Pindar’s Homer: The Lyric Possession of an Epic Past

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9. The Authority of Historiā and the Sign of the Hero

§2. Snell draws our attention to one particular example of histōr in this sense of ‘arbitrator’: it occurs at Iliad XVIII 501, in the context of the description of the Shield of Achilles. [7] On the Shield is depicted a scene of litigation (XVIII 497–508), [8] specifically a neikos ‘conflict’ (νεῖκος 497, ἐνείκεον 498) over a poinē ‘penalty, fine’ (498) to be paid as compensation for the death of an anonymous man (499). [9] Our first impression is that the penalty is the equivalent of the Anglo-Saxon wergild, a fine paid by the kinsmen of the manslayer to the kinsmen of the slain (cf. the uses of poinē at Iliad IX 633, 636; XIII 659; XIV 483). But there is more to it. The anonymous defendant ‘was making a claim’ (eukheto 499) [10] that he paid the fine in full (pant’ apodounai 499), but the anonymous plaintiff ‘was refusing to accept anything’ (ho d’ anaineto mēden helesthai 500). [11] This case can be contrasted {251|252} with the pattern in a speech addressed by Ajax to Achilles (Iliad IX 632–636), where a defendant, charged with killing a plaintiff’s brother or son, tries to assuage the plaintiff and offers a poinē ‘fine’ (IX 633, 636) that is then accepted by the assuaged plaintiff. [12] Thus the litigation depicted on the Shield is inconclusive, [13] and we find both parties in the process of submitting the case to arbitration:

ἄμφω δ’ ἱέσθην ἐπὶ ἴστορι πεῖραρ ἑλέσθαι

Iliad XVIII 501

… and both were striving to come to terms in the presence of an arbitrator [histōr].

The process of arbitration is presented as a contest among a group of elders, where each takes his turn in offering, with skēptron ‘scepter’ in hand (XVIII 506), [
14] a formula for resolution of the litigation (502–506); whoever pronounces the most equitable formula is to be awarded a given measure of gold (507–508). [15]

§4. The point made by Ajax is that the heart of a man can be assuaged by compensation even if he has lost someone as close as a brother or father, whereas Achilles is supposedly heartless in refusing compensation for the loss of someone who is surely far less close, the girl Briseis (Iliad IX 636–638). [20] Ajax is in effect accusing Achilles of ranking Briseis ahead of his own hetairoi ‘comrades-in-arms’ by failing to be swayed by the comrades’ philotēs—the mutual state of being philoi ‘near and dear’ to each other (IX 628–632). [21] From the vantage point of the ambassadors, they as comrades-in-arms of Achilles should be closest to him—that is, most philoi ‘near and dear’ to him (so says Phoenix at IX 522). [22] From the superior vantage point of the overall narrative, however, someone is more philos ‘near and dear’ to Achilles than Briseis or the hetairoi—someone who is in fact so close to him as to be his other self, Patroklos. [23] For Achilles, Patroklos is πολὺ φίλτατος … ἑταῖρος—the ‘hetairos who is the most philos by far’ (Iliad XVII 411, 655). When Achilles gets the news that Patroklos has been killed, he mourns him as the philos hetairos whom he ranked above all other hetairoi (XVIII 80–81). For a man other than Achilles, as the god Apollo remarks, a brother or a son would be more philos than a comrade-in-arms (XXIV 46–49). For a man other than Achilles, then, the compensation for the death of a brother or a son would have to be greater than any compensation for the death of a comrade-in-arms, and yet even such a man comes to terms with death, whereas Achilles does not (ibid.). Apollo makes this remark in the context of blaming the heartlessness of Achilles (XXIV 39–45). Earlier, in the same context of blaming the heartlessness of Achilles (IX 628–632), we have seen that Ajax had contrasted the willingness of a hypothetical plaintiff to accept compensation for the death of someone who is even as close as a brother or a son (IX 632–636). In the first case the paradigm of accepting compensation is being applied to the hero’s refusal of compensation offered by Agamemnon for the taking of Briseis; in the second case it is being applied to his refusal of any compensation offered by Priam for returning the corpse of Hektor (witness the use of apoina ‘compensation’ at XXII 349). [24] Thus in neither case is anyone intending compensation for the death of {253|254} Patroklos. Yet the paradigms applied to the hero’s refusal of compensation indicate that, from the superior vantage point of the overall narrative, what is really at stake for Achilles is coming to terms with his own death by accepting compensation for the death of someone who is more philos ‘near and dear’ to him than anyone else—his other self, Patroklos.

§5. Which brings us back to the litigation depicted on the Shield of Achilles, a scene that reflects in microcosm the vantage point of the overall narrative. [25] By the time this scene is unveiled, Patroklos is already dead and Achilles has just been mourned by his mother as if he too were dead (at XVIII 54–60). [26] The anonymous little plaintiff pictured on the Shield is frozen in his inflexible position of refusing compensation for the death of a victim—a victim who is none other than the plaintiff himself from the overarching standpoint of the Iliad. [27] Soon after this scene, however, Achilles in the end accepts compensation from Agamemnon, who declares publicly that he was not aitios ‘responsible’ for causing the anger of Achilles—that it was really Zeus who inflicted atē ‘aberration, derangement’ (Iliad XIX 86–88, 134–136). [28] If Agamemnon really was aitios, of course, he would also be aitios for the death of Patroklos, which had resulted from the withdrawal of Achilles from his comrades-in-arms on account of his anger. But the situation is more complicated. Achilles too had incurred atē by refusing the entreaties of those who were near and dear to him. [29] As a reflection then of {254|255} the neikos between Achilles and Agamemnon, the neikos between the anonymous plaintiff and the anonymous defendant on the Shield of Achilles presents the ultimate juridical problem. Who in the end is aitios ‘responsible’: is it one of the two heroes, or both, or, as one of them claims, the god himself, who is explicitly accused of inflicting atē?

§7. At this juncture we may shift our emphasis from a preoccupation with the Homeric stance of Herodotus. It is time to consider his Hesiodic stance, as reflected in the concept of historiā. As one who pronounces dikē ‘judgment’, the histōr ‘arbitrator’ of the Shield of Achilles fits a pattern that is clearly visible in the portrait of the ideal king in the Hesiodic Theogony (80–93). The ideal king is one who has the moral authority to arbitrate and thus bring to an end ‘even a great neikos [= conflict]’ (αἶψα τε καὶ μέγα νεῖκος ἐπισταμένως κατέπαυσεν Theogony 87). [31] The ideal king stops the neikos ‘conflict’ in the setting of an agorā ‘public assembly’ (ἀγορεύων/ἀγορῆφι/ἀγρομένοισιν Theogony 86/89/92), which is also the setting for the neikos that is to be stopped by the histōr (both words neikos and agorā at Iliad XVIII 497). [32] To be able to arbitrate, Hesiod explains, kings must be ekhephrones ‘sound of mind’ (Theogony 88). [33] This quality is the same one that is required of the kings who are to understand the ainos—here we may translate the word as ‘fable’—told by Hesiod in the Works and Days: {255|256}

Hesiod Works and Days 202

Now I will tell the kings a fable [ainos]—sound of mind [phroneontes] as they are.

