[[This article was originally published in 1985 by The Johns Hopkins University Press as Chapter 2 of Theognis of Megara: Poetry and the Polis (ed. by T. Figueria and G. Nagy) 22-81. Baltimore. In this online version, the original page-numbers of the printed version are indicated within braces (“{” and “}”). For example, “{22|23}” indicates where p. 22 of the printed version ends and p. 23 begins]] [1]
Poet and Community
εἰ μὲν χρήματ᾽ ἔχοιμι, Σιμωνίδη, οἷά περ ἤδη,
οὐκ ἂν ἀνιῴμην τοῖς ἀγαθοῖσι συνών.
νῦν δέ με γινώσκοντα παρέρχεται, εἰμὶ δ᾽ ἄφωνος
χρημοσύνῃ, πολλῶν γνοὺς ἂν ἄμεινον ἔτι,
οὕνεκα νῦν φερόμεσθα καθ᾽ ἱστία λευκὰ βαλόντες
Μηλίου ἐκ πόντου νύκτα διὰ δνοφερήν,
ἀντλεῖν δ᾽ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν, ὑπερβάλλει δὲ θάλασσα
ἀμφοτέρων τοίχων. ἦ μάλα τις χαλεπῶς
σῴζεται, οἷ᾽ ἔρδουσι· κυβερνήτην μὲν ἔπαυσαν
ἐσθλόν, ὅτις φυλακὴν εἶχεν ἐπισταμένως·
χρήματα δ᾽ ἁρπάζουσι βίη, κόσμος δ᾽ ἀπόλωλεν,
δασμὸς δ᾽ οὐκέτ᾽ ἴσος γίνεται ἐς τὸ μέσον·
φορτηγοὶ δ᾽ ἄρχουσι, κακοὶ δ᾽ ἀγαθῶν καθύπερθεν.
δειμαίνω μή πως ναῦν κατὰ κῦμα πίῃ.
ταῦτά μοι ᾐνίχθω κεκρυμμένα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖσιν.
γινώσκοι δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ κακὸν ἂν σοφὸς ᾖ .
Theognis 667–682
If I had my possessions [khrēmata], Simonides, [2] {22|23}
I would not be distressed as I am now [3] at being together with the noble [agathoi]. [4]
But now they [= my possessions] have passed me by, even though I was aware, [5] and I am speechless
because of my lack of possessions, [6] though I would be better aware than many, [7]
[aware] that we are now being carried along, with white sails lowered,
beyond the seas of Melos, through the dark night,
and they refuse to bail, and the sea washes over
both sides of the ship. It is a difficult thing for anyone
to be saved, such things they are doing. They have deposed the pilot [kubernētēs],
the noble [esthlos] one, who was standing guard with expertise.
They seize possessions [khrēmata] by force [biē], and order [kosmos] has been destroyed.
There is no longer an equitable [8] division [of possessions], in the common interest, [9]
but the carriers of merchandise rule, and the base [kakoi] are on top of the noble [agathoi].
I am afraid that perhaps a wave will swallow the ship.
Let these things be allusive utterances [= ainigmata] hidden by me for the noble [agathoi].
One could be aware of even [future] misfortune, if one is skilled [sophos].
γινώσκοι δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ κακὸν ἂν σοφὸς ᾖ.
Theognis 682
one could be aware of even [future] misfortune, if one is sophos. [16]
The reading offered here follows the manuscript tradition, which gives κακόν —as opposed to the emendation κακός adopted by most recent editors (but not by Douglas Young) and yielding this alternative interpretation of the same verse:
even a base person could be aware [of what is hidden away for the noble], if he is sophos.
In support of the reading κακόν, there is a parallel passage where the immediate context is the mention of poets and seers as parallel types in a catalogue enumerating representatives of various social functions:
ἄλλος ᾿Ολυμπιάδων Μουσέων πάρα δῶρα
διδαχθείς, ἱμερτῆς σοφίης μέτρον
ἐπιστάμενος· ἄλλον μάντιν ἔθηκεν ἄναξ ἑκάεργος
᾿Απόλλων, ἔγνω δ᾽ ἀνδρὶ κακὸν τηλόθεν
ἐρχόμενον.
Solon fr. 1.51–54 GP [= fr. 13 W]
And another man is taught the gifts of the Olympian Muses,
and such a man understands the control of desirable sophiē.
Far reaching Apollo makes yet another man a seer, and such a man is aware of misfortune even as it is coming from afar. [17]
The next two verses go on to say that, even if one has such powers of foreseeing misfortunes, one still cannot prevent what is fated to happen (Solon fr. 1.55–56). [18] {25|26}
ταῦτά μοι ᾐνίχθω κεκρυμμένα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖσιν·
γινώσκοι δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ κακὸν ἂν σοφὸς ᾖ .
Theognis 681–682
Let these things be allusive utterances made by me for the agathoi. One could be aware of even [future] misfortune, if one is sophos.
The poet has experienced such misfortune, but when he is together with the agathoi (§1 verse 668) he is painfully reluctant to speak of his experience directly to them; instead, he speaks to his audience indirectly, and they are specifically named as the agathoi (681). For them the key to being aware of future misfortune is being aware of the hidden message encoded in the image of the ship in a seastorm. And to be thus aware, the audience has to be sophoi as the poet is sophos.
Μοῦσαι καὶ Χάριτες, κοῦραι Διός, αἵ ποτε Κάδμου
ἐς γάμον ἐλθοῦσαι καλὸν ἀείσατ᾽ ἔπος ·
“ὅττι καλὸν φίλον ἐστί, τὸ δ᾽ οὐ καλὸν οὐ φίλον ἐστί”·
τοῦτ᾽ ἔπος ἀθανάτων ἦλθε διὰ στομάτων. [23]
Theognis 15-18
Muses and Kharites, [24] daughters of Zeus! You were the ones who once
came to the wedding of Kadmos, and you sang this beautiful utterance [epos]: [25] {27|28}
“What is beautiful is philon, what is not beautiful is not philon.” [26]
That is the utterance [epos] [27] that came through their immortal mouths.
The song of the Muses at the wedding of Kadmos, founder of Thebes, inaugurates the polis just as the invocation of the Muses inaugurates the poetry of Theognis. In this way the song of the Muses at verse 17 sets the overall theme of Theognidean poetry. The song itself amounts to an equation of beauty with that which is philon, where the adjective philos in the neuter serves to convey the institutional and sentimental bonds that integrate society. In other words, the beauty of the Muses’ song is equated with the social integration of Thebes and, by extension, the beauty of Theognidean poetry is equated with the social integration of Megara.
