bipartition τὸ μὲν … τὸ δέ at 1413b5–6 that is not immediately apparent and only follows from reflecting on the context and the logic of the argument. At the same time, I must emphasize that the correct identification of these referents does not call for a construal of the grammar that is in any way questionable or exceptional. Therefore, even if it does not correspond to the most immediately apparent reading, with the proper perspective Aristotle’s true meaning flows with unexceptional ease. Since the context regards two pairs, the first, the ‘graphic’ and the ‘agonistic’ styles (γραφική and ἀγωνιστική), the second, the ‘demegoric’ and the ‘dicanic’ (δημηγορική and δικανική), a reasonable understanding of the immediately succeeding ἄμφω would seem ‘X + Y’ where ‘X’ is ‘the one,’ and ‘Y’ is ‘the other,’ element of whichever pair is in view. Yet, quite apart from the interpretive difficulties that result from any of the corresponding four possible alternatives, the neuter gender of τὸ μέν and τὸ δέ already hints that perhaps none of them is in view. Aristotle of course could have switched from the feminine-gender adjectives to a neuter bipartition (‘the former [thing] … while the latter [thing]). The mismatch between the feminine λέξις and the neuter verbal predicates (ἐπίστασθαι and μὴ ἀναγκάζεσθαι) might even be enlisted to motivate the switch. But it is unarguable that, had he wanted to, he could have placed beyond doubt that he had in mind one of the four alternatives by writing ἡ μὲν … ἡ δέ instead. If in fact this was his meaning, it is only too ironic that he did not take his own advice at 1407b6–9, the fourth principle of correct Greek usage (ἑλληνίζειν) ascribed to Protagoras, and failed to secure gender agreement with a view to clarity. Aristotle deserves no such criticism, however, if my interpretation below is correct. At any rate, one can infer how hard it is to make sense of the passage from how often most scholars neglect to engage or translate it. This can only be explained as a show of embarrassed silence or as proof that they are oblivious to the interpretive difficulties entailed by the commonplace rendering. On the other hand, full-length translations of the Rhetoric, of which I list the following samples, cannot avoid going on the record:
Of the two pairs of stylistic opposites that open the chapter, scholars make the latter, the δημηγορική and δικανική, an explication (by way of division) of the ἀγωνιστική, the second member of the first and more fundamental opposition around which Aristotle articulates his presentation: there is, on the one hand, a ‘graphic’, and on the other, an ‘agonistic’ style. The agonistic suits the ἀγών, i.e. a contest (in the extended sense) in which various options compete for the allegiance or support of the audience, whether in the law-court or the assembly (calling respectively for the λέξις δικανική and the λέξις δημηγορική). If the relationship commonly assumed between the first pair and the second is right, the graphic style, unlike the agonistic, does not receive a shorthand explication. Instead, after noting that ‘one must know both’ (ἄμφω δὲ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι 1413b5), the philosopher appends as rationale an enigmatic statement about the possibilities closed to those who ‘know not how to write’: τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἑλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκάζεσθαι κατασιωπᾶν ἄν τι βούληται μεταδοῦναι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅπερ πάσχουσιν οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι γράφειν (1413b5–8). This is an observation that has baffled many. Rapp (2002:2.932) sums up the difficulty with characteristic insight: “Nicht sehr erhellend ist die Begründung, die der Abschnitt für die Nützlichkeit der schriftlichen und der kontroversen Form gibt. Wenn die Kontroverse nämlich mit der Fähigkeit in Verbindung gebracht wird, sich auf korrektes Griechisch (ἑλληνίζειν) zu verstehen, dann scheint damit nur eine minimale Bedingung genannt zu sein, und außerdem eine, die auch der schriftlichen Form zugrunde liegt … . Ebenso wenig klar ist, warum die Eigenschaft, nicht zum Schweigen gezwungen zu sein, wenn man etwas mitteilen will, eher die schriftliche als die mündliche Form betrifft.” 