Hesiod’s presupposition of the kings’ soundness of mind is really a condition here: if the kings do not understand the ainos, then they are not sound of mind. [
35] These same kings have so far in the Works and Days displayed just the opposite of soundness, in that they have earlier been described as ready to pronounce a dikē ‘judgment’ that is unsound (οἱ τήνδε δίκην ἐθέλουσι δικάσσαι Works and Days 39). This unsound dikē was pronounced by the kings in the context of their arbitrating a neikos ‘conflict’ between Hesiod and his brother Perses (Works and Days 35); [36] it is in this light that Hesiod seeks to instruct them, by way of his ainos (202) of “The Hawk and the Nightingale,” [37] in how to pronounce a sound dikē. If the kings understand the ainos, then they will have learned the lesson that dikē, in its ultimate sense of ‘justice’, is superior to its opposite, hubris ‘outrage’; [38] if they do not understand, however, then their very raison d’être, which is to pronounce dikē ‘judgment’, is undermined, and they are left without any authority.

§8. In fact the Works and Days claims an authority of its own, not dependent on that of any earthly king. It is founded on the higher authority of Zeus as a model for kings. When a king pronounces dikē ‘judgment’ (as at Theogony 86), he is in effect ‘sorting out’ (= verb dia-krīnō: διακρίνοντα Theogony {256|257} 85) what is themis ‘divine law’ and what is not (that is, διακρίνοντα θέμιστας ibid.). Still, as we see from the Works and Days, the dikē ‘judgment’ of a king may not always be the same thing as ‘justice’. [39] For the equation of ‘judgment’ and ‘justice’, the model of Zeus must come into play: at the beginning of the Works and Days, Hesiod invokes Zeus to keep themis [plural] ‘divine laws’ straight by way of his divine dikē—where the ‘judgment’ of Zeus is tantamount to the ‘justice’ of Zeus. [40] This action of Zeus, the pronouncing of dikē, is explicitly made parallel to the words of Hesiod as he speaks to Perses (Works and Days 10), [41] and we must keep in mind that the words of Hesiod as addressed to Perses are in fact the Works and Days as a poem. Thus the justice of Zeus and the Works and Days are treated as coefficients in the context of a neikos ‘conflict’ that Hesiod and Perses must ‘sort out’ for themselves (again, = verb dia-krīnō: διακρινώμεθα νεῖκος ‘let us sort out for ourselves this neikosWorks and Days 35). [42] Since Hesiod is here saying that he and Perses should resolve their conflict themselves, it is clear that their neikos—and the whole poem for that matter—will not in the end require the authority of a king as arbitrator. In fact after the last admonition of Hesiod to the kings, at Works and Days 263–264, the kings are never to be heard of again in the poem. From a dramatic point of view, it is as if the poem were eliminating the authority of kings while maintaining the ultimate authority of Zeus as king; I interpret this state of affairs as a poetic reflex of the historical fact that the institution of kingship was obsolescent in most Greek cities by the time of the Archaic period. [43]

§11. Let us try to sum up what we know about the histōr ‘arbitrator’. From the comparative evidence to be found in Homeric and Hesiodic poetry, we see that a histōr is a man who has the authority, derived from the kingship of Zeus, to solve conflicts, even by deciding who is aitios ‘responsible’ for what. His mode of discourse, based on privileged information, is that of the ainos.

§13. By now we see more clearly how the historiā of Herodotus, in seeking to establish who was responsible for the ultimate conflict between Hellenes and barbarians, is analogous to the task of the histōr depicted on the Shield of Achilles. In the microcosm of the Shield, an ideal histōr must seek the most equitable solution of a conflict between two litigants; in the macrocosm of the Iliad this same conflict recapitulates the ultimate conflict that leads off the entire narrative, the neikos of Achilles and Agamemnon.

§15. In this light we may also consider the semantic specialization of Latin arbiter. From the survey by Emile Benveniste of this word’s usage in the diction of Plautus, [59] it becomes clear that the arbiter, unlike the testis, is a ‘witness’ only in a special sense: whereas the testis is known to the parties in a given case or situation, the arbiter may or may not be known and may or may not even be seen:

secede huc nunciam si videtur, procul,
ne arbitri dicta nostra arbitrari queant

Plautus Captivi 219–220

Come over here, please, a way off,
so that arbitrī may not arbitrārī what we say.

eamus intro, non utibilest hic locus factis tuis
dum memoramus, arbitri ut sint qui praetereant per vias

Plautus Mercator 1005–1006

Let’s go inside. This is not a suitable place for us to talk about what you’ve done.
Those who pass by on the streets may be arbitrī.

miquidem iam arbitri vicini sunt, meae quid fiat domi,
ita per impluvium intro spectant

Plautus Miles 158–159

The neighbors are now arbitrī of whatever happens in my house:
they peer through the impluvium.

In explaining how such a “clandestine witness” as an arbiter evolves into an arbitrator, a judge, Benveniste adduces the semantics of iūdex: [
60] {260|261}

We must recall that in the most ancient sense of the word the name iūdex was given to every authoritative person charged with passing judgment in a disputed case. In principle it was the king, the consul, the holder of all powers. But for practical reasons this power was delegated to a private judge who, according to the nature of the cases, was called iūdex or iūdex privātus, or iūdex selectus or arbiter. The last was empowered to decide in all cases which were not foreseen by the law. [ … ] In effect, the arbiter makes his decision not according to formulae and the laws but by a personal assessment and in the name of equity. The arbiter is in fact a iūdex who acts as an arbiter, he judges by coming between the two parties from outside like someone who has been present at the affair without being seen, who can therefore give judgment on the facts freely and with authority, regardless of all precedent in the light of the circumstances.

Although Benveniste does not directly adduce histōr or historiā in this connection, we can see that his working definition of arbiter is pertinent to the meanings of both these Greek words. [
61] The histōr, whose authority is derived from Zeus as king, can be understood as thereby having the privileged vantage point of the gods themselves, who can see without being seen. [62] The same goes for the historiā ‘inquiry’ of Herodotus: when he sēmainei ‘indicates’ that Croesus is aitios ‘responsible’ for the ultimate conflict between Hellenes and barbarians (Herodotus 1.5.3), [63] he is in effect speaking from a privileged vantage point similar to that of the god Apollo himself, who sēmainei ‘indicates’ by way of his Oracle (Heraclitus 22 B 93 DK) [64] —and who likewise declares that Croesus is aitios (Herodotus 1.91.4). [65]

§18. The very word historiā, as used by Herodotus in his prooemium, indicates the juridical aspect of what Herodotus has to say. In finding Croesus guilty or aitios ‘responsible’ for the ultimate conflict between Hellenes and barbarians, Herodotus is taking a stance similar to that of the histōr on the Shield of Achilles. Earlier we saw that Croesus proves himself to be guilty even by way of his behavior, which the narrative of Herodotus represents as a paradigm of atē ‘derangement’. This representation is achieved in a quasi-juridical framework insofar as atē is defined through the teachings of the lawgiver Solon. But the atē of Croesus, as we have noticed, is not confronted directly by Solon in the encounter dramatized by Herodotus. [70] Moreover, Solon in Herodotus’ Histories does not tell Croesus directly what we find him teaching in his own poetry, that atē is brought about by hubris. [71] This indirectness is not just a matter of diplomacy on Solon’s part. Rather it can best be explained by considering the medium of Herodotus, historiā. With his privileged position of knowledge, the master of historiā is implicitly narrating divine actions as he explicitly narrates human actions. [72] {262|263} The divine pattern of atē as brought about by hubris is for Herodotus an implicit message as he sēmainei ‘indicates’ that Croesus was in the wrong. The task still at hand is to show how the implicitness of Herodotus, and even his dramatization of Solon as a sage who formulates implicit messages about the dangers of hubris and atē, is akin to the communication of Pindar through the ainos.