In other words, the very concept of Harmoniē has a built-in equation of musical beauty with social integration, which is the message delivered by the song of the Muses—and by the poetry of Theognis. [29] {28|29} Thus, the invocation to the Muses reveals that the poetry of Theognis is based on an ideology that awards the highest priority to the quality of being philos. To repeat: like the ainos, the poetry of Theognis is communicating with an ostensibly integrated community of philoi.
Κύρνε, σοφιζομένῳ μὲν ἐμοὶ [30] σφρηγὶς ἐπικείσθω
τοῖσδ᾽ ἔπεσιν —λήσει δ᾽ οὔποτε κλεπτόμενα,
οὐδέ τις ἀλλάξει κάκιον τοὐσθλοῦ παρεόντος,
ὧδε δὲ πᾶς τις ἐρεῖ· “Θεύγνιδός ἐστιν ἔπη
τοῦ Μεγαρέως· πάντας δὲ κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπους ὀνομαστός.”
Theognis 19–23
Kyrnos, let a seal [sphrēgis] be placed by me, as I practice my poetic skill [sophiē],
upon these utterances [epos plural]; that way they [= the utterances] will never be stolen without detection,
and no one will substitute something inferior for the genuine [31] thing that is there.
And everyone will say: “These are the utterances [epos plural] of Theognis
of Megara. His name is known among all men.”
For an understanding of the sphrēgis ‘seal’ of Theognis, it is pertinent to review the semantics of the word sophizomai ‘practice sophiē‘ in the same verse (19). To repeat: The concept of sophiē as ‘poetic skill’ embraces an ideology characteristic of the ainos —and of Theognidean poetry. [32] The seal placed on the poetry of Theognis through the sophiē of the poet himself guarantees the correct perception of the poet’s message. Any use of the poet’s words in an incorrect context will be exposed as theft, and any tampering with the words will implicitly garble their message and thereby produce, again, an incorrect context; in the correct context, however, the words will {29|30} identify and thereby glorify Theognis as the genuine poet. The occurrence of epos [plural] at verses 20 and 22 must refer primarily to Theognidean poetry as a whole, but the pointed use of epos at verses 16 and 18, in the passage immediately preceding (§6), to quote the song of the Muses colors the use of epos in the two occurrences now under consideration, associating what the Muses sang with all of Theognis’ poetry. Moreover, since the song of the Muses is quoted in an invocation that actually inaugurates the poetry of Theognis, the theme of their song—to repeat—serves as the very foundation of Theognidean poetry. This theme glorifies the quality of being philos, and one is led yet again to the expectation that the audience of Theognis is an integrated community of philoi.
And everyone will say: “These are the utterances [epos plural] of Theognis of Megara. His name is known among all men.”
The very next verse, however, which combines with the previous verse about the poet’s future pan-Hellenic status to form a complete elegiac couplet, makes it just as clear that the poetry of Theognis has as yet failed to gain universal acceptance in his own polis of Megara:
ἀστοῖσιν δ᾽ οὔπω πᾶσιν ἁδεῖν δύναμαι
Theognis 24
But I am not yet able to please all the citizens.
οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν, Πολυπαΐδη· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς
οὔθ᾽ ὕων πάντεσσ᾽ ἁνδάνει οὔτ᾽ ἀνέχων.
σοὶ δ᾽ ἐγὼ εὖφρονέων ὑποθήσομαι, οἷάπερ αὐτὸς
Κύρν᾽ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν παῖς ἔτ᾽ ἐὼν ἔμαθον.
Theognis 25–28
This is not surprising, son of Polypaos! For not even Zeus
can please everyone either by raining or by letting up.
But I, having good intentions toward you, will give you the kind of advice
that I myself, Kyrnos, learned from the agathoi when I was still a boy. {30|31}
By implication, the advice of Theognis to Kyrnos represents social order just as the weather as controlled by Zeus represents natural order—the cosmos itself.
ἔργμασι ἐν μεγάλοις πᾶσιν ἁδεῖν χαλεπόν.
Solon fr. 9 GP [=fr. 7 W]
In matters of great importance it is difficult to please all.
To cite once again the verse of Theognis (§9):
ἀστοῖσιν δ᾽ οὔπω πᾶσιν ἁδεῖν δύναμαι.
Theognis 24
But I am not yet able to please all the citizens.
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν ὀλίγης παρὰ σεῦ οὐ τυγχάνω αἰδοῦς,
ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ μικρὸν παῖδα λόγοις μ᾽ ἀπατᾷς.
Theognis 253–254
But I do not even get a bit of respect from you,
and you deceive me with what you say, [44] as if I were some small boy.
Similarly, the same poet who boasts of future pan-Hellenic approval at verses 22–23 (quoted at §8) declares in the very next verse that he fails to win the universal approval of his own community in his own time:
ἀστοῖσιν δ᾽ οὔπω πᾶσιν ἁδεῖν δύναμαι.
Theognis 24
But I am not yet able to please all the citizens. {34|35}
Champions of Justice
τόρνου καὶ στάθμης καὶ γνώμονος ἄνδρα θεωρὸν
εὐθύτερον χρὴ <ἔ>μεν Κύρνε φυλασσόμενον,
ὧτινί κεν Πυθῶνι θεοῦ χρήσας᾽ ἱέρεια
ὀμφὴν σημήν πίονος ἐξ ἀδύτου·
οὔτέ τι γὰρ προσθεὶς οὐδέν κ᾽ ἔτι φάρμακον εὕροις
οὐδ᾽ ἀφελὼν πρὸς θεῶν ἀμπλακίην προφύγοις.
Theognis 805–810
A man who is theōros [= who consults the Oracle]
must be more straight , [51] Kyrnos, being on his guard, [52] than a carpenter’s pin and rule and square—
a man to whom the priestess [= the Pythia] of the god at Delphi makes a response, revealing
a sacred utterance from the opulent shrine.
You will not find any remedy [53] left if you add anything,
nor will you escape from veering, in the eyes of the gods, if you take anything away.
That the theōros must be none other than Theognis—and that his dikē ‘judgment’ itself is at stake if there is any “veering” from “straightness”—becomes clear in another passage: [54]
χρή με παρὰ στάθμην καὶ γνώμονα τήνδε δικάσσαι
Κύρνε δίκην, ἶσόν τ᾽ ἀμφοτέροισι δόμεν,
μάντεσί τ᾽ οἰωνοῖς τε καὶ αἰθομένοις ἱεροῖσιν,
ὄφρα μὴ ἀμπλακίης αἰσχρὸν ὄνειδος ἔχω.
