Lastly, compare Latin mēns ‘mind’ with Greek μένοc ‘power, faculty’; formally, gēns is to genus as mens is to *menus, the would-be cognate of μένοc.

In view of such formal indications that Greek μένοc is related to Latin mēns, I propose that the noun μένοc is derived from the verbal root *men- as in μι-μν-ῄcκω, just as γένοc is derived from *gen- as in γί-γν- ομαι. The actual context of μένοc in the traditional diction of Epic corroborates this proposed etymology. In order to fight bravely, the Homeric hero has to be reminded of his μένοc, or power, whence such expressions as ἀλκῆc μνηcαμένω (Ν 48). By contrast, forgetting one’s power is losing one’s power: μένεοc ἀλκῆc τε λάθωμαι (Χ 282).

On the thematic level, reminders of the {266|267} hero’s power come from the gods. For example, at the beginning of the Odyssey, Athena helps Telemachos prove his manhood by her frequent interventions. In one of these interventions she assumes the form of a person called Μέν-τηc (α 105ff). This name, from a purely morphological standpoint, should be expected to mean ‘he who reminds’. Before setting out from Olympus to help Telemachos, Athena declares her intention with these words (α 88f):

Hence μέν-οc is actually being infused by Μέν-τηc. In other words, I propose that an etymology of μένοc may be derived from the internal thematic and formulaic evidence of Homeric diction. Later on, her task accomplished, Athena flies off in the form of a bird, and we hear the following account of what she has done (α 320ff):

Elsewhere, Athena encourages Telemachos by {267|268} assuming the form of Μέν-τωρ (β 268) and saying (β 270f):

Elsewhere again, Athena in the form of Μέντωρ goads Odysseus into fighting the suitors by saying (χ 226):

Of course, such chiding words are all that the old warrior needs to have his μένοc roused. Similarly, Apollo turns Hektor back from flight by encouraging him in the form of one Μέν-τηc (Ρ 73).

Faced with the ambivalence of μήδεα, meaning both ‘thoughts’ and ‘genitals’, we are led to ask which of these two basic meanings is appropriate to ἄφθιτα. From a contextual survey of verbs with root φθι- in Greek Epic, the fact emerges that nowhere are they linked with the notion of mental faculty. By contrast, verbs with this root φθι- designate the wasting-away not only of the whole person but also of various parts of the body, such as the heart (κῆρ: Α 491), {269|270} cheeks (παρειαί: θ 530), complexion (χρώc: π 145). Also, the wasting-away of wine (οἶνοc: ι 163) or of food (ἤϊα: μ 329). Also, the wasting-away of the physical faculties, μένεα (δ 363):

Finally, the wasting-away of progeny (δ 740f):

We may conclude that μήδεα in the sense of ‘thoughts’ is inappropriate to the known contexts of φθι- in general and ἄφθιτο- in particular. From the contextual evidence of the latter, as well as from the comparative contextual evidence of Rig-Vedic ákṣita-, we may also infer that ἄφθιτα μήδεα means ‘unfailing genitals’. Yet the sense of ‘genitals’ seems inappropriate when μήδεα is in collocation with εἰδώc ‘knowing’ (Ω 88):

For a solution, let us refer to the epic contexts of μήδεα and of the verb from which μήδεα is derived, namely μήδομαι ‘think, plan, devise’. {270|271}

Our point of departure is that a human can only know so much, as Hera declares in her contrast of humanity with her own divinity (Σ 363):

Now if a human devises (μήδεται), his devices (μήδεα) are also human; but if a supernatural being devises, these devices are supernatural and should be respected or feared accordingly by humans. For example, we find that even though the goddess Kalypso condescends to the mortal Odysseus, he dares not accept her on human terms. She devised for him a way to return home (μήδετο πομπήν: ε 233), but when she had initially offered to do so (ε 160-170), Odysseus had refused her offer. After all, why should a goddess devise as a human devises? There must be something sinister to it all, says he (ε 173):