§22. For Theognis, such stories are made applicable to the hubris that the poet finds in his own city of Megara (ibid.; also Theognis 603–604). In another poem, Theognis 1081–1082b, the voice of the poet goes so far as to say that Megara is pregnant with a future tyrant, a man of hubris. [80] From this image of the pregnant city we see most clearly that tyranny can be generated from within. That the man of hubris in this poem is indeed a tyrant becomes evident from another poem, Theognis 39–52, a variant in which the emphasis shifts from the hubris represented by the future tyrant to the hubris that could bring forth the tyrant in the first place. Again the poet says that his city is pregnant (Theognis 39), but this time he fears that it will give birth to a man who will be ‘a corrector of our base hubris’ (εὐθυντῆρα κακῆς ὕβριος ἡμετέρης Theognis 40). [81] He goes on to say that the unjust behavior of his city’s élite leads to stasis [plural] ‘discord’, intrasocietal phonos [plural] ‘killings’, and monarkhoi ‘monarchs’ (Theognis 51–52). [82] This triad of misfortunes matches closely the one found in the celebrated Herodotean passage known as the Debate about the Constitutions, [83] where the Persian king Darius is dramatized as praising tyranny and blaming oligarchy: in an oligarchy, says Darius, the behavior of the élite leads to stasis [plural], from which arises phonos ‘killing’, from which arises monarkhiā ‘monarchy’—so that monarchy, he reasons, must be superior to oligarchy (Herodotus 3.83.3). [84] As {265|266} this particular passage makes clear, the word monarkhos ‘monarch’ is the attenuated equivalent of turannos ‘tyrant’ (Herodotus 3.80.2 in conjunction with 3.80.4). [85]

§25. The two aspects of hubris, luxuriance and savagery, tend to alternate in poetic treatments. In the poetry of Theognis, for example, the hubris that threatens to destroy Megara is either the same hubris that destroyed the luxuriant Hellenes, as we have read in the passages cited, or the same hubris that destroyed the Centaurs, ‘eaters of raw flesh’ (Theognis 541–542; ὠμοφάγους at 542). [91] The eventual destruction of Megara can be visualized as happening either from the inside, with the degeneration of the élite (again Theognis 39–52) [92] or from the outside, with the influx and subsequent ascendancy of savages (Theognis 53–68), who are described as ‘formerly’ living outside the city like grazing deer, wearing the hides of goats for clothing (54–56). [93] There is a similar description of the Persians in Herodotus, before they conquered the Lydians: as an advisor points out to Croesus, the Persians still wear leather for their trousers and indeed for all their clothing (οἱ σκυτίνας μὲν ἀναξυρίδας, σκυτίνην δὲ τὴν ἄλλην ἐσθῆτα φορέουσι 1.71.2). Once they taste of our good things’, says this Lydian advisor, ‘they will cling to them and we will be unable to push them away’ (γευσάμενοι γὰρ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀγαθῶν περιέξονται οὐδὲ ἀπωστοὶ ἔσονται 1.71.3). Thus the Persians of Herodotus are a combination of the worst: already savage, they then become luxuriant as well. [94] {267|268}

§26. For Herodotus, the ultimate exponent of the luxuriance and savagery of hubris is Xerxes, the Great King of the Persians, leader of the “Asian” hordes massed against Hellas. Even more interesting for my present purposes, however, is another Persian exponent of hubris, whose story pointedly brings to a close the Histories of Herodotus. He is Artauktes, descendant of a man who had advised Cyrus, founder of the Persian Empire, to move from the ‘harsh’ land of Persia (γῆν … τρηχέαν Herodotus 9.122.2) to some milder place (ibid.). Cyrus had rejected this advice on the grounds that men become ‘soft’ and slavelike when they live in ‘soft’ places (φιλέειν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν μαλακῶν χώρων μαλακοὺς ἄνδρας γίνεσθαι Herodotus 9.122.3). With this thought, along with the observation that the Persians at that former time had heeded the advice of Cyrus, Herodotus ends his narrative in the last sentence of the Histories. Obviously the Persians of later times, under the kingship of Xerxes, failed to heed the advice of Cyrus as they sought to occupy a new European homeland in the wake of Xerxes’ invasion of Hellas. From the standpoint of the Histories, the Persians had already been corrupted by the Lydians: they had acquired from these fellow Asians the characteristic of being habroi ‘luxuriant’ (1.71.4), abandoning the harsh life that went hand in hand with living in a harsh country (1.71.2). [95] The topic of corruption is picked up again at the end of the Histories, where Cyrus is seen arguing against the advice given by the ancestor of Artauktes, who had argued that the Persians should move from the harsh land of Persia (9.122.2). With this background we come to the story of Artauktes—a story that realizes the advice given by his ancestor and that serves as a negative paradigm for the advice given by Cyrus.

§27. Described as an underling of Xerxes, Artauktes was put in charge of administering a region on the “Greek” side of the Hellespont, which he ruled in the style of a turannos ‘tyrant’ (ἐτυράννευε Herodotus 9.116.1). The story has it that Artauktes was a dreadful and atasthalos ‘wanton’ man (9.116.1)—and the word atasthalos in Archaic Greek poetry regularly characterizes a man of hubris [96] —who contrived to occupy as his own property the oikos ‘house’ of ‘a Greek man’ (ἔστι οἶκος ἀνδρὸς Ἕλληνος ἐνθαῦτα 9.116.3). At least Xerxes was led to believe that Artauktes was to occupy the house of ‘a Greek man’. The story is actually being told by Herodotus in a mode analogous to that of an ainos, in that double meanings abound. [97] To begin with, the ‘house’ of the ‘Greek man’ is really the sacred precinct of the hero Protesilaos, a cult center filled with riches supplied by the hero’s worshippers (9.116.2). [98] Lusting to possess these riches, Artauktes {268|269} had deceived Xerxes by asking the king to grant him the ownership of an oikos ‘house’ of ‘a Greek man’ who had died while attacking the land of Xerxes:

δέσποτα, ἔστι οἶκος ἀνδρὸς Ἕλληνος ἐνθαῦτα, ὃς ἐπὶ γῆν τὴν σὴν στρατευσάμενος δίκης κυρήσας ἀπέθανε, τούτου μοι δὸς τὸν οἶκον, ἵνα καί τις μάθῃ ἐπὶ γῆν τὴν σὴν μὴ στρατεύεσθαι.