Theognis 543–546
I must render this judgment [dikē], Kyrnos, along [the straight line of] a carpenter’s rule and square, {37|38}
and I must give to both sides their equitable share,
with the help of seers, portents, and burning sacrifice, [55]
so that I may not incur shameful reproach for veering.
Solon as lawgiver likewise renders dikē ‘judgment’:
θεσμοὺς δ᾽ ὁμοίως τῷ κακῷ τε κἀγαθῷ
εὐθεῖαν εἰς ἕκαστον ἁρμόσας δίκην
ἔγραψα
Solon fr. 30.18–20 GP [=fr. 36W]
I wrote down the laws for base and noble alike,
fitting a straight judgment [dikē] for each.
The ‘straightness’ of the lawgiver’s dikē is manifested in his even-handedness, which is equated elsewhere with his refusal to add to or take away from what rightfully belongs to one of two sides (Solon fr. 7.1–2GP [=fr. 5W]), just as Theognis equates ‘veering’ with adding or subtracting (verses 809–810, quoted above): [56] by adding to or subtracting from the words of revelation emanating from the Oracle, one would be ‘veering’ by taking one side or another. Solon goes on to declare that he protects ‘both sides’ and allows ‘neither side’ to win (ἀμφοτέροισι / οὐδετέρους at Solon fr. 7.5/6), just as Theognis presents himself as giving an equal share to ‘both sides’ (ἀμφοτέροισι at verse 544, quoted above). Elsewhere too, Theognis teaches Kyrnos to walk ‘the middle road’ (verses 219–220, 331–332) and give to ‘neither side’ that which belongs to the other (μηδετέροισι at verse 332). [57]
The Universality of a Poet’s Message
Κύρνε, κύει πόλις ἥδε, δέδοικα δὲ μὴ τέκῃ ἄνδρα
εὐθυντῆρα κακῆς ὕβριος ἡμετέρης.
ἀστοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔθ᾽ οἵδε σαόφρονες, ἡγεμόνες δὲ
τετράφαται πολλὴν εἰς κακότητα πεσεῖν.
οὐδεμίαν πω Κύρν᾽ ἀγαθοὶ πόλιν ὤλεσαν ἄνδρες·
ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ὑβρίζειν τοῖσι κακοῖσι ἅδῃ
δῆμόν τε φθείρωσι δίκας τ᾽ ἀδίκοισι διδῶσιν
οἰκείων κερδέων εἵνεκα καὶ κράτεος,
ἔλπεο μὴ δηρὸν κείνην πόλιν ἀτρεμίεσθαι,
μηδ᾽ εἰ νῦν κεῖται πολλῇ ἐν ἡσυχιῃ,
εὖτ᾽ ἂν τοῖσι κακοῖσι φίλ᾽ ἀνδράσι ταῦτα γένηται,
κέρδεα δημοσίῳ σὺν κακῷ ἐρχόμενα.
ἐκ τῶν γὰρ στάσιές τε καὶ ἔμφυλοι φόνοι ἀνδρῶν
μούναρχοί τε· πόλει μήποτε τῇδε ἅδοι.
Theognis 39–42
Kyrnos, this polis is pregnant, and I fear that it will give birth to a man
who will be a straightener of our base hubris.
The citizens here are still moderate, but the leaders [hēgemones]
have veered so much as to fall into debasement [kakotēs].
Men who are agathoi, Kyrnos, have never yet ruined any polis,
but when the kakoi decide to behave with outrage [hubris],
and when they ruin the dēmos and render judgments [dikai] in favor of the unjust [= persons or things without dikē],
for the sake of private gain [kerdos plural], and for the sake of power,
do not expect that polis to be peaceful for long,
not even if it is now in a state of great serenity [hēsukhiē],
when the base [kakoi] decide on these things,
namely, private gains [kerdos plural] entailing public damage.
From these things arise discord [stasis plural], intestine killings [phonoi] of men,
and tyrants [mounarkhoi]. [67] May this polis never decide to adopt these things! {42|43}
So universalized is this picture that the description of the emerging tyrant is expressed in words that would be appropriate for describing the Athenian lawgiver Solon in Solon’s own poetry. The tyrant of Megara will be ‘a straightener of our base hubris ‘, says Theognis to Kyrnos (verse 40), and the wording is parallel to the ‘straight dikē‘ that Solon hands down by way of his laws (εὐθεῖαν…δίκην : Solon fr. 30.19GP [=fr. 36W]). We must also compare the eunomiē ‘good government’ of Solon (fr. 3.32 GP [=fr. 4W]), which makes everything ‘cohesive’ (32: ἄρτια) and ‘endowed with good kosmos‘ (32: εὔκοσμα); most important, it also ‘scorches hubris‘ (34: ὕβριν ἀμαὺροῖ) and ‘straightens crooked judgments [dikai]’ (36: εὐθύνει δὲ δίκας σκολιάς)—themes that match those of Theognidea 40.
ἐν δὲ ὀλιγαρχίῃ πολλοῖσι ἀρετὴν ἐπασκέουσι ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ἔχθεα ἴδια ἰσχυρὰ φιλέει ἐγγίνεσθαι· αὐτὸς γὰρ ἕκαστος βουλόμενος κορυφαῖος εἶναι γνώμῃσί τε νικᾶν ἐς ἔχθεα μεγάλα ἀλλήλοισι ἀπικνέονται, ἐξ ὧν {44|45} στάσιες ἐγγίνονται, ἐκ δὲ τῶν στασίων φόνος, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ φόνου ἀπέβη ἐς μουναρχίην, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ διέδεξε ὅσῳ ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἄριστον.
Herodotus 3.8.3
But in an oligarchy, where many men are competing for achievement [aretē] in public life, [73] intense personal hatreds are bound to break out. For each of them wants to be on top and to have his proposals win the day, and so they end up having great hatreds against each other. From which arise conflicts [stasis plural], from which arises killing [phonos], from which in turn it all comes down to monarchy [mounarkhiē]—and in this there is proof how superior is monarchy! [74]
λίαν δ᾽ ἐξάραντ᾽ <οὐ> ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι κατασχεῖν
ὕστερον, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη χρή <τινα> πάντα νοεῖν.
Solon fr. 12.5–6 GP [=fr. 9W]
It is a difficult thing to hold down someone who has risen too far up,
once it has happened, but now is the time for someone to take all precautions.
Κύρνε, κύει πόλις ἥδε, δέδοικα δὲ μὴ τέκῃ ἄνδρα
ὑβριστήν, χαλεπῆς ἡγεμόνα στάσιος ·
ἀστοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔασι [76] σαόφρονες, ἡγεμόνες δὲ
τετράφαται πολλὴν εἰς κακότητα πεσεῖν.