The suspicion that Odysseus harbors towards the gods is well founded, as we latter-day humans must concede after noting all the Homeric instances of μήδομαι with a god as subject; the context is regularly sinister (for example, Β 38, Η 478, Ξ 253, γ 132, ξ 243, ω 96). The Kalypso passage at hand happens to contain the only {271|272} notable exception. All the same, the poor goddess is forced to make a declaration on her own divine terms (swearing by the Styx), rather than on human terms, before she is believed by Odysseus. After swearing by the Styx, however, she descends to the human level again (ε 188ff):

Of course Kalypso the goddess would never be in such need as Odysseus the human: she is simply looking for a human frame of reference. Accordingly, there is not much that is supernatural about the craft which Odysseus builds from what Kalypso supplies (ε 233ff): the material is natural, the tools are natural, even the drinks and food are natural—no nectar and ambrosia. The μηδοίμην of Kalypso is kept on human terms, with no magic. Otherwise, however, μήδομαι regularly connotes supernatural faculties in the context of the divine or even the part-divine. A case in point is the name of the witch par excellence, Μήδεια.

A dramatic example of the verb itself, μήδομαι, occurs in this passage describing the {272|273} cosmic potency of Demeter (Hymn to Demeter 351ff):

This usage of μήδομαι corresponds with μήδεα, attested in the same context (Hymn to Demeter 452f):

It is tempting to translate ‘by the magic power of Demeter’, from the human point of view. One who knows the supernatural has power over the natural. Thus Zeus has supreme power because he has supreme knowledge; the agent-noun of μήδομαι is μήcτωρ, and Zeus by his own boast is the supreme deviser, the ὕπατοc μήcτωρ (Θ 22). Zeus urges the other gods to find out for themselves, in the following test (Θ 19ff):

This ultimate feat of strength is based on magical power which is based on supreme knowledge: to know is to know how, and Zeus is the ὕπατοc μήcτωρ. To be all-knowing is to be all- powerful. Zeus became supreme god because he became supreme magician. The supreme magician before him was his father Κρόνοc, with the suitable epic epithet ἀγκυλομήτηc ‘devious-minded’. How, then, did Zeus usurp the power of Kronos? Not by killing him but simply by outwitting him, as we see in Hesiod’s Theogony (464f):

Even the contexts of ἄφθιτα μήδεα εἰδώc relate to these two inherent notions of generative and mental power:

1. Hesiod, Theogony 559, Works and Days 54. In these passages alone, the epithet [ἄφθιτα] μήδεα εἰδώc does not describe Zeus. Rather, it describes the Titan Prometheus, wizard par excellence, who challenged the power of Zeus (Theogony 534):

Prometheus is regularly described by epithets connoting magical powers, such as αἰολόμητιν (Theogony 511), ποικιλόβουλον (521), δολοφρονέων (550), πολύιδριν (616), and, most important, ἀγκυλομήτηc (546). The latter epithet of Prometheus (also in Works and Days 48) is otherwise reserved exclusively for Kronos, just as the epithet ἄφθιτα μήδεα εἰδώc is otherwise reserved exclusively for Zeus. A possibly related detail: Prometheus has an unfailing ἧπαρ (Theogony 523ff).

2. Hesiod, Theogony 545, 550, 561. Zeus is ἄφθιτα μήδεα εἰδώc as he matches the wiles of Prometheus; finally, Prometheus is defeated {276|277} (Theogony 614ff).

3. Hymn to Aphrodite 43. Zeus is ἄφθιτα μήδεα εἰδώc as he makes Hera, daughter of Kronos and his own sister, his bedmate.

5. Hymn to Demeter 321. Iris the Messenger goes to the overtly cosmic deity Demeter and announces that Zeus is calling her; Zeus had just comprehended that Demeter was suspending all fertility in the universe (313):

… Ζεὺc ἐνόηcεν ἑῷ τ’ ἐφράccατο θυμῷ

“Zeus took note and thought it over in his θυμόc”