Herodotus 9.116.3

Master, there is here a house [oikos] belonging to a Greek man who had made war against your land. Getting his just deserts, he had died. Give me this man’s house [oikos], so that everyone may learn not to make war against your land.

What Artauktes had said actually conveys an ulterior meaning: in Greek epic tradition Protesilaos was the first Achaean to die fighting the Trojans (Iliad ΙΙ 698–702). Moreover, oikos is a word that can designate the sacred precinct of a hero (e.g., Sophocles Oedipus at Colonus 627). [
99] For Xerxes, the oikos requested by Artauktes is the ‘house’ of a Greek; for Artauktes, it is the precinct of Protesilaos. Once he is granted ownership of the precinct, Artauktes proceeds to rob it of its riches, to which the narrative refers as the khrēmata of Protesilaos (9.116.1, 3; 9.120.3). The personalized tone reminds us of the same word khrēmata in a poem of Theognis (667, 677), describing the loss of possessions on the part of a figure who is presented as an exponent of dikē ‘righteousness’ and who speaks in the mode of the ainos (ᾐνίχθω 681). [100] Artauktes commits the further outrage of farming the lands of the precinct for his own profit and having sexual intercourse with women within the shrine (9.116.3). From a Hellenic standpoint Artauktes is clearly an exponent of hubris.

§32. This theme recurs in the anonymous Alexander Romance, conventionally dated to the third century A.D. [108] After conquering the Persian Empire, Alexander pushes on further east till he reaches the edge of the world (τὸ τέλος τῆς γῆς 2.39.4), and he finds himself in the Land of the Makares ‘Blessed’ (2.39.1). There his mageiros ‘cook’ discovers a spring of immortalizing water when he washes a tarīkhos ‘preserved fish’ in the spring and the dead fish ἐψυχώθη ‘recovered its psūkhē’, that is, came back to life (2.39.12). Alexander is not told of this water, and he fails to drink of it. Later, when he comes to a place that is described as ‘where the gods dwell’ (3.24.1), a place where he has visions of lightning (ibid.), he asks the apparition of the kosmokratōr Sesonchosis, who now dwells in this realm, this question: how long will I live (3.24.2-3)? The apparition refuses to answer this question, which implicitly acknowledges Alexander’s mortality, and indicates instead that the city founded by Alexander, Alexandria, is suitable compensation for mortality (3.24.3–4). The apparition even implies that Alexander will not really be dead, in that his corpse will have Alexandria as its oikos ‘abode’: οἰκήσεις δὲ αὐτὴν καὶ θανὼν καὶ μὴ θανών. τάφον γὰρ αὐτὴν ἕξεις ἣν κτίζεις πόλιν ‘you will have it [= Alexandria] as your oikos both as one who is dead and yet also as one who is undead, for you will have as your tomb the very city that you founded’ (3.24.4). What Alexander is being told at the edge of the world corresponds closely to what he had read inscribed in the shrine of Sarapis, back home in Alexandria, before he had begun his expedition to the East; the text here reads: σὺ δὲ ἀποθεωθεὶς προσκυνηθήσῃ νεκρὸς καὶ δῶρα λήψῃ ἐκ πολλῶν βασιλέων πάντοτε, οἰκήσεις δὲ αὐτὴν καὶ θανὼν καὶ μὴ θανών. τάφον γὰρ ἕξεις αὐτὴν ἣν κτίζεις πόλιν ‘you will become a god and you will be worshipped, as a corpse, receiving gifts from many kings for all time, and you will have it [= Alexandria] as your oikos both as one who is dead and yet also as one who is undead, for you will have as your tomb the very city that you founded’ (1.33.9). It has been argued that {271|272} the enigmatic description of Alexander as dead and yet not dead refers to his status as founder and cult hero of Alexandria. [109] In becoming the cult hero of Alexandria, Alexander’s corpse was to be transformed from a thing of nature into a thing of culture—a mummy. [110] The paradox of Alexander’s being both dead and immortalized is comparable to the ideology of Archaic Greek hero cults, where the hero’s abode is visualized simultaneously as (1) a cult place where his corpse is buried and (2) a paradise-like setting at the edge of the world, where he has been immortalized. The names for the two kinds of abode may even converge, as in the case of Ēlusion ‘Elysium’ and the Nēsoi Makarōn ‘Islands of the Blessed’: both names designate either a cult place or a paradisiacal setting. [111]

§33. Let us return to the story of Herodotus. The hapless Artauktes attempts to offer compensation for the wrongs that he had committed (9.120.3), but his offer is refused by his captors; he is executed at a spot near the place, as Herodotus emphasizes, where Xerxes had committed the ultimate outrage of bridging the Hellespont (9.120.4). On the surface Artauktes is paying retribution that is being exacted by human agency, that is, by his Athenian captors. Under the surface, however, retribution is being exacted by divine agency, through the hero Protesilaos.

§34. The role of Protesilaos is significant. By virtue of being the first Achaean to die in the Trojan War (Iliad II 698–702), he is described by Artauktes as a prominent Hellene who dared to attack Asians (again Herodotus 9.116.3). The narrative makes a point of drawing attention to the Persian assumption that underlies this description: the Persians take it for granted that all Asia belongs to them (9.116.3). With this theme the historiā of Herodotus comes full circle in that the same assumption is cited at the beginning of the narrative (1.4.4) in the context of explaining why the logioi of the Persians find the Hellenes aitioi ‘responsible’ for the ultimate conflict (1.4.1): that the Hellenes were in the wrong when they attacked Troy (ibid.). Even if this Persian assumption—that all Asia is theirs—were valid, the Persians would have been in the wrong when Xerxes bridged the Hellespont separating Asia from Europe in that even the assumption of the Persians implicitly cedes Europe to the Hellenes. Besides, the historiā of Herodotus {272|273} had already established at the beginning who is aitios for the present conflict as Herodotus sēmainei ‘indicates’ that Croesus had initiated the wrongdoing (1.5.3). Now, at the end of the historiā, the first of the Hellenes whom the Persians hold responsible for the present conflict is vindicated: he is really the party wronged by the Persians, just as all Hellenes are wronged when the Persians cross over to Europe, and it is he who exacts retribution from the offending Persians. As he does so, he sēmainei ‘indicates’ his power, which is equated here with the efficacy of the gods (again Herodotus 9.120.2).


[ back ] 1. See Ch. 8§17 and following, with commentary on the relationship between aitiā ‘cause’ in the prooemium and aitioi ‘responsible, guilty’ in 1.1.1 of Herodotus.

[ back ] 2. See Ch. 8§3.

[ back ] 3. Snell 1924.59–71. On the word histōr see also Dewald 1987, especially p. 153n18, with further bibliography.

[ back ] 4. For the semantics of histōr as ‘he who knows’, Snell, p. 60n3, cites eidotes ‘they who know’ in the sense of ‘witnesses’ at Demosthenes 55.9, 11ff, 35, and at Isocrates 17.44. He also adduces (ibid.) the rare and apparently Solonian word idūos/eidūos, cited by Eustathius as a synonym of histōr in the context of Iliad XVIII 501. As an agent noun, histōr is not to be linked with eidenai ‘know’ only, to the exclusion of idein ‘see’: see Snell, p. 61, on the expression Ἡρακλῆα μεγάλων ἐπιίστορα ἔργων ‘Herakles, the one who experienced deeds of enormity’ at Odyssey xxi 26, where epi-histōr ‘he who experiences’ is to be derived from ep-idein (not ep-eidenai), as in κακὰ πόλλ’ ἐπιδόντα ‘having experienced many evil happenings’ at Iliad XXII 61. Cf. Ch. 8§23.