Theognis 1081–1082b
Kyrnos, this polis is pregnant, and I fear that it will give birth to a man
who is a perpetrator of outrage [hubris], a leader [hēgemōn] of dire discord [stasis]
The citizens are moderate, but the leaders [hēgemones]
have veered so much as to fall into debasement [kakotēs].
These verses seem to concern the same figure that we have seen in the doublet at verses 39–42, but the perspective is different: whereas the hēgemones ‘leaders’ of verse 1082a may again represent the exponents of an oligarchy who are themselves base and therefore implicitly marked by hubris, the hēgemōn of verse 1082, representing the single exponent of a tyranny, is also marked by hubris —and this time the marking is explicit. The tyrant will be a perpetrator, not a regulator, of hubris. Whereas verses 1081–1082b are one-sidedly negative about the emerging tyrant, verses 39–42 reveal a more even-handed—one might say “Solonian”—stance. [77]
Theognis or Theognidea?
τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν πολὺς ὄλβος ἕπηται
ἀνθρώποις ὁπόσοις μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾖ.
Solon fr. 8.3–4 GP [=fr. 6W] {48|49}
τίκτει τοι κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν κακῷ ὄλβος ἕπηται
ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὅτῳ μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾖ .
Theognis 153–154
Where the Solonian … ὄλβος ἕπηται / ἀνθρώποις ὁπόσοις … (the sign / indicates verse-boundary) diverges from the Theognidean … ὄλβος ἕπηται / ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὅτῳ …, it converges with another Theognidean string of phraseology in the same metrical context: …ὄλβιος οὐδεὶς / ἀνθρώπων ὁπόσους … (Theognis 167–168). Similarly, where the Theognidean … καὶ ὅτῳ μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾖ / diverges from the Solonian … ὁπόσοις μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾖ /, it converges with the Theognidean … ὅτῳ μή τις ἔνεστι δόλος / (Theognis 416/1164f) and … καί σοι πιστὸς ἔνεστι νόος / (Theognis 88/1082d). Again, where the Solonian … ὅταν πολὺς ὄλβος ἕπηται / diverges from the Theognidean …ὅταν κακῷ ὄλβος ἕπηται / (note too the position of κακῷ at Theognis 151), it converges with the Solonian … ὅτῳ πολὺς ἄργυρός ἐστι / (Solon fr. 18.1 GP [=24W]/Theognis 719).
Decadence in a City, Debasement of Mankind
δειμαίνω μὴ τήνδε πόλιν Πολυπαΐδη ὕβρις
ἥ περ Κενταύρους ὠμοφάγους ὀλέσῃ.
Theognis 541–542
I fear, son of Polypaos, that outrage [hubris] will destroy this city
—the same outrage that destroyed the Centaurs, eaters of raw flesh. [96] {51|52}
Likewise in the doublets 39–42 (§27) and 1081–1082b (§32): the hēgemones ‘leaders’ of Megara are blamed for their explicit and implicit hubris respectively, which in turn signals the degeneration of the agathoi into kakoi. [97] The focus of blame is on the tyrant rather than the oligarchy in 1081–1082b, but even in this variant the hubris of the tyrant was implicitly made possible by the hubris of the debased elite who were hēgemones ‘leaders’ before him.
ἐς δ᾽ ἐρατὴν Κολοφῶνα βίην ὑπέροπλον ἔχοντες
ἑζόμεθ᾽, ἀργαλέης ὕβριος ἡγεμόνες.
Mimnermus fr. 3.3–4 GP [=fr.9W]
…and we, men of overweening violence [biē], settled
lovely Colophon, we leaders [hēgemones] of baneful outrage [hubris].
The expression κολοφωνία ὕβρις ‘Colophonian hubris‘ is in fact proverbial (CPG I p. 266.6–7). There is further testimony about the hubris of this city in Athenaeus (526C), who reports that it resulted in turannis ‘tyranny’ and stasis [plural] ‘discord’. This theme recalls Theognis 51–52 (quoted at §27), where the hubris of Megara leads to stasis [plural] and mounarkhoi. In the case of the Colophonians, the prime manifestation of their hubris was the truphē ‘luxuriance’ of excessive wealth, in the words of Athenaeus (526A), [98] who quotes in this context Xenophanes fr. 3GP [andW]: in the poet’s sensual description, the decadent Colophonians are said to have learned habrosunē [plural] ‘luxuriance’ from the quintessentially decadent Lydians (verse 1), while the city was still free from turanniē ‘tyranny’ (verse 2). [99] What ultimately destroyed Colophon was of course hubris, and herein lies the lesson for Megara: {52|53}
ὕβρις καὶ Μάγνητας ἀπώλεσε καὶ Κολοφῶνα
καὶ Σμύρνην· πάντως Κύρνε καὶ ὔμμ᾽ ἀπολεῖ.
Theognis 1103–1104
Outrage [hubris] has destroyed the Magnesians [100] and Colophon
and Smyrna; and it will completely destroy you [plural] too, Kyrnos!
Just as Mimnermus includes himself among the Colophonians when he calls them ‘men of overweening violence [biē]’ and ‘leaders [hēgemones] of hubris‘ (above), so also Theognis here includes Kyrnos among the Megarians who will be destroyed by hubris. The destruction of Megara, the poet warns, will be caused by its own elite:
πάντα τάδ᾽ ἐν κοράκεσσι καὶ ἐν φθόρῳ· οὐδέ τις ἥμιν
αἴτιος ἀθανάτων Κύρνε θεῶν μακάρων,
ἀλλ᾽ ἀνδρῶν τε βίη καὶ κέρδεα δειλὰ καὶ ὕβρις
πολλῶν ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἐς κακότητ᾽ ἔβαλεν.
Theognis 833–836
Everything here has gone to the ravens and perdition. And
not one of the immortal and blessed gods is responsible to us for this, Kyrnos,
but the violence [biē] of men and their baneful private interests [kerdos plural] [101] and their outrage [hubris]
have plummeted them from much nobility [polla agatha] into debasement [kakotēs]. [102]
πολλάκις ἡ πόλις ἥδε δι᾽ ἡγεμόνων κακότητα
ὥσπερ κεκλιμένη ναῦς παρὰ γῆν ἔδραμεν.
Theognis 855–856
Often has this polis, because of the baseness [kakotēs] of the leaders [hēgemones
run aground like a veering [103] ship. {53|54}
The wording here once more recalls Theognis verses 41–42 (quoted at §27) and 1082a–1082b (quoted at §32), where the hēgemones ‘leaders’ are described as falling into kakotēs ‘debasement’ at a time when the citizens-at-large are still saophrones ‘moderate’.