It is clear that τὸ πιθανόν is picked up both by τὸ μέν and by τὸ δέ. The resulting progression of μὲν … δέ divides into inherent and derivative the reasons for the convincingness and credibility of what persuades.  Because in this particular case these reasons are ordinarily  viewed as mutually exclusive, μὲν … δέ may be taken to articulate not a constructive gradation (‘first A; then, building on A, B’) but an alternative (‘either A or B’). Generally speaking, the relationship conveyed by μὲν … δέ depends on the particular context. This use of τὸ μέν and τὸ δέ is closely related to the adverbial one usually rendered as ‘now … now’, ‘partly … partly’, ‘one the one hand … on the other’, ‘both … and’.  In the case of Rhetoric 1356b27–28, the only possible latitude in the construal of the grammar is whether one assumes the implicit subject τὸ πιθανόν for ὑπάρχει, with τὸ μέν … τὸ δέ adverbial (‘now … now’) or, more naturally, one grants τό in τὸ μέν and τὸ δέ deictic force as the demonstrative ‘this’ (τό = τὸ πιθανόν). The syntax and meaning of the particles in this case are closely paralleled at Rhetoric 1413b6–8.
There is nothing in the passage that suggests strictly written dissemination of Alkidamas’ writings. εἰς τοὺς ὄχλους ἐκφερομένων regards delivery before the crowds, with ὄχλους hinting at the sophist’s contempt for the multitudes who, spoiled by their frequent hearing of speeches prepared with the aid of writing, can no longer appreciate the finer and superior skill of extempore speech-making. This negative connotation of ὄχλοι also seems present in Gorgias’ Helen 13, which envisions crowds delighted and persuaded by speeches that are artfully written but spoken without truth; and in Palamēdēs 33, where a mob (ὄχλος) that can be swayed by piteous wailing, prayers, and the entreating of friends is contrasted with those who are and appear as the foremost of the Greeks and are persuaded by one who exhibits the truth with manifest justice. So it is also with Isokrates, who in To Nikoklēs 49–50 compares the crowds (ὄχλοι) that others seek to please, rather than admonish and counsel, with Nikokles, who receives instead his paraenetic address; and who in Nikoklēs 21 contrasts advisers skillful at addressing the crowds (ὄχλοι) with advisers who know how to deal with the issues.  Finally, Aristotle’s own use of the word in Rhetoric 1395b28–29 also seems decidedly negative: ‘For this is why the uneducated are more persuasive with the crowds than the educated, just as the poets say that the uneducated are more accomplished in speaking before a crowd’.  Mariß (2002:291) remarks on the undertone of ‘regret’ in Alkidamas’ acceptance of writing for delivery before crowded audiences: “[Alkidamas sagt] daß gemeinhin ἐπιδείξεις veranstaltet würden und daß er sich wegen dieses allgemeinen Trends dem Schreiben zuwende.” To the hint of contempt he expresses with τοὺς ὄχλους, add the fact that in §11 ἀκρόασις refers to passive and politically inactive hearers under a tyranny (Mariß 2002:295). The entire context of §31, then, is one of oral delivery, whether the display is improvised or scripted. Hence the mention of ‘[vocal] recitations’ (ἀκροάσεις), of an audience spoiled by ‘listening’ (ἀκροᾶσθαι) to the speeches of others, and of forming an opinion of Alkidamas on ‘hearing’ (ἀκούοντες) him speak extempore. Nothing other than the bare fact of the sophist’s resort to writing and the failure of scholars to realize that, just as in the rest of the broadside, scripted delivery is in view supports the implausible reading that Alkidamas is now referring to the written dissemination of his speeches through the book market. If so, why should he refer to the alleged readership as ὄχλοι? A gathered throng was the desired ideal of the display sophist (Isokrates Letter 1.6): what justification does the modern scholar have to turn it into a potential multitude of individual solo readers? Hudson-Williams (1949:65) had it right: “Alcidamas, a contemporary of Isocrates, says that one reason which prompted him to compose an artistic written λόγος instead of ‘improvising’ was the prospect of giving recitals to crowded audiences … . Epideictic λόγοι were intended to be read [or, better, performed] before an audience, as a play was intended to be exhibited in the theatre.”