[ back ] 5. In Boeotian inscriptions histōr seems to be used in contexts where other dialects would feature martūs ‘witness’ (e.g., DGE 491.18, 492.7, 503a.28, 511.7, 512.6, 523.64). In line with such oath-expressions as ἴστω νῦν Ζεύς ‘may Zeus now be witness’ (e.g., Iliad X 329), we may note that the gods are called upon as histores ‘witnesses’ and as sun-(h)istores in the sworn declaration quoted by Thucydides 2.74.3.

[ back ] 6. Snell, p. 60n4, who also adduces the entry ep-ēkooi in Hesychius s.v.

[ back ] 7. Snell, p. 60. The only other attestation of histōr in the Iliad/Odyssey is at XXIII 486, where Idomeneus suggests to Ajax that they call on Agamemnon as histōr to settle a dispute that they are having.

[ back ] 8. In my interpretation of this scene, I am guided primarily by the analysis of L. Muellner (1976.100–106).

[ back ] 9. The setting of the litigation is an agorā ‘assembly’: Iliad XVIII 497.

[ back ] 10. See Muellner, pp. 100–106 on the juridical sense of eukheto here, for which there is a striking parallel in the use of e-u-ke-to = eukhetoi ‘makes a claim’ in the Linear B texts (Pylos tablets Ep 704 and Eb 297). Muellner also points out (ibid.) that the defendant in the Iliad passage is addressing his claim to an entity called the dēmos (δήμῳ πιφαύσκων XVIII 500), the same word that is attested as da-mo = dāmos in the litigation recorded in one of the same Linear B texts that feature the verb e-u-ke-to = eukhetoi ‘makes a claim’ (Ep 704). In this context the dāmos actually figures as one of the parties involved in the litigation (the other party is a i-je-re-ja = hiereia ‘priestess’). The role of the dāmos here is in line with the following definition of dāmos as used in the Linear B texts: “An administrative entity endowed with a juridical function” (formulation by Lejeune 1965.12). Similarly in Homeric diction dēmos can have the sense of ‘district’ (e.g., Iliad V 710; XVI 437, 514); in fact this sense may well be primary (cf. N 1979.149n6; also p. 56 above). In the context of an agorā ‘assembly’ (Odyssey ii 7, 10, 26; note again that the setting of the litigation depicted on the Shield takes place in an agorā: see n9)—which is the occasion for agoreuein ‘speaking publicly’ (Odyssey ii 15)—what a speaker says in public is technically dēmion ‘of the dēmos’ = public business for the dēmos (Odyssey ii 32, 44), as opposed to private business (ἐμὸν αὐτοῦ χρεῖος ii 45). The act of publicly saying what is dēmion is conveyed by the two verbs piphausketai ‘declares’ and agoreuei ‘speaks publicly’ (ii 32 and 44, respectively), the first of which is also found in collocation with dēmos at Iliad XVIII 500: dēmōi piphauskōn ‘declaring to the dēmos’. What is being declared to/in the public, the dēmos, is being made public, that is, dēmion.

[ back ] 11. Here I am following the interpretation of Muellner 1976.105–106 (‘but he said that he would accept nothing’), who notes the modal implication of negative mēden as opposed to ouden.

[ back ] 12. This passage figures prominently in the discussion that follows. Note the expression καί ῥ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἐν δήμῳ μένει αὐτοῦ πόλλ’ ἀποτείσας ‘and he stays in the dēmos, making a big payment’ here at Iliad IX 634, in light of the discussion at Ch. 9§1.

[ back ] 13. Another sign that it is inconclusive: the defendant rather than the plaintiff is represented as speaking first.

[ back ] 14. For a parallel collocation of skēptron with the verb aïssō, see Iliad III 216.

[ back ] 15. The process whereby a formula is offered for resolution is designated by the verb dikazō ‘render judgment’ (δίκαζον XVIII 506); the notion of pronouncing the most equitable formula is equated with pronouncing dikē ‘judgment’ in the most correct way, that is, ‘in the straightest manner’ (ὃς μετὰ τοῖσι δίκην ἰθύντατα εἴποι 508).

[ back ] 16. Muellner 1976.101, following the grammatical analysis of Iliad XVIII 500 by Corlu 1966.331–336, remarks that the interpretation of ἀναίνετο μηδὲν ἑλέσθαι as ‘he [= the plaintiff] said that he would accept nothing’ makes the conflict “dramatic.”

[ back ] 17. On the formulaic parallelism of apoina and poinē, see Muellner, p. 102n11.

[ back ] 18. See Muellner, p. 106.

[ back ] 19. See Ch. 9§2.

[ back ] 20. On the definition of the identity of a person by way of identifying with others, that is, by way of measuring the relative closeness of this person to others in a group, where the notion of closeness is expressed by way of the word philos ‘near and dear’, see N 1979.102–111.

[ back ] 21. This argument is undercut by the par-ainesis of Phoenix (on which see Ch. 6§88), as understood by Achilles: see N pp. 105–111.

[ back ] 22. The argument of Phoenix is in turn undercut by his own story: see ibid.

[ back ] 23. The topic of Patroklos as the ritual substitute and thereby the other self of Achilles has been examined extensively in N 1979.32–34, 292–294; also Sinos 1980 and Lowenstam 1981.

[ back ] 24. Cf. also Iliad XXIV 137, 139, 276, 502, 555, 579, 594, 686.

[ back ] 25. In this connection I draw attention to the use of the word sēma to denote the device on a shield, that is, the images on a warrior’s shield that convey his identity: see Euripides Electra 456, with reference to the Shield of Achilles. On the various sēmata in the Seven against Thebes of Aeschylus (e.g., 643), see Zeitlin 1982.

[ back ] 26. See N 1979.113, 183.

[ back ] 27. Cf. Muellner 1976.105–106; also N, pp. 109–110, 312.

[ back ] 28. See Ch. 8§41. That the dishonoring of Achilles by Agamemnon is a matter of Agamemnon’s atē is already indicated by Achilles at Iliad I 412. That this atē was inflicted by Zeus is admitted by Achilles at XIX 270–274. In this same passage it is also made clear that the atē of Agamemnon caused the anger of Achilles.