…ὃς μάλα πολλὰ πέπαται
Theognis 663
…he who has acquired much.
Now excessive wealth, to repeat, is a prime manifestation of hubris. As it turns out, it also makes men bastards. Theognis shows the decadence of Megara by telling how ploutos ‘wealth’ has made bastards out of everyone:
κριοὺς μὲν καὶ ὄνους διζήμεθα Κύρνε καὶ ἵππους
εὐγενέας, καί τις βούλεται ἐξ ἀγαθῶν
βήσεσθαι· γῆμαι δὲ κακὴν κακοῦ οὐ μελεδαίνει
ἐσθλὸς ἀνήρ, ἤν οἱ χρήματα πολλὰ διδῷ,
οὐδὲ γυνὴ κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀναίνεται εἶναι ἄκοιτις
πλουσίου, ἀλλ᾽ ἀφνεὸν βούλεται ἀντ᾽ ἀγαθοῦ.
χρήματα μὲν τιμῶσι· καὶ ἐκ κακοῦ ἐσθλὸς ἔγημε
καὶ κακὸς ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ· πλοῦτος ἔμειξε γένος.
οὕτω μὴ θαύμαζε γένος Πολυπαΐδη ἀστῶν
μαυροῦσθαι· σὺν γὰρ μίσγεται ἐσθλὰ κακοῖς.
Theognis 183–192
We seek to have, Kyrnos, rams, asses, and horses
that are purebred [with good genos], and everyone wants to breed them from stock that are noble [agathoi],
but a noble [esthlos] man does not worry about marrying a base [kakē] woman born of a base [kakos] man,
so long as the base [kakos] man gives him many possessions [khrēmata],
nor does a woman refuse to be the wife of a base [kakos] man
who has wealth, but she wants a rich husband instead of one who is noble [agathos].
Men give honor to possessions [khrēmata]. And one who is noble [esthlos] marries the daughter of one who is base [kakos],
while one who is base [kakos] marries the daughter of one who is noble [agathos]. Wealth [ploutos] has mixed up the breeding [genos].
So do not be surprised, son of Polypaos, that the breeding [genos] of the citizens is being blackened.
For whatever is noble [esthla] is mixed up with whatever is base [kaka]. [108]
The mixing up of good breeding [genos] by ploutos ‘wealth’ corresponds to the fathering of a youth named Kurnos ‘bastard’ by Polupāos, the one ‘who has acquired much’. [109] {55|56}
μή μ᾽ ἔπεσιν μὲν στέργε, νόον δ᾽ ἔχε καὶ φρένας ἄλλας.
εἴ με φιλεῖς καί σοι πιστὸς ἔνεστι νόος,
ἀλλὰ φίλει καθαρὸν θέμενος νόον, ἤ μ᾽ ἀποειπὼν
ἔχθαιρ᾽ ἐμφανέως νεῖκος ἀειράμενος.
οὕτω χρὴ τόν γ᾽ ἐσθλὸν ἐπιστρέψαντα νόημα
ἔμπεδον αἰὲν ἔχειν ἐς τέλος ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ.
Theognis 1082c–1084 [110]
Do not love me merely in word while you have a different intent [noos] and feelings.
If you are a friend [philos] [111] to me and have a trustworthy intent [noos] within,
then be a friend [philos], having an intent [noos] that is pure. Otherwise, deny me
and be my enemy [ekhthros], overtly taking on a quarrel [neikos].
This is the way a man who is noble [esthlos] must direct his intention [noēma] [112]
and keep it steadfast and consequential always for the man who is a friend [philos] to him.
The challenge, of course, is never answered, and the neikos ‘quarrel’ between Theognis and Kyrnos never becomes overt. The bond of being philoi that exists between Theognis and Kyrnos—as well as all Megara by extension—is never completely severed.
ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δ᾽ ἄκουε Δίκης, μηδ᾽ ὕβριν ὄφελλε
Hesiod WD 213
Perses! Listen to Dikē, and do not promote hubris !
This hubris is manifested in the striving of Perses for excessive wealth, as opposed to the moderate wealth won by the hard work that is espoused by Hesiod (cf. WD 315–316). Excessive wealth, however, is not a lasting thing:
χρήματα δ᾽ οὐχ ἁρπακτά · θεόσδοτα πολλὸν ἀμείνω.
εἰ γάρ τις καὶ χερσὶ βίῃ μέγαν ὄλβον ἕληται,
ἤ ὅ γ᾽ ἀπὸ γλώσσης ληίσσεται, οἷά τε πολλὰ
γίνεται, εὖτ᾽ ἄν δὴ κέρδος νόον ἐξαπατήσει
ἀνθρώπων, Αἰδῶ δέ τ᾽ ᾿Αναιδείη κατοπάζῃ,
ῥεῖα δέ μιν μαυροῦσι θεοί, μινύθουσι δὲ οἶκον
ἀνέρι τῷ, παῦρον δέ τ᾽ ἐπὶ χρόνον ὄλβος ὀπηδεῖ.
Hesiod WD 320–326
Possessions [khrēmata] should not be taken forcibly; [114] what is given by the gods is much better.
For if a man takes great wealth by force and violence [biē]
or if he plunders wealth by way of his tongue, as often happens
when private gain [kerdos] [115] leads the intent [noos] of men astray and Shamelessness drives away Shame,
the gods soon blacken [116] such a man and diminish his household.
And wealth stays with him only for a short time.
The same sentiment is echoed in Theognis: ‘he who has acquired much’ (ὃς μάλα πολλὰ πέπαται : verse 663, quoted at §43) can lose it all in one night (664). To repeat, this expression ‘he who has acquired much’ contains the same elements as in the name Polu-pāos, father of Kurnos (again, §43 above). Moreover, the meaning of Kurnos, ‘bastard’, has a parallel in Hesiod, again in the context of wealth: {57|58}
…εἰ γάρ τίς κ᾽ ἐθέλῃ τὰ δίκαι᾽ ἀγορεῦσαι
γινώσκων, τῷ μέν τ᾽ ὄλβον διδοῖ εὐρύοπα Ζεύς·
ὃς δέ κε μαρτυρίῃσιν ἑκὼν ἐπίορκον ὀμόσσας
ψεύσεται, ἐν δὲ Δίκην βλάψας νήκεστον ἀάσθη,
τοῦ δέ τ᾽ ἀμαυροτέρη γενεὴ μετόπισθε λέλειπται·
ἀνδρὸς δ᾽ εὐόρκου γενεὴ μετόπισθεν ἀμείνων.
Hesiod WD 280–285
For if anyone wishes to proclaim the just things [= the things of dikē]
of which he is aware , Zeus gives wealth to such a man.