[ back ] 29. The atē that is to befall Achilles is indicated at Iliad IX 502–512, where Phoenix tells of the atē that is to befall those who reject the Litai, goddesses of supplication personified (502–512). See Ch. 8§41. The Litai are said to heal the atē committed by wrongdoers when these wrongdoers offer compensation for such atē (502–507)—a reference to the atē that Agamemnon admits having committed and for which he stands ready to offer apoina ‘compensation’ (115–120, apoina at 120). In rejecting the Litai, one is rejecting the process whereby compensation can be awarded for damage suffered—and the word for ‘damage’ here is Atē personified (504, 505); compare the juridical attestations of atē in this sense, as discussed at Ch. 8§43. The punishment for such refusal is another round of atē—this time suffered by the one who rejects the Litai (510–512). For Achilles, this atē would be the death of Patroklos, who personally experiences atē, at the moment of his death, in the form of an aberration of the senses (XVI 685–687; 804–806; atē at 805). At XIX 270–274, Achilles seems to realize that both he and Agamemnon have been afflicted with atē. On this passage Michel 1983.298–299 comments: “Achilles now realizes to his horror that what had seemed to be his own intention and resolve was really the mysterious will of the god working through him. That sickening sense of the temporary alienation of one’s will is what the realization of one’s own atē always involves.”

[ back ] 30. Iliad XVIII 506: ἀμοιβηδὶς δὲ δίκαζον ‘they took turns in rendering dikē [= judgment]’; the prize is to go to ὃς μετὰ τοῖσι δίκην ἰθύντατα εἴποι ‘the one among them who pronounces dikē in the straightest way’ (508).

[ back ] 31. The ideal king is described as ‘sorting out the divine laws [= themis in the plural]’ (διακρίνοντα θέμιστας Theogony 85) by way of his ‘straight judgments [ dikē in the plural]’ (ἰθείῃσι δίκῃσιν Theogony 86). We may compare the depiction of the ideal histōr ‘arbitrator’ on the Shield of Achilles as ‘the one among them who pronounces dikē in the straightest way’ (Iliad XVIII 508); see n30.

[ back ] 32. See Ch. 9§1.

[ back ] 33. Note the wording of Theogony 88–90: τοὔνεκα γὰρ βασιλῆες ἐχέφρονες, οὕνεκα λαοῖς | βλαπτομένοις ἀγορῆφι μετάτροπα ἔργα τελεῦσι | ῥηϊδίως, μαλακοῖσι παραιφάμενοι ἐπέεσσιν ‘It is for this reason that there are kings, sound of mind, namely, because they can easily turn right around the [wrong] things | that are done to people who are wronged in the public assembly [agorā]. | They can do it by persuasion, using soft words’.

[ back ] 34. I have not followed the reading βασιλεῦσ’ ἐρέω of West 1978.205.

[ back ] 35. Cf. West, pp. 205–206.

[ back ] 36. This unsound dikē at Works and Days 39, pronounced by kings who are described as dōrophagoi ‘those who devour gifts’ (ibid.; also 9§20), is mentioned again at Works and Days 249 and 269 (cf. also 264); cf. N 1982.58–60.

[ back ] 37. The ainos ‘fable’ of “The Hawk and the Nightingale” is told at Works and Days 202–212. The hawk seizes the nightingale, described as an aoidos ‘singer’ (that is, ‘poet’: see Works and Days 208), on the premise that might makes right (I paraphrase 206, 207, 210), and he boasts of having the ultimate power of either releasing or devouring his victim (209). On the importance of this ainos, as a bird omen, in the overall structure of the Works and Days, see 2§27.

[ back ] 38. The “moral” of the fable becomes clear at Works and Days 274–285: Perses is urged to espouse dikē in the ultimate sense of ‘justice’ (275, 278, 279, 283), for those without it will devour each other like wild beasts (276–278). The parallel with the hawk, whose stance of might makes right corresponds to the stance of kings (n37), imposes itself. As for dikē in the ultimate sense of ‘justice’, I argue in N 1982.57–61 that dikē is ‘judgment’ in an immediate sense, as at Works and Days 39, 249, 269 (n36), and that this ‘judgment’ becomes ‘justice’ (personified as the goddess Dikē, Works and Days 256) only with the passage of time, under the supervision of the gods (Works and Days 217–218; cf. Solon F 4.14–16 W). Further, I argue (ibid.) that the Works and Days dramatizes the actual passage of time required for the workings of Dikē to take effect, so that the faulty ‘judgment’ of the kings (dikē at Works and Days 39, 249, 269) may be transformed eventually into the ‘justice’ of Zeus (dikē at Works and Days 256,275, etc.).

[ back ] 39. See Ch. 9§7.

[ back ] 40. N 1982.58.

[ back ] 41. N, pp. 58–60.

[ back ] 42. This time the verb dia-krīnō is in the middle voice, whence the translation ‘let us sort out for ourselves’; contrast the active voice of dia-krīnō at Theogony 85 (διακρίνοντα θέμιστας), where the agent is the ideal king.

[ back ] 43. Cf. N, p. 60; this view differs from that of West 1978.151, who tentatively retrojects to the life and times of Hesiod the testimony of Diodorus Siculus 4.29.4 about the rulers of Thespiai.

[ back ] 44. On the correlation of ritual and ethical correctness, see N, p. 61.

[ back ] 45. N, p. 60. For a comparative study of the theme of “ruler’s truth,” see Watkins 1979; cf. also Martin 1984.

[ back ] 46. On this subject, cf. N 1983.198–203; cf. N 1979.120§3n3.

[ back ] 47. Further details in N 1982.52–53.

[ back ] 48. This point about the nature of any theogony is argued in N, p. 56. A survey of theogonic traditions native to diverse societies of the world reveals that a basic function of a theogony is to confirm the authority that regulates a given social group. The authority figure of the king symbolically incorporates society in that the king embodies the community through his status as the very incarnation of the body politic. Cf. Ch. 6§23.

[ back ] 49. On the Panhellenism of the Hesiodic Theogony: N 1982.51–57.

[ back ] 50. Cf. Ch. 8§39.

[ back ] 51. Cf. Ch. 8§20, 8§25, and following.

[ back ] 52. Ibid.

[ back ] 53. Cf. Ch. 9§1.

[ back ] 54. Ibid.

[ back ] 55. The wording of Herodotus 2.99.1 is worth scrutiny: μέχρι μὲν τούτου ὄψις τε ἐμὴ καὶ γνώμη καὶ ἱστορίη ταῦτα λέγουσά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦδε Αἰγυπτίους ἔρχομαι λόγους ἐρέων κατὰ τὰ ἤκουον· προσέσται δέ τι αὐτοῖσι καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς ὄψιος ‘up to this point it is my opsis [= seeing] and gnōmē [= judgment] and historiā that is saying these things, but from this point onward I am going to tell the Egyptian accounts according to what I heard; to which will be added a portion that will be my own opsis’.

[ back ] 56. Note again the wording of this passage, Herodotus 2.29.1: ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ἐδυνάμην πυθέσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοσόνδε μὲν ἄλλο ἐπὶ μακρότατον ἐπυθόμην, μέχρι μὲν Ἐλεφαντίνης πόλιος αὐτόπτης ἐλθών, τὸ δ’ ἀπὸ τούτου ἀκοῇ ἤδη ἱστορέων ‘I was unable to ascertain anything from any other person [except the aforementioned], having gone as autoptēs [= eyewitness] as far as the polis of Elephantine, but from there on conducting the historiā by way of akoē [= hearing]’. Cf. Herodotus 2.123.1.

[ back ] 57. Cf. Ch. 9§1 and following.

[ back ] 58. Benveniste 1973.527 = 1969 ΙΙ 278; this example is cited in the context of Benveniste’s discussion of Latin superstes as a witness “who has his being beyond,” one “who stands over the matter” (p. 526 = 1969 II 276).

[ back ] 59. Benveniste, pp. 396–397 = 1969 II 119–122.

[ back ] 60. Benveniste, pp. 397–398 = 1969 ΙΙ 121–122. See also Benveniste, pp. 389–392 = 1969 II 111–113 on this same word iūdex, a compound built from iūs in the sense of ‘juridical formula’ and from the root *deik-/*dik- as in dīcō ‘say’ (note the collocation iūs dīcere) or in the dic– of dicis causā ‘for the sake of proper form’. I should draw special attention to a derivative of dic-, in-dic-āre, the English borrowing of which, indicate, I have been using to translate Greek sēmainō. The Latin dīcō is cognate with Greek deik-nu-mi ‘show, indicate, make manifest’; moreover, Latin dic– as in dicis causā and in-dic-āre is cognate with Greek dikē ‘judgment, justice’. In this light ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ‘the apo-deixis of the historiā’ in the prooemium of Herodotus becomes all the more pertinent.

[ back ] 61. The pertinence of arbiter to histōr is brought up at a later point in Benveniste’s discussion, 1973.442 = 1969 II 174–175, in another connection.

[ back ] 62. I have in mind the oath expressions cited at n5 above. We may also compare the invisible phulakes ‘guardians’ of Dikē ‘justice’ at Hesiod Works and Days 124–126, as discussed in N 1979.153; also the theme of the Eye of Zeus at Works and Days 267–269, as discussed in N 1983.42–43.

[ back ] 63. Cf. Ch. 8§20, 8§25 and following.

[ back ] 64. See Ch. 8§27.

[ back ] 65. Cf. Ch. 8§39.

[ back ] 66. The derivation of eidos ‘visible form’ from the verb represented by the aorist *u̯id- of idein ‘see’ is pertinent to the semantics of historiā as discussed at Ch. 9§1 and following.

[ back ] 67. The passage is quoted at Ch. 8§2. Note again the etymological pertinence of Latin in-dic-āre, as discussed at Ch. 9§58.

[ back ] 68. Ch. 6, Ch.7.

[ back ] 69. Cf. Ch. 8§1 and following.

[ back ] 70. Cf. Ch. 8§49.

[ back ] 71. Ibid.

[ back ] 72. Cf. Ch. 8§34 and following.

[ back ] 73. That the Lydians are characterized by what is habron ‘luxuriant’ is a theme also reflected in the epithet pod-(h)abros ‘with a footstep that is luxuriant [habros]’ applied to Croesus the Lydian in the oracular pronouncement at Delphi as quoted at Herodotus 1.55.2 (ποδαβρέ). I suggest that the notion of foot in this epithet can refer not only to a graceful step but even to its corresponding mimesis, a graceful dance-step, as conveyed, for example, by the use of ἁβροβάται in Aeschylus Persians 1073 (for the diction, cf. ἁβρὸν βαίνουσα παλλεύκῳ ποδί in Euripides Medea 1164; cf. also 830). For a possible reference to an ungraceful dance-step, as a mimesis of hubris, cf. Sophocles Oedipus Tyrannus 878.

[ back ] 74. To quote from Herodotus 1.71.2: χώρην ἔχοντες τρηχέαν ‘having a harsh country’. On the detail of the leather clothing worn by the Persians before they became contaminated by the Lydians, at 1.71.2, cf. Ch. 13§16.

[ back ] 75. Phylarchus uses the expression εἰς τρυφὴν ἐξώκειλαν ‘they [= the Colophonians] ran aground on truphē [= luxuriance]’ (FGH 81 F 66). Elsewhere he uses the expression ἐξοκείλαντες εἰς τρυφήν ‘running aground on truphē’ in describing the luxuriance of the people of Sybaris (Phylarchus 81 F 45 in Athenaeus 521c). After this description Phylarchus uses the expression ἐξοκείλαντες εἰς ὕβριν ‘running aground on hubris’ in describing the savage behavior of the people of Sybaris (81 F 45 in Athenaeus 521d): they had murdered the ambassadors of the people of Croton and cast out their corpses to be devoured by wild animals. That was the beginning of the misfortunes of Sybaris, reports Phylarchus, μηνίσαντος τοῦ δαιμονίου ‘because of the anger [mēnis] of the daimonion [= power of the daimōn]’ (ibid.); the anger is manifested by portents: the statue of Hera vomits bile and a fountain of blood erupts in her shrine. In this story, as elsewhere, the luxuriance of a society goes hand in hand with a propensity to savage behavior. For the nautical image of ‘running aground on truphē/hubris’, compare Theognis 855–856: the city often runs aground, like a veering ship, because of the degeneration of its élite. On the equivalence of habrosunē and truphē as ‘luxuriance’, see Knox 1984.

[ back ] 76. The whole passage of Xenophanes as quoted by Phylarchus FGH 81 F 66 should be compared with a passage about the luxuriance of the Samians, ascribed to Asius and quoted by Duris of Samos FGH 76 F 60 in Athenaeus 525e-f.

[ back ] 77. That this theme is linked ultimately with the ktisis ‘foundation’/‘colonization’ of Colophon is suggested by another text, Mimnermus F 9.3–4 W, where the actual colonizers of Colophon, the speaker included, are characterized as βίην ὑπέροπλον ἔχοντες ‘men of overweening violence [biē]’ and ὕβριος ἡγεμόνες ‘leaders of hubris’. Further discussion in N 1985.52–53.

[ back ] 78. On the eventual domination of Colophon and Smyrna by Lydia, see Jeffery 1976.224–225. In his own narrative Herodotus chooses not to present these instances of the domination of Hellenes by previous tyrants of Lydia as equivalent to the later domination by Croesus. The effect is to sharpen the parallelism between the Lydian Empire of Croesus and the Athenian Empire, on which theme see Ch. 8§20, 10§49 and following.

[ back ] 79. The sources that make this story explicit are Strabo 14.1.40 C647 and Athenaeus 525c. The disasters befalling Magnesia are compounded: apparently after their capture by the Ephesians, Magnesia was destroyed by the invading Cimmerians (Strabo ibid.). On the grounds that Callinus (F 3 W) mentions the Magnesians as still flourishing while Archilochus (F 20 W) refers to their misfortunes at the hands of their enemies, Strabo (ibid.) and Clement (Stromateis 1.131.7–8) reason that Callinus is an earlier poet than Archilochus. Such reasoning, perpetuated in latter-day scholarship on the Greek lyric poets, should be subject to doubt in view of the poetic device where the poet is presented as foreseeing a disaster that is yet to befall a community (on this theme see, for example, Solon F 9 W and the commentary in N 1985.45; also Theognis 39–52 and 1081–1082b, to be discussed immediately below).

[ back ] 80. An important variant, Theognis 39–52, is taken up in the discussion that immediately follows.

[ back ] 81. On euthunō ‘straighten, correct’ in the sense of ‘check the growth of a plant, prune’ as a metaphor for dikē ‘justice’, see N 1985.61; cf. Michelini 1978.