But whoever as witness knowingly swears a false oath
and lies, thus hurting Dikē and committing an error without remedy,
the future descendants of such a man are blackened, [117]
while the future descendants of the man who swears truly are by contrast noble.
ἔλπεο μὴ δηρὸν κείνην πόλιν ἀτρεμέεσθαι,
μηδ᾽ εἰ νῦν κεῖται πολλ? ἐν ἡσυχίῃ.
Theognis 47–48
Do not expect that city to be peaceful for long,
not even if it is now in the position of much serenity [hēsukhiē].
The noun hēsukhiē ‘serenity’ here corresponds to the adjective characterizing the Gold Men themselves; they are hēsukhoi ‘serene’ (WD 119). [120] When Theognis is presented in the moral stance of a lawgiver, an exponent of dikē, he actually describes himself as hēsukhos ‘serene’ (Theognis 331). [121] Likewise in the diction of Solon, hēsukhiē ‘serenity’ is associated with dikē and contrasted with hubris :
δήμου θ᾽ ἡγεμόνων ἄδικος νόος, οἷσιν ἑτοῖμον
ὕβριος ἐκ μεγάλης ἄλγεα πολλὰ παθεῖν·
οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστανται κατέχειν κόρον οὐδὲ παρούσας
εὐφροσύνας κοσμεῖν δαιτὸς ἐν ἡσυχίῃ.…
πλουτοῦσιν δ᾽ ἀδίκοις ἔργμασι πειθόμενοι.…
οὔθ᾽ ἱερῶν κτεάνων οὔτε τι δημοσίων
φειδόμενοι κλέπτουσιν ἀφαρπαγῇ ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος,
οὐδὲ φυλάσσονται σεμνὰ Δίκης θέμεθλα,
ἣ σιγῶσα σύνοιδε τὰ γιγνόμενα πρό τ᾽ ἐόντα,
τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ πάντως ἦλθ᾽ ἀποτεισομένη.
Solon fr. 3.7–16GP [=fr. 4W]
But the intent [noos] of the leaders [hēgemones] of the community is without justice [dikē]. [122] What awaits them
is the suffering of many pains because of a great outrage [hubris].
For they do not understand how to check insatiability [koros], nor can they
make order [kosmos] [123] for their present merriment [euphrosunē plural] in {59|60} the serenity [hēsukhiē] of a feast [dais]. [124] …
They acquire wealth, swayed by deeds without justice [dikē],…
and, not caring at all about sacred or public property,
they steal from one another by forcible seizure,
and they do not uphold the holy institutions of Dikē,
who silently [125] observes the present and the past,
and who will in the future come to exact complete retribution.
The Fruits of Insatiability
τίκτει τοι κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν κακῷ ὄλβος ἕπηται
ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὅτῳ μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾖ
Theognis 153–154
Insatiability [koros] gives birth to outrage [hubris] when wealth is attracted
to a man who is base [kakos] and whose intent [noos] is not fit.
τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν πολὺς ὄλβος ἕπηται
ἀνθρώποις ὁπόσοις μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾖ.
Solon fr. 8.2–4 GP [= fr. 6 W]
For insatiability [koros] gives birth to outrage [hubris] when wealth is attracted
to men whose intent [noos] is not fit.
ἀκαρπότερος ᾿Αδώνιδος κήπων
CPG I p. 19.6–11
more barren [a-karpos] than the Gardens of Adonis [133]
The rituals surrounding the Gardens of Adonis, as Marcel Detienne has argued, [134] are a negative dramatization of fertility. For the details, the reader should consult Detienne’s intuitive analysis. Suffice it here to observe that the Gardens of Adonis are planted in the most unseasonal of times, the Dog Days of summer: the plants grow with excessive speed and vigor, only to be scorched to death by the sun’s excessive heat, and this death then provides the occasion for the mourning of Adonis, protégé of Aphrodite. In opposition to the normal cycle of seasonal agriculture, which lasts for eight months, the abnormal cycle of the unseasonal Gardens of Adonis lasts but eight days (cf. Plato Phaedrus 276B). Like his suddenly and violently growing plants, Adonis himself dies proēbēs ‘before maturity [hēbē]’ (CPG I p. 183.3–8, II p. 3.10–13; cf. II p. 93.13). Adonis is thus directly parallel to the debased second generation of mankind, the Silver Men:
ἀλλ᾽ ὅτ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἡβήσαι τε καὶ ἥβης μέτρον ἵκοιτο,
παυρίδιον ζώεσκον ἐπὶ χρόνον, ἄλγε᾽ ἔχοντες
ἀφραδίῃς· ὕβριν γὰρ ἀτάσθαλον οὐκ ἐδύναντο
ἀλλήλων ἀπέχειν …
Hesiod WD 132–135
But when the time of maturing and the full measure of maturity [hēbē] arrived, [135]
they lived only for a very short time, [136] suffering pains
for their heedlessness, for they could not keep overweening outrage [hubris] away from each other … [137]
To Plough or to Sail?
ὄρνιθος φωνὴν Πολυπαΐδη ὀξὺ βοώσης
ἤκους᾽, ἥ τε βροτοῖς ἄγγελος ἦλθ᾽ ἀρότου
ὡραίου · καί μοι κραδίην ἐπάταξε μέλαιναν,
ὅττί μοι εὐανθεῖς ἄλλοι ἔχουσιν ἀγρούς,
οὐδέ μοι ἡμίονοι κυφὸν ἕλκουσιν ἄροτρον
τῆς ἄλλης μνηστῆς εἵνεκα ναυτιλίης.
Theognis 1197–1202
I heard, son of Polypaos, the sound of a bird making its resonant
call, the bird that comes as a messenger of ploughing for men,
ploughing in season. And it roused my somber heart,
for other men now possess my flowery fields,
and my mules no longer pull my curved plough—
all because of that other sea-voyage that is on one’s mind.
The last verse of this passage has defied the understanding of editors, who have generally deemed it corrupt. It is possible, however, to justify the text as it stands through a closer examination of other passages that seem to be drawing from poetic traditions parallel to those of Theognis. [140] The adjective qualifying nautiliē ‘sea-voyage’ at verse 1202, namely mnē-s-tē, has been translated above as ‘on one’s mind’ in view of parallel diction in a passage from Hesiod:
τύνη δ᾽ ὦ Πέρση ἔργων μεμνημένος εἶναι
ὡραίων πάντων, περὶ ναυτιλίης δὲ μάλιστα.
Hesiod WD 641–642
Perses, you must have on your mind all things that are
in season , especially with regard to sea-voyaging.