[ back ] 82. See Ch. 6§62, 6§64; 12§55.

[ back ] 83. Ibid.

[ back ] 84. The élite behave as follows: each of them strives eagerly for aretē ‘excellence’, and great hatreds break out as a result (again Herodotus 3.83.3). Compare Theognis 401–406: the man who is too eager for aretē and seeks kerdos ‘personal gain’ commits a grave error: his divine punishment is that he thinks that kaka ‘bad things’ are agatha ‘good’ and the other way around. On kerdos as a potential aspect of hubris, see Theognis 46 and 50; also 835, discussed at Ch. 10§3.

[ back ] 85. See Ch. 6§62 and following.

[ back ] 86. Cf. the testimonia collected at Archilochus F 19 W, most notably Etymologicum Gudianum s.v. τύραννος, where we learn that the word turannos is derived from an epithet of Gyges as King of Lydia—a piece of information inferred apparently from the actual poetry of Archilochus. Also, I draw attention to the use of the word turannos for the title of Croesus as King of the Lydian Empire (e.g., Herodotus 1.6.1; cf. especially the use of turannis in the context of 1.14.1). As we shall see in detail later at Ch. 10§3 and following, the supreme generosity of Croesus in his public display of material offerings to Apollo at Delphi (Herodotus 1.50.1–1.53–2) is a traditional theme in the epinician lyric poetry of Pindar and Bacchylides, directly compared to the generosity of Hieron as Tyrant of Syracuse. It is in this context that we can understand the nonpejorative application of the word turannos to Hieron, as in Pindar Pythian 3.85, discussed in Ch. 6§55 and following. It is also in this context that we can understand the naming of an otherwise unknown Athenian as Kroisos = Croesus, memorialized in an inscription at the base of a kouros-statue, on which see Ch. 6§22.

[ back ] 87. I say seemingly because we have to reckon with the political relations of Megara as mother city with its daughter cities, on which subject see Ch. 2§37n96.

[ back ] 88. In the context of Theognis 681–682: Ch. 6§4 and following; also 6§62, 6§65, and following.

[ back ] 89. Cf. Ch. 9§18.

[ back ] 90. This other aspect has already emerged in the discussion at Ch. 9§18 of Phylarchus 81 F 45, where the savagery of the people of Sybaris is parallel to their luxuriance.

[ back ] 91. Cf. Apollodorus 2.5.4 (Pholos the Centaur eats his own portions of meat raw) and the comments at N 1985.51§39n2.

[ back ] 92. Cf. Ch. 9§22 above.

[ back ] 93. This image of savages seems to be a reflex of poetic traditions describing colonization, where the polis of transplanted Hellenes is surrounded by local barbarians: see Ch. 2§37n96. In Theognis 53–68, the equation of ethically inferior citizens with sociopolitically inferior savages who threaten the polis from the outside (cf. N 1985.44§29n4, 51§39n2, 54) may convey a colonial point of view adopted from a daughter city on the coast of the Black Sea: see Figueira 1985.129.

[ back ] 94. The luxuriance of the Persians is a dominant theme in the Persians of Aeschylus; cf. the use of habros and its derivatives at lines 41, 135, 1072.

[ back ] 95. Cf. Ch. 9§18.

[ back ] 96. A survey of passages in N 1979:163. Cf. also, for example, Herodotus 3.80.4.

[ back ] 97. On the ainos as a discourse with one code that bears at least two messages: Ch. 6§4.

[ back ] 98. For a detailed discussion of the hero cult of Protesilaos, see Boedeker 1988; some of her conclusions, reached independently, concerning the deployment of the Protesilaos story in the narrative of Herodotus coincide with those presented in N 1987c; the main points of the latter article are recast in what follows.

[ back ] 99. See N 1985.76–77, 81§79n1, especially with reference to the riddle in Theognis 1209–1210; see also Edmunds 1981, especially p. 223n8, with reference to Sophocles Oedipus at Colonus 627 and other related passages involving oikos and its derivatives.

[ back ] 100. Cf. Ch. 6§6, 6§65, and following. Cf. N 1985.22–24, 76–78. On ainigma ‘riddle’ as a derivative of ainos: N 1979.240–241.

[ back ] 101. I translate tarīkhos generally as ‘preserved’ rather than specifically as ‘dried’, ‘smoked’, ‘salted’, or ‘pickled’; that brine or salt is used for the process of tarīkheusis ‘preservation’ is evident from Herodotus 4.53.3 (also 2.77.4).

[ back ] 102. Chantraine DELG 1094 s.v. tarīkhos allows for the possibility that this word is connected with tarkhuō. At p. 1095 s.v. tarkhuō, where he follows the evidence presented by Laroche 1958.98–99 and Heubeck 1959.32–35, Chantraine concedes that tarkhuō was a borrowing from an Indo-European language of Anatolia—whether that language be Hittite, Luvian, or Lycian. But here (p. 1095) he goes on to deny the connection that he mentioned as a possibility at p. 1094. On the meaning of tarkhuō, see N 1983b and Schein 1984.48. Cf. also Boedeker 1988.40–41.

[ back ] 103. For tarīkhos/tarīkheuō as ‘mummy/mummify’, see especially Herodotus 2.85–2.89, with a detailed description of the process of mummification. Cf. also Plato Phaedo 80c.

[ back ] 104. We may compare the everyday and the hieratic or mystical sense of olbios, as discussed at Ch. 8§45–46.

[ back ] 105. Lloyd 1976.354–355.

[ back ] 106. Lloyd, p. 18, cites Herodotus 2.61, 2.86, 2.132, 2.170, and 2.171. It seems that this mystical procedure was named after Osiris, the prototype of immortalization (ibid.).

[ back ] 107. For more on this theme, see N 1985.68–81; also 1983.54n55. Again we may compare the everyday and the mystical meanings of olbios as discussed at Ch. 8§45.

[ back ] 108. I follow the edition of van Thiel 1974. In using this source, I have benefited from the advice of M. N. Nagler.

[ back ] 109. See van Thiel 1974.178.

[ back ] 110. On the mummy of Alexander, see Pfister II 422n33; also I 178, 192, 296; II 434–436, and 584. The tomb of Alexander at Alexandria was officially known as the Sēma ‘Tomb’: Strabo 17.1.8 C794. Also as Sōma ‘Body’: Alexander Romance 3.34.5. On the relationship of sēma ‘tomb’ and sōma ‘body’ in the context of Alexander’s place of entombment in Alexandria, see van Thiel 1974.195.

[ back ] 111. See N 1979.189–192 for documentation; note too that both of these names are associated with the mystical theme of being struck by lightning. On the association, at Hesiod Works and Days 172, of the word olbioi with the heroes who inhabit the Islands of the Blessed, see N 1979.170§30n2.

[ back ] 112. Yet even if the Hellenes were in the right, the way in which the Asians were in the wrong corresponds to the way in which the Athenian Empire was in the wrong: on this point see Ch. 10§49 and following.

[ back ] 113. For more on this double meaning, see Sinos 1980:48–49 on Iliad XXIII 326/331; also N 1983:45–48.

[ back ] 114. For the intervention of the hero into the present, through the medium of the ainos, see Ch. 6§87 and following.