Here, the expression me-mnē-menos ‘having on one’s mind’ or ‘being mindful’ is specifically correlated with the concept of nautiliē {64|65} ‘sea-voyage’ or ‘voyaging’ in the context of seasonal activities.
…τότ᾽ ἔπειτ᾽ ἀρότου μεμνημένος εἶναι
ὡραίου·…
Hesiod WD 616–617
Then you should be mindful of ploughing
in season.
Instead of sailing when it is not in season, Hesiod teaches that one should wait:
αὐτὸς δ᾽ ὡραῖον μίμνειν πλόον, εἰς ὅ κεν ἔλθῃ
Hesiod WD 630
And you yourself should wait for sea-voyaging in season , until it comes.
The words ploos and hōraios in this verse recur at verse 665, where Hesiod teaches that ploos ‘sea-voyaging’ is indeed hōraios ‘in season’ when summer comes. Another good time is the spring (WD 678, 682), and again the word for ‘sea-voyaging’ is ploos (ibid.).
ἄλλος δ᾽ εἰαρινὸς πέλεται πλόος ἀνθρώποισιν.
Hesiod WD 678
There is another sea-voyage for man in the spring.
The diction here is comparable to that of the last verse in the Theognidean passage (§42):
τῆς ἄλλης μνηστῆς εἵνεκα ναυτιλίης.
Theognis 1202
…all because of that other sea-voyage that is on one’s mind. {65|66}
To repeat: this ‘other voyage’ is correlated with the time for ploughing (§52 verses 1198–1199), which is signaled by the resonant call of ‘a bird’ (§52 verse 1197). Similarly, in the Works and Days (448–451), the two messages “do plough” and “do not sail” are both conveyed by a single sign, the call of the cranes as they migrate yearly to milder climates.
δασμὸς οὐκέτ᾽ ἴσος γίνεται ἐς τὸ μέσον.
Theognis 678
There is no longer an equitable distribution, in the common interest.
Indeed, the kakoi ‘base’ now have the upper hand over the agathoi ‘noble’ (§1 verse 679). Moreover, the kubernētēs can be identified with none other than Theognis himself:
οἵ με φίλοι προδιδοῦσιν, ἐπεὶ τόν γ᾽ ἐχθρὸν ἀλεῦμαι
ὥστε κυβερνήτης χοιράδας εἰναλίας.
Theognis 575–576
My friends [= philoi] betray me, since I steer clear of the enemy,
much as a pilot [kubernētēs] steers clear of the reefs in the sea.
The nuances of this passage have been paraphrased by Hudson-Williams: “It is my friends who betray me; for I can easily keep off my declared enemies, as a pilot can keep his ship clear of the reefs that stand out above the surface of the sea” (a false friend is like a hidden reef). [142] These philoi ‘friends’ betray a man whose prime {67|68} theme is the celebration of being a philos (§§6–7), and they turn out to be none other than the elite of Megara: like a ship that has veered off course, the city has often run aground because of the kakotēs ‘debasement’ of its hēgemones ‘leaders’ (Theognis 855–856, quoted at §41).
A Poet’s Two Kinds of Justice
ἧσο μέσην κατὰ νῆα, κυβερνητήριον ἔργον
εὐθύνων · πολλοί τοι ᾿Αθηναίων ἐπίκουροι.
Oracle no. 15 Parke-Wormell
Sit in the middle of the ship, steering like a pilot [kubernētēs].
Many of the Athenians are your helpers.
Ζεύς μοι τῶν τε φίλων δοίη τίσιν, οἵ με φιλεῦσιν,
τῶν τ᾽ ἐχθρῶν μεῖζον Κύρνε δυνησόμενον.
χοὔτως ἄν δοκέοιμι μετ᾽ ἀνθρώπων θεὸς εἶναι
εἴ μ᾽ ἀποτεισάμενον μοῖρα κίχῃ θανάτου.
ἀλλὰ Ζεῦ τέλεσόν μοι ᾿Ολύμπιε καίριον εὐχήν·
δὸς δέ μοι ἀντὶ κακῶν καί τι παθεῖν ἀγαθόν·
τεθναίην δ᾽, εἰ μή τι κακῶν ἄμπαυμα μεριμνέων
εὑροίμην. δοίην δ᾽ ἀντ᾽ ἀνιῶν ἀνίας·
αἶσα γὰρ οὕτως ἐστί, τίσις δ᾽ οὐ φαίνεται ἡμῖν
ἀνδρῶν οἳ τἀμὰ χρήματ᾽ ἔχουσι βίῃ
συλήσαντες· ἐγὼ δὲ κύων ἐπέρησα χαράδρην
χειμάρρῳ ποταμῷ, πάντ᾽ ἀποτεισόμενος. [143] {68|69}
τῶν εἴη μέλαν αἷμα πιεῖν· ἐπί τ᾽ ἐσθλὸς ὄροιτο
δαίμων ὃς κατ᾽ ἐμὸν νοῦν τελέσειε τάδε.
Theognis 337–350
May Zeus grant me retribution on behalf of the friends who love me,
and that I may have more power than my enemies.
Thus would I have the reputation of a god among men,
if my destined death overtakes me when I have exacted retribution.
O Zeus, Olympian, bring my timely prayer to fulfillment !
Grant that I have something good happen in place of misfortunes.
But may I die if I find no respite from cares brought on by misfortunes.
And may I give harm in return for harm.
For this is the way it is destined, and yet I see no retribution on the horizon
against the men who have robbed me of my possessions [khrēmata] by force [biē].
But I am a dog and I cross the stream
with its wintry torrent, about to exact retribution for everything.
May I drink their black blood! And may an esthlos spirit [daimōn] oversee [all this],
who may bring these things to fulfillment, in accordance with my intent [noos].
φρόνημα τοῦ θανόντος οὐ δαμά-
ζει πυρὸς μαλερὰ γνάθος,
φαίνει δ᾽ ὕστερον ὀργάς.
Aeschylus Cho. 324–326
The phronēma of the dead is not overcome
by the ravenous jaws of [cremation-] fire,
it manifests its anger later. {73|74}
The murder of Agamemnon calls for an Erīnūs ‘Fury’ (Cho. 403), who is later pictured as standing ready to drink the blood of his murderer (577–578). In short, the self-representation of Theognis as an infernal hound longing to drink the blood of those who had wronged him conjures up the vision of a hero as an avenging revenant. Theognis is thus the exponent of Dikē ‘justice’ not only in life but also in death—much like those phulakes ‘guardians’ of Dikē in the Works and Days (again, 249–255). But unlike the pan-Hellenic model of Hesiodic poetry, where myriad invisible phulakes range all over the earth (WD 255), this solitary spirit presides only over his native city of Megara.
Theognis and Odysseus
μή με κακῶν μίμνησκε · πέπονθά τοι οἷά τ᾽ ᾿Οδυσσεύς,
ὅς τ᾽ ᾿Αίδεω μέγα δῶμ᾽ ἤλυθεν ἐξαναδύς.
ὃς δὴ καὶ μνηστῆρας ἀνείλετο νηλέι θυμῷ…
Theognis 1123–1125 {74|75}
Do not remind me of my misfortunes! The kinds of things that happened to Odysseus have happened to me too.
Odysseus, who returned, [154] emerging from the great palace of Hades,
and who then killed the suitors with a pitiless spirit [= thūmos] … [155]
The emergence of Odysseus from Hades is here directly connected with vengeance, much like the emergence of the infernal hound that will drink the blood of those who had wronged Theognis. As for Odysseus in the Odyssey, his heart literally ‘barks’ (xx12/16: ὑλάκτει) as he contemplates vengeance in his thūmos (xx 5/9/10) against the handmaidens who slept with the suitors, and this image actually frames a simile in which an enraged bitch attacks a man in order to protect her young (xx14–15; on the Homeric image of dogs drinking human blood, cf. Iliad XXII 70).
ἆ δειλὴ Πενίη, τί ἐμοῖς ἐπικειμένη ὠμοῖς
σῶμα καταισχύνεις καὶ νόον ἡμέτερον?
αἰσχρὰ δέ μ᾽ οὐκ ἐθέλοντα βίῃ καὶ πολλὰ διδάσκεις
ἐσθλὰ μετ᾽ ἀνθρώπων καὶ κάλ᾽ ἐπιστάμενον.
Theognis 649–652
Ah miserable poverty! Why do you weigh upon my shoulders
and debase both my body and my noos ?
Forcibly and against my will, you teach me many base things,
though I am one among men who understands what is noble and beautiful.
Like Odysseus, Theognis espouses adaptability to each new situation:
πουλύπου ὀργὴν ἴσχε πολυπλόκου, ὃς ποτὶ πέτρῃ
τῇ προσομιλήσῃ, τοῖος ἰδεῖν ἐφάνη. {75|76}
νῦν μὲν τῇδ᾽ ἐφέπου, τοτὲ δ᾽ ἀλλοῖος χρόα γίνου.
κρέσσων τοι σοφίη γίνεται ἀτροπίης.
Theognis 215–218
Have the temperament of a complex octopus, who
looks like whatever rock he has clung to.
Now be like this; then, at another time, become someone else in your coloring.
I tell you: sophiē is better than being not versatile [atropos].
To be atropos ‘not versatile’ is the opposite of polutropos ‘versatile in many ways’, epithet of Odysseus (Odyssey i 1), a hero who is actually compared to an octopus when he is about to drown at sea (v432–433). As for sophiē ‘skill’, this word recalls the epithet sophos ‘skilled’ applied to the man who can foresee impending misfortune like some mantis ‘seer’ (§1: Theognis 682)—a man who speaks in the mode of an ainigma ‘riddle’ (681) about the ship beset by a storm at sea. This man had himself lost his possessions and finds himself in distress as he associates with the agathoi ‘noble’ (667–670). By implication, the undying noos of Theognis the poet is ever testing, by way of a timeless poetry that keeps adapting itself through the ages, the intrinsic worth of the citizens of Megara—ever ready to unleash a punitive daimōn against those agathoi who have failed to live up to their heritage of nobility.
The Starving Revenant
Αἴθων μὲν γένος εἰμί, πόλιν δ᾽ εὐτειχέα Θήβην
οἰκῶ, πατρῳᾶς γῆς ἀπερυκόμενος.
Theognis 1209–1210
I am Aithōn by birth, and I have an abode in well-walled Thebes,
since I have been exiled from my native land.
The language here and in the verses that follow seems intentionally opaque, but at least some aspects of the message are translucent. The word oikeō ‘I have an abode’ is a reference appropriate to a hero as a cult figure. [157] There is a comparable use of the word in Sophocles Oedipus at Colonus (27, 28, 92, 627, 637), in the context of the exiled and destitute hero’s intent to establish himself after death within the {76|77} precinct of the Erīnues ‘Furies’ (for whom cf. the context of oikeō at OC 39). Hidden within the foreign earth of his final place of rest, Oedipus will have vengeance against his fellow Thebans: he predicts that his cold corpse will be drinking their warm blood as they fall fighting over Athenian territory (OC 621–622)—that is, ‘if Zeus is still Zeus and if Phoebus the son of Zeus is accurate’ (OC 623). This seerlike prognostication is strikingly parallel to the wish expressed by Theognis (§60) to drink the blood of those who had wronged him (349), uttered in the context of a prayer imploring the justice of Zeus (341–345; also 337–340).
ἤδη γάρ με κέκληκε θαλάσσιος οἴκαδε νεκρός,
τεθνηκὼς ζωῷ φθεγγόμενος στόματι.
Theognis 1229–1230
The Corpse of the Sea is now calling me home.
It is dead, but it calls with a mouth that is alive.
This passage has been preserved by Athenaeus (457A), who interprets it as a riddle about the kokhlos ‘conch shell’ used as a makeshift trumpet (ibid.). While such an interpretation may well turn out to be at least part of a solution (cf. kērux ‘herald’, the name for a trumpet-shell: Athenaeus 349C, Aristotle HA 528a10, etc.), it remains to ask: what is the point of a declaration that Theognis is being called home? By now it is clear that, as master of the ainigma ‘riddle’ (cf. §1 verse 681), Theognis is sending cryptic and prophetic messages to the agathoi, the ‘noble’ citizens of Megara and beyond. {78|79} Surely, then, there is more to these verses than a mere guessing-game about mollusks: there must be another dimension latent in the image of a nekros ‘corpse’ of the sea who is calling back Theognis ‘with a mouth that is alive’.
ἣ πρὶν μὲν ἔην βροτὸς αὐδήεσσα
νῦν δ᾽ ἁλὸς ἐν πελάγεσσι θεῶν ἒξ ἔμμορε τιμῆς
Odyssey v 334–335
[Ino,] who was formerly a mortal endowed with speech,
but who now has her share of divine honors in the depths of the sea.
In much the same way, Hesiodic poetry refers obliquely to the local Theban tradition of Semele’s death at Thebes:
ἀθάνατον θνητή· νῦν δ᾽ ἀμφότεροι θεοί εἰσιν
Hesiod Theogony 942 {79|80}
She, a mortal, [gave birth to Dionysos,] an immortal; but now they are both immortal.
Bibliography
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